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JPRS-NEA-86-013

3 February 1986

Near East/South Asia Report

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3 February 1986

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Kuwaiti Paper Reveals 'Secret' Libyan-Tunisian Relations (AL-QABAS, 4 Jan 86)	1
Islamic Development Bank Funding Plans (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 22 Nov 85)	3
ALECSO Conference Addressed by PLO Delegate Milhim (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 28 Dec 85)	5
Asian Workers in Gulf Face Unemployment (AL-HAWADITH, 6 Dec 85)	6
Briefs	
Two More Dailies	9
Pollution Problems	9

ARAB AFRICA

ALGERIA

Briefs	
Iranian Ambassador Received	10
Ghanaian Envoy Received	10
Algerian Role in Burkina-Mali Dispute	10
Crude Oil Discovery	10
French-Algerian Documents Signed	11
Verdicts in Coup Attempt	11
Verdicts for Tract Distribution	11

EGYPT

Government Statement on Economy Called Good Beginning ('Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql; AL-AHRAM, 6 Dec 85).....	13
Subsidies Crucial Factor in Economic Problems (Sharif al-'Abd; AL-AHRAM, 6 Dec 85).....	15
Minister of Industry Discusses Problems of Public Sector (Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab Interview; AL-AHRAM, 25 Oct 85)..	18
Briefs	
Annual SLP Conference Postponed	27
Local Official Sentenced	27

LIBYA

Tripoli Comments on U.S. Threat to Libya (Voice of Greater Arab Homeland, 22 Dec 85).....	28
Tripoli Radio Solicits Listeners' Contributions (Voice of Greater Arab Homeland, 2 Jan '86).....	30

SUDAN

Ba'th Leader Calls for End of September Laws (AL-DUSTUR, 23 Dec 85).....	31
---	----

TUNISIA

Tunisian Scholar on Tunisia-Libya, Government-UGTT Relations (Mohcen Toumi Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 2 Dec 85).....	33
--	----

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

ISRAEL

Development of Battle Systems (MA'ARAKHOT, Jul-Aug 85).....	38
--	----

LEBANON

Chief of Parliament Holds Hope for National Conciliation (Husayn al-Husayni Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 21-27 Oct 85).....	45
Speaker of Parliament Discusses Political Situation (Husayn al-Husayni Interview; AL-DUSTUR, 14 Oct 85).....	58

Hizballah Guide Describes Tripoli Situation (Subhi al-Tufayli Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 14-20 Oct 85).....	62
Moslem Nationalist Leader Defines Policies (Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 14-20 Oct 85).....	68
Hard-Line Shiite Leader Discusses Positions, Policies (Husayn al-Musawi Interview; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 28 Oct-3 Nov 85).....	81
Various Forces in Sidon Anticipate Peace (Zaki Shihab; AL-MAJALLAH, 30 Oct-5 Nov 85).....	89

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Report on High-Level Palestinian Meeting (Diyab Nabhan; AL-TADAMUN, 30 Nov 85).....	95
PLO's Abu Iyad Comments on Amman Agreement (Abu Iyad Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 13 Dec 85).....	98
Palestinian Groups' Financial Activities Detailed (Salih Qallab; AL-MAJALLAH, 18-24 Dec 85).....	104
Frayj: Occupied Territories Are Being Swallowed Up (Ilyas Frayj Interview; AL-MAJALLAH, 18-24 Dec 85).....	109
Briefs Palestinian Economic Conference	113

SAUDI ARABIA

Corrosive, Immoral Effects of Bribery Categorized (AL-YAMAMAH, 11 Dec 85).....	114
Minister of Industry, Energy on Industrial Developments ('Abd-al 'Aziz al-Zamil Interview; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 24 Nov 85).....	129

SYRIA

National Leaders Honor Olive Industry (TISHRIN, 31 Oct 85).....	136
Various Tartus Governorate Projects Reviewed (Muhammad 'Ali 'Umran; TISHRIN, 22 Oct 85).....	139
New Road, Bridge Projects Carried Out Throughout Country ('Ali Ma'ruf; TISHRIN, 21 Oct 85).....	141

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Article Examines Mujahidin Effort Against Apathy (ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Dec 85).....	144
Leader Strives To Unite Mujahidin (ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Dec 85).....	146
Leader Gives Views on Resistance (ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Dec 85).....	148
Soviet Population Learning Price of War (ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, Dec 85).....	150
Moscow Advocates 'Dialogue' With Resistance (LE MONDE, 24 Dec 85).....	154
Resistance Becoming Professionalized (LE MONDE, 24 Dec 85).....	157
Pakistan's Strategic Position Increasing (LE MONDE, 24 Dec 85).....	162

INDIA

Refugee Problem Examined (Shadid Rahim; DINMAN, 24-30 Nov 85).....	165
---	-----

IRAN

Khomeyni Ends Speculations on Health, Accuses Western Press (QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, 2 Dec 85).....	169
Government Announces New Strategies, Policies (KEYHAN, 27 Oct 85).....	171
Fadlallah Gives Views on Present Lebanese Crisis (KEYHAN, 14 Nov 85).....	194

3 February 1986

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

KUWAITI PAPER REVEALS 'SECRET' LIBYAN-TUNISIAN RELATIONS

GF061530 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 4 Jan 86 p 20

[Text] Paris--Informed Arab diplomatic sources have disclosed to AL-QABAS that secret Libyan-Tunisian talks are currently being held in Paris in order to normalize relations between the two countries and to reach an understanding on how to settle existing differences between them 5 months after the crisis between them began and after Tunisia withdrew its ambassador from Tripoli.

The sources affirmed that these talks, which are being shrouded with secrecy, are being held at a high diplomatic level and that they are tackling the various sides of relations between the two countries. The sources indicated that four lengthy meetings have so far been held over the past 10 days. These meetings took place at a neutral place in Paris outside the embassies of the two countries.

The question being raised is: Who has given the green light for these talks to open a new page in the relations between Tunisia and Libya? High-level Arab sources have disclosed to AL-QABAS the secrets and dimensions of the Paris talks.

The story began in early November when Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi told the Libyan and Tunisian sides of his readiness and the readiness of the Arab League to make all the necessary efforts to normalize relations between the two countries. Contacts between Klibi and the Libyan and the Tunisian sides continued from which appeared a serious and strong Libyan readiness to open a new page with Tunisia. From these contacts also appeared a Tunisian readiness to discuss the means to overcome the crisis which severely strained relations between the two countries.

In this regard, AL-QABAS has learned that Libyan officials affirmed that the crisis with Tunisia should be settled in the framework of the Arab League. They indicated that they had turned down many proposals by foreign and African countries and parties to mediate between Libya and Tunisia. Among these proposals was one from the USSR and another from France. As a result of Klibi's contacts and efforts, an understanding was reached on a kind of time frame to reach a settlement to the Tunisian-Libyan crisis. This time frame include two major stages:

1. To halt propaganda campaigns between the two countries and to avoid everything that may strain relations between them. This has in fact been achieved.

2. To hold initial talks in total secrecy between representatives from the two countries to discuss the crisis from all of its aspects and to reach an understanding on how to resolve it. An agreement has been reached between Libya and Tunisia that such negotiations would be held in Paris between high-ranking diplomats. An agreement was also reached to not announce anything about these talks.

AL-QABAS has learned from informed Arab sources that the Libyan side showed readiness to start to give compensations to the Tunisian workers expelled from Libya last summer, more than 30,000 workers. However, the Libyan side added the condition that each case will be studied separately, instead of paying collective compensations to the workers.

The sources told AL-QABAS that an understanding was reached between the two sides on the need to establish a joint Libyan-Tunisian committee to include experts from the two countries to discuss various issues and problems between them, not just the issue of the workers who were expelled from Libya, and to discuss the expansion of cooperation between Libya and Tunisia on a firm and strong basis. The sources do not expect the normalization of diplomatic relations before the formation of this joint committee is officially announced and before this committee begins meetings and achieves a progress in the settlement of the problems between the two countries.

However, informed Arab sources consider that what has been achieved so far is the most important development in the Tunisian-Libyan relations since these relations were strained last August.

/9599

CSO: 4500/58

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK FUNDING PLANS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 22 Nov 85 p 4

[Text] Jiddah--Saudi Press Agency: The board of executive directors of the Islamic Development Bank headed by Dr Ahmad Muhammad Ali, the president of the bank, ended yesterday the work of its 80th session. The board agreed to finance new projects in member countries estimated at 128 million Islamic dinars or \$135,500,000. The board also discussed the continuation of several development projects and it studied the final accounts and the financial position of the bank during the year 1405 Hegira. It also studied the 10th annual report of bank activities which will be presented to the board of governors' meeting in Jordan during the coming month of Rajab. The board also reviewed the work schedule of the meeting of the governors board and made its remarks concerning the meeting. In a detailed report, the president of the bank informed the members of the board regarding the outcome of the missions he undertook recently in four Asian Islamic countries that are members of the bank and about his conversations with their high officials concerning the cooperation of the bank with their countries and the projects that the bank finances for those countries.

The board also approved two development projects in the amount of 12,054,000 Islamic dinars or \$12,185,000. The first project is a loan to the Sultanate of Oman to provide water in Sayfan Valley by building the necessary facilities aimed at reinjecting the rocky water layer in the region. The amount of this loan is 54 million Islamic dinars or \$185,000. The payment of this loan is stretched over 15 years including a 3-year grace period. The second project is a rent and contribution loan given to the Industrial Development Bank of Egypt. The amount of the loan is 10 million Islamic dinars or \$10 million. The purpose of the loan is to finance medium and small agricultural and industrial projects. This loan is the first development project given by the bank to Egypt after the resumption of its membership in the bank.

The board also agreed to give two grants from the Special Assistance Fund. The amount of these grants is 2,514,000 Islamic dinars or 2,514,000 American dollars. The first grant for 500,000 Islamic dinars goes to the Muslims of the "Walla" region in Ethiopia in order to finance an educational center to house orphans, train them in agricultural and livestock development fields and teach them the Arabic language and the Islamic culture. The center will house 300 children. The second grant for 14,000 Islamic dinars or

14,000 American dollars goes to Indian Muslims. The money is allocated to support a number of educational establishments for training girls; to build houses for young people, schools, and a training institution; and to buy diagnostic equipment to train technicians in laboratories in various Indian regions.

The board also agreed to give two technical grants in the form of allotments from the Special Assistance Fund in the amount of 300,000 Islamic dinars or \$320,000. The first goes to the Somali Government and is allocated to develop animal resources by improving training and the supervision of animal health. The amount of this assistance is 150,000 Islamic dinars or \$160,000. The second grant goes to the government of the Republic of Guinea and it is allocated for the completion of consultation services in order to build the National Health School in Kindia Region next to the capital Konakri. This school will undertake each year the training of 50 technicians in the following fields: nursing, X-rays, laboratories and health care.

In the foreign trade domain, the board of executive directors decided to finance foreign trade transactions with a total amount of \$120,300,000. These transactions are: \$10 million for the Republic of Bangladesh to import cement from a member country; \$25 million for Egypt to import cement from a member country; \$10 million for Egypt to import metal reinforcement rods from a member country; \$5 million for Egypt to import burlap from Bangladesh; \$20 million for Morocco to import petroleum from a member country; \$30 million for Pakistan to import palm oil from Malaysia or Indonesia; \$11.3 million for Syria to import burlap bags from Bangladesh; \$7 million for Tunisia to import sulfur from a member country; and \$2 million for the Yemen Arab Republic to import burlap bags from Bangladesh. In adding these amounts, the total of what the Islamic Development Bank has loaned to finance development projects and foreign trade transactions since the beginning of this current Hegira year 1406 is 262 million Islamic dinars or \$271.2 million.

9786/13167

CSO: 4404/151

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ALECSO CONFERENCE ADDRESSED BY PLO DELEGATE MILHIM

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 28 Dec 85 pp 13, 14

[Text] The general conference of the Arab League's Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) began last Saturday in Tunis. Muhammad Milhim, a member of the Executive Council of the Occupied Homeland Affairs Department, headed the PLO delegation. Milhim said, "The Palestinian delegation's participation in this conference acquires great importance as a result of the subjection of educational institutions in the occupied homeland, especially universities and institutes, to closings, arrests of students and teachers, and insufficient budget support. He added, "The PLO will raise before the conference the subject of the closing of the university by the Zionist enemy in order to strive to create means which will help to stop Zionist practices against these institutions and to pressure the powers which are aiding the Zionist entity until Zionist authorities adhere to international law. Over the 6 days, the conference will discuss a number of subjects, among them, the organization's accomplishments, its budget for the seventh session, and its programs for the 1986 and 1987 sessions. The conferees will discuss sites for holding the organization's meetings during the next 2 years, the election of members of the Executive Council, and authorizing it to approve the organization's balance sheet for the seventh session and to pay member nations their shares of the organization's budget, which it has not yet done.

On the other hand, the director of the PLO Political Department, Zakariya 'Abd-al-Rahim Abu-Yahya, stressed that the organization's headquarters will remain in Tunisia. He denied that the organization had asked any Arab state to move its headquarters to it. He said, "The headquarters is located in Tunisia, and nothing will induce it to change it. We have obtained a full welcome and all facilities in the Tunisian republic, from the president, the government, and the people. Abu-Yahya expressed his thanks to the Tunisian authorities that take a noble stand on the side of the Palestinian cause.

/9365

CSO: 4504/145

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ASIAN WORKERS IN GULF FACE UNEMPLOYMENT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 6 Dec 85 p 55

[Text] World economic stagnation and a decline in Arabic oil revenues has placed the market for Asian labor in a critical situation. Labor export into Arab countries was a principal source of income in foreign currencies for Asian countries. On one hand, Asian countries of the Far East suddenly found themselves deprived of this income; on the other hand, they have been experiencing a serious social crisis which began immediately after the return of a large number of their workers from Arab countries, a fact which immensely aggravated the unemployment crisis.

A folk proverb says "misfortune unites," and misfortune compelled labor exporting Asian countries, which were affected by the decline of the Arab oil revenues, to call a meeting of their ministers of labor in Manila, the capital of the Philippines. These Asian countries are Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. The meeting of the labor ministers of the affected countries, which was held with the support of the United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and the Pacific, resulted in an agreement to establish a united Asian policy concerning future labor export. As for the present, the conference resulted in the revelation of the economic and regional dimensions of workers' emigration to Arab countries that might be unknown to the Arabs. The most important of these dimensions is the acknowledgment at the meeting that only a small percentage of the money transferred by Asian workers residing abroad has been invested in productive projects in their countries, and as a consequence the view at the conference was that the long-term or permanent emigration of workers brought an apparent financial and human loss to the resources of the Asian countries. In view of the continuation of the world economic stagnation, and the slowing down of the construction business in the Arab countries, it was expected at the meeting that the amount of money transferred by Asian workers will continue to decline, resulting in a shrinkage in their countries' income of foreign currencies.

It is worth mentioning that the conferring ministers of the Asian countries noticed that the largest amount of monetary transfer originated from workers who spent short periods of time in Arab countries. Despite the complaint concerning the effect on their economies following the decline in monetary transfers, the ministers of eight Asian countries mentioned that the amount

of money sent by their workers from Arab countries reached \$7.3 billion in 1980. For some of the participant countries this money constitutes a large portion of their export revenues. For example, Pakistani workers transferred \$1.9 billion in 1981. This amount was equal to 69.9 percent of the value of Pakistan's trade exports of that year, and 8.8 percent of its total national production. In 1980, Indian workers transferred to their country \$1.6 billion, which is equal to 19.9 percent of the value of India's trade exports of the same year or 1.1 percent of total national production. A great amount of these transfers was used to pay off the price of imported goods and to finance construction projects. The conference in Manila succeeded in identifying the problems ensuing from the return of Asian workers to their countries. These problems were categorized as follows: loss of jobs paying wages equal to the average wage paid in Arab countries; difficulty arising from returning to lower paying jobs when jobs can be found in the mother country; the feeling of a personality split experienced by those who returned after a long stay abroad. However, the conference in Manila refrained from dealing with sensitive subjects such as the return of workers to their mother country and the difficulty of assimilating them again into the local labor market.

On the other hand, the problem of workers returning home is not characteristic to Asian workers only; some Arab countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt are presently facing complicated problems resulting from their attempt to absorb the number of workers returning from Libya and the Gulf states. The problem of the "return" prompted the Pakistani community workers in Kuwait to send a message to the Pakistani president, Ziaul Haq, suggesting the holding of a conference to discuss the problems and worries of Pakistani workers returning home. The urgency of this matter is manifested by the increasing numbers of Pakistani workers leaving the Gulf states. During the last year 50,000 Pakistanis left Kuwait. Statistics from the UAE showed that the number of Pakistani workers leaving their territories in the past two years has increased to 20 percent compared to the previous years. The International Labor Organization indicated in one of its statistics that the number of Pakistanis working in the Gulf states was estimated at 7.7 million workers in 1981.

The mergers of banks and financial establishments into larger units, as is taking place in some Gulf states, contributed to the decrease in work opportunities for Pakistanis. Some in Kuwait banking circles expect the departure by the end of the year of a great number of Pakistanis employed by the Kuwaiti banks. A study conducted by one of Dubai's banks indicated that the policy of Arab banks aimed at hiring local employees will increase the percentage of national employees to 25 percent by 1990 and to 50 percent by the end of this century. Concerning the same subject, Mr Ahmad al-Yahya, Undersecretary at the Saudi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, explained in a seminar which took place in Riyadh during the middle of this month, November, that Saudi Arabia expects the percentage of jobs held by Saudis in the private sector to be approximately 75 percent in the next few coming years.

In any case, the conference in Manila showed that the countries of the Far East know well that the golden years of Asian workers in Arab countries have gone and that they have to manage the affairs of returning employees without causing an internal social crisis that they had never considered.

9786/13167

CSO: 4404/151

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TWO MORE DAILIES--Manama--Bahrain is to publish two more daily newspapers, one in Arabic and another in English, Information Minister Tariq Almoayed said in a television interview last week. It was part of a long-term plan, he said, adding that Bahrainis had proved that they were capable of running newspapers which served the country. The minister also discussed the island's plans to develop into a regional tourist centre, which would be another source of revenue. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 23 Dec 85 p 4] /9274

POLLUTION PROBLEMS--Doha--A fullscale clean-up operation has begun to remove the threat of oil pollution from Qatar's northern coastline. A source at the national Environment Protection Committee told the Qatari News Agency that the campaign was planned to cover all the country's coasts. Experience gained from the current campaign which began on Saturday, will be utilised to form permanent teams for constant observation and maintenance of the Qatari beaches. [Text] [Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 23 Dec 85 p 4] /9274

CSO: 4400/79

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

IRANIAN AMBASSADOR RECEIVED--Dr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, member of the Political Bureau and minister of foreign affairs, today received the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Algeria. They discussed relations of cooperation between the two countries. [Text] [Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 6 Jan 86] /9871

GHANAIAI ENVOY RECEIVED--President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and party secretary general, today received the special envoy of the president of the state of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings. The meeting was attended by 'Abd al-Gadir bin Gasim, in charge of the Department of International Affairs and Cooperation at the Presidency, and by the charge d'affaires of the Ghanaian Embassy in Algiers. [Text] [Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 6 Jan 86] /9871

ALGERIAN ROLE IN BURKINA-MALI DISPUTE--Algiers, 22 Dec (AFP)--Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid on Saturday held telephone conversations with the heads of state of Mali, Moussa Traore, and of Burkina Faso, Captain Thomas Sankara, it was announced by official sources in Algiers. No details were given about the content of their conversations which, according to observers, concerned the border incident between Mali and Burkina Faso which occurred on 14 December and was announced on Saturday by the radios of the two countries. Algeria has been playing a quiet mediatory role between the two countries, which have decided to send their border dispute before the International Court of Justice at The Hague for a ruling on this dispute which has been "poisoning" their relations since their independence 27 years ago. It could be recalled that the Malian minister of interior, Abdourahamane Maiga, and his Burkinabe counterpart, Ernest Nongma Ouedraogo (? were received last October by the Algerian head of state) and met their Algerian counterpart, Mohamed Yala, with whom they discussed how to settle the border dispute. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 0738 GMT 22 Dec 85] /9871

CRUDE OIL DISCOVERY--Algiers, 18 Dec 85--The National Enterprise of Hydrocarbons (ENAFOR) discovered an accumulation of oil in the Weel Decheira I drilled by the apparatus No 11. It is the fifth discovery of crude oil by national means in the region of Adrar after the ones of Oved Zine (June 85), Touat (1984), Ilatou (1983), and Sbaa (1980). The first estimations indicate that it is one of the most important discoveries of crude oil made by Sonatrach. [Text] [Algiers APS in English 1057 GMT 18 Dec 85] /9871

FRENCH-ALGERIAN DOCUMENTS SIGNED--An Algerian-French joint statement was signed today on exercising the right of entry across the borders of the two countries for children born to mixed marriages and separated from one of the parents. The statement was signed for the Algerian side by Boualem Baki, member of the Political Bureau, and by Mrs Georgina Dufoix, French minister of social affairs and national solidarity, for the French side. An Algerian-French agreement of the movement, work, and residence of Algerian citizens in France was also signed today. The agreement was signed by Minister of Social Protection Z'hor Ounissi and her French counterpart Mrs Georgina Dufoix. An exchange of documents concerning the right of access to children born to mixed marriages and separated from one of the two parents was also signed. [Text] [Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 22 Dec 85] /9871

VERDICTS IN COUP ATTEMPT--[names as received]--Medea, Algeria, Dec 26 (AFP)--Fifteen supporters of former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella were jailed here Wednesday for up to 13 years each for plotting to overthrow the government. Twenty-one others, including former minister of health Mohamed Sighir Nekkache, were acquitted. Three defendants tried in absence, including the alleged chief plotter, former Air Algerie pilot Abdelwahab Benchennouf, were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. One of the accused was only fined. Three people considered Mr Benchennouf's top aides--Seghir Abdallah, Ben Benmakhlouf Nadir, and Malkmi Lyes--got 13, 10, and seven-year sentences, respectively. Ali Fawzi Rebaine, portrayed as representative of the opposition front of socialist forces, was jailed for 10 years. He was sentenced at another subversion trial last week to three years in jail. Pettouma Ouzeggane, Mr Rebaine's mother, who was also jailed last week for 11 months for belonging to the Algerian Human Rights League, was one of those acquitted. Defence lawyers protested during the trial about confessions obtained by force and other irregularities. The prosecution, which had asked for life terms for the three who got the heaviest sentences, said Mr Benchennouf was suspected of having received money from Saudi Arabia to buy arms. [Text] [Hong Kong AFP in English 0439 GMT 26 Dec 85] /9871

VERDICTS FOR TRACT DISTRIBUTION--In Medea the State Security Court has pronounced its verdict after a 5-day hearing. The 23 accused were charged with producing and distributing tracts which might damage the supreme interest of the country, setting up illegal associations, and holding unarmed gatherings. The charge of offenses against the authority of the state was not accepted. The accused were sentenced as follows: Rebaine Ali Faouzi, 3 years imprisonment, fined 5,000 dinars; Ait Hamouda Amrane, 11 months imprisonment, fined 2,500 dinars; Fennoun Rachid, 2 years imprisonment, fined 3,000 dinars; Ajroud Belkacem, 18 months imprisonment, fined 3,000 dinars; Benceikhoun Rabeh, 11 months imprisonment, fined 2,000 dinars; Chemine Mokrane, acquitted; Arous Kaddour, 2 years imprisonment, fined 3,000 dinars; Mgeoucha Ahmed, 10 months imprisonment, fined 1,000 dinars; Bouzid Hadjersi, 10 months imprisonment, fined 1,000 dinars; Babouch Nasser, 11 months imprisonment, fined 2,000 dinars; Abouda Rezkik, 3 years imprisonment, fined 5,000 dinars; Ferhat Mehenni, 3 years imprisonment, fined 5,000 dinars; Ali Yahya Abdennour, 11 months imprisonment, fined 2,500 dinars; Saadi Said, 3 years imprisonment, fined 5,000 dinars; Ait Larbi Mokrane, 11 months imprisonment, fined 2,500 dinars; Doumene Said, 3 years imprisonment, fined 5,000 dinars; Mokrani Amor,

6 months imprisonment; Ben Aouicha Naamar, 1 year imprisonment, fined 3,000 dinars; (?Igermilala) Boujemaa, 6 months imprisonment; Fethi Mohamed, 6 months imprisonment, Ouzegane Fatouma, 10 months imprisonment, fined 2,500 dinars; and [word indistinct] El-Hachmi, 2 years imprisonment, and a fine of 5,000 dinars. [Summary] [Algiers Domestic Service in French 2200 GMT 19 Dec 85] /9871

CSO: 4500/56

3 February 1986

EGYPT

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON ECONOMY CALLED GOOD BEGINNING

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 6 Dec 85 p 7

[Commentary by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql in 'The People and the Economy' Column: The Government Statement and the Reality of Application"]

[Text] Last Saturday Dr 'Ali Lutfi delivered a government statement in which he explained existing conditions. Economic problems were a main focus in the statement not only because Dr 'Ali Lutfi is a professor of economics but also because reality gives our economic problems a significant extra dimension, starting with weak public-sector profits, a limited amount of foreign currency, weak private investments, and low exports and ending with concern over the debt. Although the statement did not include specific decisions that would have set it apart from previous statements about our situation and about government promises for a solution, it can be said, in the interest of fairness, that the statement has dispelled doubts in many cases: no new taxes and no increase in customs duties, although we would have liked a more elaborate explanation of rumors that the value of the customs duties will be reconsidered to conform to the promotional rate offered by the Central Bank for certain commodities which do not affect the broad cross-section of the people's needs. Moreover, the lists for rationalization of commodities to be issued soon have been categorized on the basis that some lists will use protectionist and prohibitive customs fees. The other thing is that the statement settled the disagreement on whether subsidies should be retained or canceled by opting to retain them, but it failed to settle the conflict over the definition of who is able and who is needy in order to direct subsidies accordingly. It is understood from the statement that he talked about visible subsidies as an appropriation in the state budget to reduce cost-of-living expenses, which total about 2 billion Egyptian pounds. As for hidden subsidies which cost many times as much, ways to deal with them as well as ways to undo the entanglements between the government and the citizens in the field of subsidies need to be demonstrated. Subsidies in many aspects have become like bookkeeping (debit and credit). It has become evident from the government's statement that the remedy for the foreign currency shortage basically lies in the demand aspect. Therefore the government has pledged to direct foreign currency to the production process, deciding not to bear the expenses of foreign currency for non-essential items. This matter calls for crucial decisions to halt the rash of consumer goods imports which have become widespread in recent years and to put a stop to the festivals of foreign travel on official business as well as to require tourists to bear a higher social cost in the form of a tax payable in foreign currency. The statement underscored the need to protect the private

sector from government control, particularly in the construction phase. We would like once again to add that investment problems in the private sector do not stop at the construction stage. Many hardships are related to the conduct of daily business in government offices such as the phenomenon of several interpretations by one agency or the enforcement of legal provisions for different times concerning the same matter by several agencies, particularly in the oversight field. Some agencies enforce their own laws, which may differ from those enforced by another agency which oversees the same matter related to the investor. A commitment to end these daily hardships constitutes the statement's unconventional content.

Seriousness and resoluteness in the government statement are clearly manifested in its commitment to introduce legislative amendments to facilitate procedures for setting up investment projects and to develop legislation governing general project activities to correct management and work procedures. Prompt introduction of such amendments and changes and the development of existing legislation represent the beginning of reform because these pieces of outdated legislation have always been an impediment to decision-makers. At any rate, efficient implementation and realistic application will be the main criteria for achieving the goals set in the government statement.

12502/12245

CSO: 4504/116

3 February 1986

EGYPT

SUBSIDIES CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 6 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Sharif al-'Abd: "Government Statement and Radical Solutions to Our Economic Problems"]

[Text] The former minister of People's Assembly and Shura Council Affairs, Tawfiq 'Abduh Isma'il, said that there are several basic factors which must be considered concerning this issue. The first factor is that every person wishing to qualify for a subsidy must submit an official request to competent authorities provided that such an applicant has a limited income of no more than 720 Egyptian pounds a year, which is close to the average per-capita income in our society, with periodic step increases only. No other groups should be entitled to subsidies.

The needy referred to here are those employees or workers who make no more than the amount mentioned above or those represented in families living in one place and making a maximum of 2,000 Egyptian pounds.

Therefore, employees and workers whose salaries fall within this range may be considered needy. All others are considered able and are therefore ineligible for subsidies. For example, is it fair that the whole class of tradesmen of various trades should go on enjoying subsidies at a time when it has experienced a startling change in its consumption rates and patterns in view of the many manifestations of wealth exhibited by every one of its members?

Can we consider as needy agricultural workers who, as we all know, have made great jumps in their wages? It may be said that a change has occurred in some activities causing a recession in some of these fields and that this phenomenon has been coupled with bankruptcy cases. I say that all these bankruptcies are delusive in view of the common practice of hiding profits willfully. The only change has been that exorbitant profits have dropped a little but are still being realized nonetheless. Often businessmen, importers in particular, hide their profits to mislead the tax collector. It is unreasonable to include businessmen or importers on the subsidy lists or to qualify some of them for subsidies under the pretext of limited income when our per-capita income is 40 Egyptian pounds a month.

Naturally, not every government or public-sector employee is considered needy and therefore eligible for a subsidy. It is unreasonable to consider as needy the

president of a public-sector company, who receives allowances and periodic awards.

Therefore, the needy who should benefit from subsidies in the future are those employees whose salaries do not exceed a specific amount. These employees must be able to prove that this is their only source of income and therefore are entitled to assistance. If any of these employees submits false statements they must receive proper punishment so as to guarantee the serious application of the guidelines and to limit subsidies to the truly needy.

Dr Talbah 'Uwaydah, chairman of the People's Assembly Plan Committee, said that "the natural approach to getting subsidies to the needy and the only way to separate the able from the needy is to require that each person carry a tax card.

"The tax agency must step up its efforts to pursue tax evaders or taxpayers who hide their activities or submit false statements. This in turn allows us to determine the actual net profits of each individual. Requiring every individual to take out a tax card is essential. By this we mean that the tax card must be carried just like an identity or family card and must be checked periodically without prior notice to ensure that the taxpayer has met his tax obligations toward the state. This is the only indicator which allows one to exclude taxpayers on the basis of income and makes it possible to determine who is able and who is needy on the basis of taxable income and not as an individual belonging to a specific sector.

"Many government employees have sources of income in addition to their salaries. How can I judge this whole class as being needy? Other sectors appear to be able, but reality confirms that a considerable number of employees within these sectors are not better off than employees considered by any standards to be the toiling masses.

"The thing to consider is not the sector, but rather the income realized by taxpayers from the viewpoint of the tax agency.

"I would like to point out that we on the Plan Committee plan to submit a new bill requiring all citizens to carry tax cards or else they will be considered in violation of the law. This, as we have already pointed out, is aimed not only at guaranteeing state revenues from taxpayers but also at getting subsidies on the right track by limiting them to the needy, whose income can only be ascertained through the tax card."

Sa'd Shalabi, advisor to the minister of supplies, said: "We cannot accurately determine the toiling classes in society, particularly following the open-door policy which was instituted in the seventies and before which most sectors were considered needy. These sectors have become able and more than able and the only thing that can be determined unequivocally are those pensions which were set on the basis of social studies, such as al-Sadat's pension, for example.

"For example, public-sector employees are classified as needy and receive incentives totaling more than their basic salaries. Even losing companies give out incentives and government agencies give out allowances and overtime compensation.

"We have all heard about public-sector bank employees who fall within the limited-income category. These people receive incentives equal to 10 or 12 months a year. So, can it be said that subsidies must be retained for government and public-sector employees?

"I believe that it is wrong to exclude certain sectors from subsidies while continuing to funnel them to other sectors. Take, for example, the real estate sector. An owner of an old building receives 6 pounds a month in rent for one apartment. A 10-apartment building brings in 60 pounds, a low income notwithstanding the fact that the land on which it was built is assessed at 1 million pounds. How would this landowner fare under the subsidy law? Will he be excluded merely because he belongs to the real estate sector?

"The main thing in this case is to have consumer awareness whereby consumers will disqualify themselves on the basis that other consumers are more deserving. Nonetheless, we find that reality unfortunately indicates that high income people use their influence to obtain subsidized goods. At any rate, while I oppose the exclusion of specific sectors, I believe that the tradesmen sector, with all its groups, and importers and storeowners must be excluded forthwith. Perhaps some of these people would have qualified had our per-capita income not been so low or had state revenues been adequate for handling any increases in subsidy appropriations. In light of the necessary rationalization, however, those mentioned above, and only those, should be excluded.

"So that we emphasize the need to exclude the tradesman sector in particular, it is because this sector includes the great majority of able people and because the needy are definitely better off than the able ones in several other sectors. Furthermore, this sector consumes the most and has been enjoying subsidized goods for many years."

12502/12245

CSO: 4504/116

EGYPT

MINISTER OF INDUSTRY DISCUSSES PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC SECTOR

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Oct 85 p 7

[Interview with Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql: "Egyptian Industry's New Departure, a Change From the Public Sector Style to Contribution on an Economical Basis"; date and place not given]

[Text] Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry: "We Have Begun To Implement the Concept of Managing the Public Sector As a Business Sector Which Relies on Itself to Provide Foreign Currency and Investments."

[This was said] in an extremely frank conversation about Egyptian industry with Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry, concerning numerous questions. [He said that this is] so that we may bring Egyptian industry into a new phase in which it will be freed from its difficulties and worries. Over a period close to a quarter century, the companies of the industrial public sector have offered an ample contribution. The public sector takes many burdens upon itself, especially in the social sphere. These burdens have had a clear effect on the economics of projects. In last year's budget, they made themselves apparent in the form of losses by many public sector units. Since the public sector is the capital that society owns, it must be preserved and defended from the negative influences to which it becomes subject as the result of circumstances beyond its control.

It was on account of all this that the interview took place with Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, who has long advocated managing the public sector as a business in order to correct its shortcomings. He said: "We have begun to implement a policy of turning the public sector into a business sector as regards the subject of evaluating production and its prices. This policy has become clearly established, and manufacturing is therefore taking place at economical prices. If the state wishes to sell this production at reduced prices, this is the role of the distribution outlets."

He said: "In return, according to this concept, industry is asked to grow on its own and not to fall back on the Finance Ministry to correct inadequacy in structures for financing. The companies have to correct their own structures." He said: "Industry is responsible for providing its own foreign currency needs."

The minister said: "What was proper in 1960 as a method of management is no longer proper for 1985, even within the same ideologies and the same political models."

The minister said: "We have important projects whose economic feasibility has been studied--for example, paper and fertilizers, among other things. These are projects whose local raw materials are abundant, and the local market needs the production. We invite investors to subscribe to these projects." He said: "We are now designing pasteurization and cheese processing plants to be attached to the centers of milk production, in order to overcome the problem of collecting and hauling milk to the Egyptian Dairy Company."

The minister said: "We have initiated steps to dispose of inventories in the industrial sector, especially in the sector of spinning and weaving. The volume of the inventory has dropped from 700 million Egyptian pounds to 550 million pounds. When we ask for protection, our intention thereby is not to dispose of an economically stagnant reserve; it is in order to exploit available capacities to the full."

The minister stated that the concept of turning the public sector into a business sector does not mean a rise in prices. It means operating in an economical manner in the units of the public sector.

[Question] Since you took over the Ministry of Industry more than a year ago, it might be appropriate for us to ask about the new arrangements for setting Egyptian industry on the move. Among the most important features of this departure may be the transformation of the public sector into a business sector, as well as improvement in the method of public sector management. What are the details of these arrangements and of the practical program to implement them?

[Answer] In fact, we began some time ago to turn the public sector into a business sector. Much has been accomplished in the area, especially as regards the subject of evaluating production and its prices. The government's policy in this has become clearly established: industrial production has nothing to do with the circumstances that dictates distribution prices, and vice versa. Production takes place at economical prices on the basis of rationalized cost. If because of political, social or economic circumstances it becomes necessary, the product in question will be sold at reduced prices; but this is the role of the distribution outlets, not the role of industry. This policy has been implemented in many commodities, and the rectification of industrial prices on this basis is underway.

If we hold to this policy in production, we will not support any factory that produces an inferior product or one for which there is no demand. We will not impose goods on the market if it does not accept them, either because they are not good or because they are basically unacceptable. Factories must produce an acceptable product. On this basis, the balance sheet for factories can be drawn up very precisely.

Similarly, when we consider industry as a business sector, we are also taking into account the obligation of the business sector to grow on its own. This results from the fact that a company's financial position and its financing structure (or the correction of that structure) must be more the concern of the company than of any other agency--rather than falling back from time to time on the Finance Ministry. It is our aim that such recourse not take place in the future.

Thus, replacement or renewal projects having to do with preserving capacity are the responsibility of the companies. It is they, relying on themselves, who must provide the investments required for these projects. Any new expansions or projects will take place in one of two ways: If they are expansions of existing production, responsibility is the company's through recourse to the banks to finance the expansions. If it is a new project, the state must take responsibility for it when it is vested in the public sector. The business sector has advantages which we must take. But it is not possible, as some people imagine, for the business sector to obtain the advantages that it sees in the private and investment sector without bearing the responsibilities of the latter sector. There are rights and there are responsibilities. Just as an individual obtains rights, so he has responsibilities. These include self-reliance, whether in obtaining financing or in providing foreign currency requirements. I believe this concept has become current among those in charge of the public sector. There are many discussions about it in meetings and conferences in order to clarify it.

As for the method of management, I believe what was proper in 1960 is not necessarily proper in 1985, even given the same ideologies and the same political models. We have been a socialist country since 1960; we are still a socialist country in 1985. But this does not mean that the laws and organizing decrees applying to the organization of public sector management proper in 1960 are necessarily proper in 1985 or until 2000. We are talking about the future up to 2000, not only about the current year. Looking at the problem of public sector management and its forms is not a matter of laws or of the salary and promotion schedule. The problem lies in the way things are carried out. I believe that it needs adjustment. At the High-level Management Conference in Alexandria, I asked those present to devote attention to discovering new ways and to look into the subject without any premature decisions, for we sense that the pattern in question has become inappropriate in practice. It is a subject that requires exhaustive and careful study at the level of all organizational forms. It is not connected only with the economic or political or managerial side; it is an integral totality. When we talk about this subject, we only want to solve the problem. Management in its present pattern has not given the results we hoped for. One must free oneself from everything that was considered axiomatic. The only real axiom is the welfare of the people. We are all defending it, defending the rights of different groups, and defending social peace. As for methods, however, you cannot espouse the principle that there are axioms relative to methods. That is illogical.

[Question] About the new projects: in the sixties, there was a period marked by the establishment of the citadels of industry. That meant the

employment of a new labor force and new production. You said that you would carry out this role as a business sector, except for the new projects which the state must carry out. Why, then, is the Ministry of Industry not a pioneer in espousing large joint-stock ventures through popular subscription? The financing of the project would take place in full through such subscription, with the participation of the banks, instead of falling back on the state treasury.

[Answer] This is a role they are in fact carrying out. It is the role of the Industrialization Authority, which has to define the desired large projects and then undertake the required integrated feasibility studies to define the specifics and yield of the project. It also must decide the direction from which support for the project is to come: public sector, private sector, or joint? We now stay away from the public sector as much as possible, as long as there is room in which to implement the project. The final goal is to set up the project, not investment for its own sake. The way to set up the project in question is for the government either to raise a loan for its establishment or to invite investors to set it up for the government's account. In both cases, the yield will go to the national economy. The problem is that when [the government] espouses the promotion of projects on the basis of their being government projects, confidence is still inadequate due to past experience. Anybody, that is, who holds a share in such public sector projects as the Iron and Steel [Company] or al-Ahliyah [Company] is today suffering from having gone into the venture.

[Question] But when the project is being promoted, would it be possible to announce in advance a guarantee for the shares' yield, so as to encourage small savers?

[Answer] A guarantee of yield means support from the state. "Yield" means that when a loss materializes, the state will carry it. Is support the way? Or, is the way the facilitation of investment opportunities, clearing of the atmosphere and the encouragement [of investment] by protecting what it produces and by making the cost less? I think that support is not the correct method.

[Question] By "guarantee," support from the state is not meant. Rather, with the new method of public sector management, subscriber confidence will materialize. The industries that now exist are an indication of this. They arose on the basis of the funds of individuals and small savers, and the desire to subscribe to these projects has become very great as a result of yield: that was the incentive. We see that the projects in question took place by means of investment by savers, in the light of a yield reaching 24 percent.

[Answer] Did these industries promise a minimum yield?

[Question] The beginning was with a promise that the yield would not be less than a certain percentage. There are many enticement methods that have been used in this area. We now have a General Financial Market Authority; it, in

cooperation with the Ministry of Industry, can promote the large projects in which individuals participate.

[Answer] We used to regard the method in question as undesirable on the ground of it being a hidden form of support. However, if it is going to encourage subscription, there is no harm. As long as it does not turn into support, and as long as the feasibility studies confirm that the project will realize a sufficient yield, going into such a venture is possible. However, I say that the investment of funds in large amounts after the fashion of joint stock companies is an operation that should be promoted through the media and on the national level. Private investment still has the character of household or family investment; we do not have a pattern of private investment in the large sense. We are talking about large investment projects whose capital is not less than 100 million. We have projects ready. They are distinguished by the fact that their raw materials are plentiful locally. This is what always attracts investors--as long as the raw materials are plentiful, with markets for the product, and with the government providing protection. These three points, I think, are the cornerstones of any successful investment. One example of the projects that are ready is a project such as the paper industry. The raw material, sugar-cane refuse, is plentiful. The paper market needs the industry, since we still import about 70 percent of the writing paper we need and 100 percent of our newsprint needs.

Investments for this project will range between 180 and 200 million Egyptian pounds, for the production of 100,000 metric tons. Another project is for the production of nitrogen fertilizers. Given the High Dam, we need large quantities of these in order to fertilize our agricultural land properly. We have the raw material for the project, [natural] gas. It is abundant, and there is a market. The government will protect the investor by guaranteeing the raw material in the market, as well as the land on which the project is built--that it will be close to the sources of gas. The government will deliver the production on the dock of the factory. The project needs from 250 to 300 million Egyptian pounds, to produce 1,000 metric tons of ammonia a day. It is one of the heavy industries.

[Question] This comes at a time when the banks are complaining about the search for investment opportunities.

[Answer] I do not see a clear role for the banks in investment.

[Question] Is there a deficiency in promoting the projects? Are the paper and fertilizer projects ready and waiting to be built?

[Answer] We are not implementing a paper project for the benefit of the public sector. We have the costs for it and for the machinery.

[Question] Has the Financial Market Authority played a clear role in promoting these projects?

[Answer] Dr Salman Abu 'Ali, the economy minister, asked me to provide these projects. I am preparing for him two model studies for the paper and

fertilizer projects, so that they can be presented for subscription or for the participation of foreign financing. Also, [there is a study] about a project to produce refrigerator compressors. We need about 1 million units a year. A project has been prepared, and we shall invite participation in it in partnership with the public sector, particularly the Ideal Company, since the latter is the principal consumer. This is so that subscribers will be assured that the principal consumer is participating and will obtain its needs from the project in question.

Again, as regards the private sector, we are not going to be able to look to it in large operations. We want to provide small projects, particularly in the food and processing industries. At present, we need dairy products. They are not being produced at present. A decision has been issued for the preparation of a study for a factory with a capacity of 5,000 metric tons, just for cheese production. I asked the Industry Development Center to design a complete factory for pasteurization and cheese processing and [to study] the extent to which it would be possible to establish this factory among our factories, so as to attach it as a unit next to the milk production centers. Current practice is that milk is collected and transported to the Egypt Dairy [Company]. It would be better for these units to be next to the production centers, so that pasteurization and cheese production could take place with a view to distribution. Speaking about shoe manufacturing: we want it transformed from a craft industry into a large industry, so that the distribution sector will not dominate it.

We Ask for Protection in Order To Operate at Our Full Available Capacity

[Question] You are asking for protection. Surely, the reason behind this is the pile-up of stock. What have you done with the stock that does not sell? What are the ideas for ways to move it?

[Answer] There is no way to dispose of stagnant stock except to sell it at a price in line with its condition. There is the idea that this is a loss. However, there is no loss: the price at which any product is sold is the true price of that product. If its costs were greater, that is not the market's problem. There are directives for selling at market price, disregarding any problems that would confront new production through the disposal of the stock. It is a question that requires care. Disposal of stock is taking place in the spinning and weaving sector. The stock of cloth at various stages [of processing] has dropped from about 700 million Egyptian pounds to 550 million pounds. But the problem still exists. Companies suffer from it in the form of a liquidity [problem]. By operating companies with the logic of a business sector, will this stock be unloaded on the basis of it being production, or do the companies have to bear responsibility for covering their obligations?

As for protection, we did not ask for it in order to dispose of stagnant stock. We asked for it so as to exploit available capacities to the full, since there are capacities that have not been exploited until now, especially in the finishing of textiles. All the finishing plants are operating at partial capacity.

[Question] Why is the available capacity not exploited in export?

[Answer] That is what happens. However, the export attitude was that no commodity be exported at less than the cost of its production. But the business sector and world export operations do not do business in this manner. It is the local market that bears the other burdens. When another, new market for export comes along, variable costs and part of the constant costs begin to be utilized. But if I insist that goods cannot be sold at less than their cost, then the result of this is that production does not take place. The machines remain idle, and they bear the constant costs, in addition to the fact that there is a variable one that has stopped and that is not operating. Confidence becomes weaker. This is something we do not fall back on, except when we reach the end of the line--so that we can obtain the variable costs. This is what happens in the production of Korea, for example. This is what is said: that [Korea's industries] lower their prices and receive support. The truth, however, is that they do not receive support from anyone. Even if there is support for some industries, as in the case of Turkey, it is still essential that companies in export consider the variable costs in addition to a percentage of the constant costs of every market. Every market has its own situation.

The problem in the public sector is that if it follows this method, it will be faced with criticism from the supervisory agencies on the ground that export was possible at a higher price, in accordance with considerations of production costs, and that it obtained the price differential for its own account. I have spoken with the companies about this subject and have asked them to work without sensitivity. We have to make the correct decision based on fundamentals, for export will take place only through this method. I believe that the coming stage will be the stage of export. There is no way other than it.

[Question] To return to discussion of the business sector as regards industry and to what some people may imagine: that the transformation and the use of this method represent a trend toward raising prices--even though I think that by this method product prices may go down through the improvement of cost schedules and directing them toward competition. Raising product prices locally will not stimulate exports, since selling in the domestic market will bring in greater earnings than export. This is a view that the business sector may prefer.

[Answer] Therefore, I say that there is no solution except obliging Egyptian industry to meet its free currency requirements on its own. When I find a company that has the capability for export but that does not do so--for many reasons--we prevent the company in question from obtaining a monetary quota from the Banks Center [for Foreign currency]. This is what I am putting into effect. [The company] has to take care of its needs through export. The companies have to be forced to set goals for export. This will never come about except by following the method of a business sector which will be forced to take care of its own free currency requirements. I will not provide them for it, since there is no business sector that falls back on others for aid.

[Question] We have heard that you have a foreign exchange problem. Has the problem ended? If not, what is the size of your need for foreign exchange?

[Answer] It has not ended yet. We need about \$90 million a month in the industrial sector; \$50 million are taken care of through exports, equivalency deals, loans, facilitations for importers and government loans. About \$40 million remains to be taken care of from the Banks Center. This sum is not always available. Of course, we all know about the sluggish economic situation now prevailing in the world. However, insofar as we persist in exploiting available capacities and in giving incentive to export and to the production of local requirements, all of these things are steps toward solving the problem.

[Question] What is the size of the debts being carried out by the industrial sector? Is it paying its debts, or is it suffering from liquidity [problems]?

[Answer] The debts are of two kinds: current debts as a result of current needs, and the financing of revolving loans. There are no debts that have fallen due and that have not been paid, since all of them are considered a public withdrawal. There are three reasons for this: either loss [incurred at] some stage, or sums that were spent on investment, or [sums] for financing raw materials and requirements for production, i.e., current activity. The aspect of financing current activity is the responsibility of the company. As for loss resulting from sovereign decisions, the state will bear responsibility for the sum in question. There remains what is current, and it is the responsibility of the companies. Concerning foreign loans, we are paying all the foreign loans that we obtained in order to carry out the investment plan.



[Key on following page]

Key:

1. Small savers
2. Public
3. Sector [The piles of banknotes have been arranged to form the Arabic word for "sector," and the word written on top of the desk balanced on the lefthand stack completes the phrase "the public sector."]
4. The Investors
5. Construction Zone: Please Do Not Disturb

12937/13167

CS0: 4504/109

EGYPT

BRIEFS

ANNUAL SLP CONFERENCE POSTPONED--The Supreme Council [of the Socialist Labor Party] held its regular meeting on 12-13 December 1985 headed by struggler Ibrahim Shukri. The Supreme Council decided to postpone the meeting of the annual party conference to Thursday and Friday, 6-7 March 1986, to complete studies which will be prepared for submission to the conference. [Excerpts] [Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Dec 85 p 1] /9365

LOCAL OFFICIAL SENTENCED--The appeals court of misdemeanors in the city of al-Mansurah, headed by Dr Salah 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, upheld the verdict which the lower court had issued to imprison Bahi-al-Din al-Husayni, Talkha city council chairman, for 2 weeks of hard labor and suspension from work, along with paying 101 pounds in civil damages, in addition to expenses and fees. This is because it was proved that the city council chairman was insolent to struggler Ibrahim Shukri, head of the Socialist Labor Party, during the elections. Pleading the case was Dr Labib Ahmad 'Attarah, lawyer and party chief in Talkha District. [Text] [Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Dec 85 p 1] /9365

CSO: 4504/142

LIBYA

TRIPOLI COMMENTS ON U.S. THREAT TO LIBYA

LD230028 Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland in Arabic 2115 GMT 22 Dec 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] It is a well-known and obvious fact that real strength is made by man and not by oil. Starting from this point of view, we see that the U.S. Administration focuses its attention and most of its interest on all that happens in Libya. If oil was the source of strength then America would have looked toward other states in the region which are richer in oil. We say that the America's deliberate hostility to this country is not a coincidence, nor does America seek to seize the sources of energy as some believe. No, the point is that America has sensed a hotbed of danger that could be perhaps more effective than oil. This danger lies in the role that the Jamahiriya has played and continues to play in relation to international politics.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has a pioneering role in changing the understanding of the Arab and African man from a negative understanding into a positive understanding that fully realizes the reality of colonialism and the behind-the-scene role it plays against the Arab nation and the African continent, a role seeking hegemony, domination, and plundering resources.

It is remarkable that America's attempts to harm the Arab Libyan people have been repeated because this is the only people able to stand against American arrogance in many areas. And we say that the recent hue and cry raised by the United States over the fact that the Jamahiriya is in possession of anti-aircraft missiles to defend itself is merely a link in the chain of American attempts to persuade public opinion of the need for an act of aggression against the Jamahiriya which logically, like any other state, should be in possession of all the means to defend its territory, its territorial waters, and its skies against all attempts to harm its people, whether the threat comes from American, Zionist, or any other enemy.

It is surprising to see the U.S. official spokesman make devious statements in which he tries to define the specific weapons that Libya must not exceed--going beyond this would be a great error in the eyes of America, and an illegal step too.

We wonder about the legitimacy conferred on America which has a free hand in the world, manufacturing the missiles of destruction and the bombs of death with which it commits aggression against peaceful peoples, and at the same time considering as illegal the fact that any people should stand against it.

America has given legitimacy to the Zionist enemy to possess the necessary modern power to expand its aggression against the Arab nation; it has allied itself with it strategically despite the illegal character of this alliance at international level.

The United States resorts to the right of veto against any resolution at the UN taken against the Zionist entity; the United States arms the enemy and supplies it with all the means of destruction for aggression against the Arab nation; the United States commits aggression against many countries in Latin America, and mobilizes agents to disturb their peoples; the United States launches spying wars and tries to assassinate world leaders loyal to their countries and nations.

All these things are legitimate in the eyes of America, but that a small people should defend itself is illegitimate in the eyes of the American Yankee. How strange!

/9599

CSO: 4500/49

LIBYA

TRIPOLI RADIO SOLICITS LISTENERS' CONTRIBUTIONS

LD031235 Tripoli Voice of Greater Arab Homeland in Arabic 1117 GMT 2 Jan 86
(tentative)

[Voice of Revolutionary Committees]

[Text] This is the Radio of the Voice of the Greater Arab Homeland--the Voice of the Revolutionary Committees. We invite all Arab intellectuals, writers, and men of letters--critics, poets, storywriters, and writers of plays for the theater and radio--those who are interested in political, economic, and social issues, those who specialize in military and strategic affairs, and all those talented people to contribute to the enrichment of the programs in the form of written or recorded material or by way of voice dispatches via telephone. This is in response to the feelings we all have toward the responsibility of serving the issues of the Arab masses and to share with them their fundamental battles by way of responsible word, correct view, guidance, and agitation--all of which will lead to a comprehensive mass mobilization and awareness to the level of confrontation and challenge.

The Radio of the Voice of the Greater Arab Homeland--the Voice of the Revolutionary Committees have allocated the following two telephone numbers for receiving contributions from brothers replying to this appeal: 40 112 and 35 700--Tripoli, the Jamahiriyah--during the morning period from 1000 to 1400; and during the evening period from 1800 to 2100. This is on the understanding that the post office boxes of the radio are as follows: 4677 and 83294--Tripoli, the Jamahiriyah.

/9599

CSO: 4500/49

3 February 1986

SUDAN

BA'TH LEADER CALLS FOR END OF SEPTEMBER LAWS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 23 Dec 85 p 4

[Text] At the conference held by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party's organization in al-Hasahaysa, Badr-al-Din Mudaththir, secretary of the party, demanded the repeal of the September 1983 laws because they are repressive laws which sanction one-man dictatorship and strip the judiciary of its independence, just as they strip citizens of their fundamental rights and ruin their dignity.

Badr-al-Din Mudaththir went on to say that the purpose of these laws was to liquidate dissidents and political opponents in the name of the Corruption, Illegal Gain and Apostasy Law--these laws which put ideas on trial rather than deeds.

He said, "We had demanded the repeal of the September laws because they have no connection with the Islamic Shari'ah except that they are a distortion of the merciful Islamic Shari'ah. He said, "We believe that the Shari'ah is one of the basic sources of legislation, which is what constitutions in all Arab countries from the Atlantic to the Gulf stipulate."

As for the process of lawmaking and the manner of returning to the sources to draw up legal texts, this is not the right of any one group; and it is not possible for any one group of Muslims to claim that it has a monopoly over it, that what it believes is the Islamic Shari'ah, and that what others believe is not. There are ulema and imams who have opinions about the manner of applying the Islamic Shari'ah and the manner of returning to the sources. This is the job of all political forces, schools, jurisconsults, and the representatives of the people.

Badr-al-Din Mudaththir stated, "We call for the distancing of Islam from the tricks of politics, interests, and the caprices of political groups that peddle Islam; we do not call for the removal of the religion from life. An example of the genuine political movements that peddle Islam and exploit it for worldly purposes is al-Turabi's group that now demands the continuation of the laws on the pretext that they are Islamic laws of an Islamic regime while they brought the sickness, prejudice, and the triumph of the regime's greed over reason, not to mention the stipulations of religion, to the point of acknowledging Numayri as Imam of the Muslims and not just supporting him in

ruling in spite of all that was known about him before and after May 25 and up to and after al-Turabi's compromise.

Badr-al-Din Mudaththir stated, "Such people as these are not competent to deliver formal legal opinions or to make contributions in worldly matters, not to mention the rules of the religion, and likewise, how to apply the Islamic Shari'ah. We observed their application of it in such a way as to appoint the dictator as Imam of the Muslims, and we observed the issuing of these laws and the linking of them to Islamic Shari'ah without their having any relationship to it. Believers are not bitten by the same snake twice.

He explained the importance of defining the stipulation for applying legal punishments just as the great fuqaha' (jurisconsults) did in the early period of Islam and in subsequent eras just before their application. He said, "We and all of the forces in the Grouping have supported the punishment for fornication and wine-drinking. However, we saw this group cutting off the hands of young, hungry thieves while protecting big thieves who stole from the people and sold out the homeland.

Badr-al-Din Mudaththir ended his talk by saying, "We demand the nullification of the September laws immediately and the presentation of a formulation devoted to the cause of God and the interests of his servants in such a way that the intentions of the Islamic Shari'ah will be realized in our age.

/9599

CSO: 4504/122

TUNISIA

TUNISIAN SCHOLAR ON TUNISIA-LIBYA, GOVERNMENT-UGTT RELATIONS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 2 Dec 85 pp 23,25

[Interview with Professor Mohcen Toumi by al-Salami al-Husni in Paris: "The Crisis Between Tunisia And Libya Began in 1969"; date not specified]

[Text] Professor Mohcen Toumi is a Tunisian academic and scholar who has published a number of articles and books in the French language on the history of the working classes and the history of the Maghreb, of the political, economic and social developments that have taken place in it.

His analysis, research and political positions have been influential in the face of an argument that has been renewed by recent events in Tunisian political circles. Although they are critical of some of the government's policies, they support the government in its steadfastness against the Libyan aggression against Tunisia.

In spite of the fact that Professor Mohcen Toumi's analysis, books and articles emphasize the role of the opposition and its struggle to crystallize the distinctive characteristics of a free and just society, he is not tolerant of what he calls, in his analysis, the "superficialities" of developments in Tunisia. The Tunisian scholar thinks that to the same extent that the government lost its "nerve" in its dealing with some of the crisis that Tunisia has experienced, the Tunisian opposition in turn lost some of its "credibility" in its dealing with events, because of the undemocratic procedures in its ranks.

The interview that AL-DUSTUR conducted with Mr Mohcen Toumi dealt with a number of issues, although it focused primarily on the roots of the Tunisian-Libyan crisis and the critical development in relations between the UGTT and the Tunisian government.

We discussed with him the results of the Israeli aggression on Tunisia. He indicated in his reply that his aggression was expected ever since the Palestinians came to Tunisia, for two reasons. The first is the support of America for Israel and the collusion of the West with it. The second is the fragmentation fading away of the Arabs on the political, economic and perhaps cultural planes.

When talking about the aggravated Arab situation, the Tunisian scholar asked, bitterly, "Are we fighting people or a people of pleasures and consumerism?"

This long interview, from which we publish some selections concerning the events currently developing in the Tunisian arena, also touched on the topics of the disturbances in the region of the Maghreb, the role of the Tunisian army, which Mr Mohcen Toumi considers a "national army, not a mercenary army," as in some countries, and the economic and political situation in Tunisia.

AL-DUSTUR met Mohcen Toumi in Paris and conducted this interview with him, which focuses primarily on the roots of the Tunisian-Libyan crisis and the critical development in relations between Tunisian General labor Union (UGTT) and the Tunisian government.

We asked for his point of view of the background of the crisis between Tripoli and Tunis. He answered, saying: "The crisis between the two countries began on 1 September 1969, not this past summer. Prior to 1 September 1969, Tunisia had good relations with the royal regime and was wary toward all of the 'Arab unionist units,' even toward 'Abda-al-Nasir, of all people, with whom relations had been favored for a long time, and then ebbed. When the new Libyan regime came to power in 1969, it carried the slogans of 'Abd-al-Nasir and became very reserved toward Tunis due to the relations that had tied it to the royal regime.

"Consequently, the roots of the differences were present from the beginning between the two regimes.

"After about only 2 years from the change of the regime in Libya, a crisis broke out between the two regimes concerning the idea of union for the Maghreb. It was expected that a meeting would be held in 1971, at the level of the ministers of economics from Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Libya with the goal of urging a course of unification among these countries, on the basis of recommendations of a committee for economic studies founded in 1964 which provided important research on the level of economic integration in the Maghreb. Some of the studies began to be implemented.

"But Libya rejected the unionist meeting under the pretext that realization of unity at the level of the Maghreb conflicts with realization of Arab unity, which is the primary goal of the Arab nation.

"With the withdrawal of Libya, the activities of the committee on Maghreb studies faltered, and, consequently, the process of integration among the countries of the Maghreb stumbled.

"Three years after the withdrawal of Libya from the work of this committee, what has been called the 'Djerba operation' occurred, which was presented as a 'union' between Tunisia and Libya. I was not the only Tunisian who criticized this false unity, because the destiny of the people is not determined in hotels or by two 'political brokers,' but rather by participation of the people in decision making and in implementation of decision. Unity is a popular demand to which leaders respond, not the reverse. In my opinion, the

failure of the Arab unification projects is hidden within the absence of democracy in those regimes that seize upon unity.

"Although the Tunisian parliament refused to ratify this unification, al-Qadhdhafi persisted in it and continued to celebrate the Djerba agreement each year, even though it was an agreement that lasted only a few days!

"The basic problem is that unification in al-Qadhdhafi's style is an effort to divide the Arab ranks, not to unite them.

"This, quickly, and according to my opinion, is the background of the Tunisian-Libyan controversy and the background of the recent Libyan aggression against Tunisia, which facilitated, indirectly, the Israeli aggression against Tunisia.

[Question] What is your assessment of what is called the 'trade-union crisis' in Tunisia?

[Answer] I think that it would be excessive to consider this crisis solely a trade-union crisis. This crisis is also a political crisis, in view of the history of the UGTT and its role in the national struggle. Hached is not calling for increasing wages, but for the sake of Tunisia. Habib Achour himself opposed the French in 1947, in defense of Tunisia, not in defense of increased wages. Consequently, all of the developments that have occurred in Tunisia society reflect politically on the UGTT, which, throughout its history has played two roles: a trade-union role and a political role.

[Question] How did the crisis between the government and the union begin?

[Answer] It began immediately after the report by the World Bank concerning the economic situation in Tunisia, in which the unions saw indications of a return to the policy of the ill-reputed IMF. Further, the unions launched a number of strikes demanding an increase in wages.

In the meantime, Libya decided to expel the Tunisian workers and began to launch attacks on Tunisia. The leaders of the UGTT were mistaken in their assessment of the Libyan threat, and did not criticize it at the time. This gave the government the opportunity to use this mistaken assessment to separate the Libyan aggression and to contain the rebellion that appeared in the union ranks. In spite of the fact that I have no doubts about the national leadership of the UGTT, I think that the mistaken political assessment to distance themselves from the hostile Libyan campaign gave the government and the ruling party a golden opportunity to shrink the size of the UGTT.

[Question] Do you think that the crisis between the unions and the government has resulted in the isolation of Habib Achour?

[Answer] I do not think so, because the crisis is not a crisis between personalities. It is a crisis between the head of the government and the

secretary general of the unions. The crisis has union and political aspects and can only be solved within this framework.

It is true that there are some who think that the age of 'charisma' and the personal halo rules the political and union level in Tunisia, and it is true that there are, in the ranks of the opposition itself, some elements content to remove Achour. If the opposite is demonstrated, then I think this step will not solve the roots of the problem. It is not possible to conclude this solution at the expense of a familiar national organization that has played and continues to play, a fundamental role in balancing Tunisia society.

If it is true, from another perspective, that the Destour Party has regained some of its strength and has attracted some cadres, and has tested the success of its activities during the recent crisis, this does not mean that Tunisia is immune to violent shocks if the party continues to provoke the 'labor union council' that is its client to convene an extra ordinary convention to nominate a replacement leadership. I hope that the government does not interfere and that the union bases are left to choose their leaders with all freedom.

It is incumbent on us all to avoid wasting energies and splitting the ranks and to remove the specter of civil war.

This is the responsibility of all Tunisians--the defense of their country, threatened by imperialist and Zionist powers. Unfortunately, the policy of a neighboring Arab states hides behind the slogans of Arab unity--for which Arab unity is not responsible. It is also the responsibility of all Tunisians to protect their nation themselves, because the 'defenders' might turn into resistance fighters, as ancient and modern history has taught us.

[Question] Do you think that the Maghreb is going the way of the disturbances in the eastern region in light of what has happened recently in terms of the differences between these states? There is the Tunisia-Libya dispute, the Algerian-Morocco dispute and the Libya-Algeria dispute. What do you think about the development of the situation in the Maghreb?

[Answer] The Maghreb region, which is an inseparable part of the Arab nation, has always had disturbances, even though the expressions of these disturbances has varied. The expression of these differences in the Maghreb has been more political than military. The political way has dealt with all of the issues over which struggles has flared up in the Arab East, from the progress of the Palestinian revolution to the problem of Arab unity.

Although the move of the Arab League headquarters to Tunisia, the political and commercial activities that accompanied it, and the settling down of the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia and of some of its men in Algeria directly illuminated the upheavals that the Arab Maghreb has been experiencing (rather, I should say I disclosed the inconsistencies that the region has been experiencing on the official level on the one hand and on the popular level on the other). Tunisia, for example, is not prepared to play its Arab role fully, and the Maghreb as a whole still bears the wounds left on it by the

Western Sahara problem--which is still going on. Among the results of the afflictions of the Maghreb is hindrance of progress toward unified integration among its peoples.

Permit me to say that the region as a whole is not prepared, at the official level, to face the other Arab concerns. It appears that the region has now begun to adapt to this new situation with new methods.

This assessment is not the product of today. I said this when the Arab League moved to Tunisia. The Arabs, without Egypt, are paralyzed. I mean by this the Egypt of Arabism, the Egypt of culture, not the Egypt of al-Sadat and the Egypt of Camp David. It is not possible to do without the 50 million Arabs in Egypt. Those who demand this are perpetrating an unpardonable crime.

12780/13068

CSO: 4504/112

ISRAEL

DEVELOPMENT OF BATTLE SYSTEMS

Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew Jul-Aug 85 pp 41-44

[Text] A battle system includes officers and soldiers, structures and resources, all integrated in a way which enables it to function in a defined range of missions (figure 1). For example, weapons, anti-aircraft missiles. A weapon system consists, for example, of an anti-aircraft missile on a launch pad plus the launching equipment. A battle system is an anti-aircraft unit together with all supporting equipment as part of a field unit.

Utilizing the capability of a new weapon system mandates its proper integration into the whole battle system, sometimes even creating a whole new system. For example, the establishment of tactical intelligence units to take advantage of new observation equipment.

In previous articles published in MA'ARAKHOT (Dr Z. Bonen, "The Development of Weapon Systems for the Eighties," MA'ARAKHOT No 255, Apr 1977; Dr Z. Bonen "Tactical Experiments and the Development of Weapon Systems," MA'ARAKHOT No 227, Feb 1980), the authors discussed mainly the development of complex battle systems. No attention was paid to organizing for development. This article identifies an organizational gap in the way battle systems are developed, and a proposal is put forth as to how to bridge this gap in order to reduce substantially the time before a new weapon system can be fully utilized.

The Problem of Organization

The problem stems from the difference in the function of those who are in charge of development and the armed forces on the one hand, and those who develop weapon systems (figure 2).

When developing a weapon system, the major activity is with the developers, starting with the ideas and followed by the implementation. The IDF defines the need, approves the specifications and then follows and supervises the development phase. In contrast, when battle systems are developed, the IDF plays the major role, starting with the ideas and the process of developing the system, whereas the developer contributes to clarifying the potential capability of the new weapon systems and by offering additional equipment for the system.

If there were a way to separate the development of a weapon system from that of a battle system, a clear-cut division of labor could be defined. The problem is that the development of new systems has to be done in an integrated fashion in order to be able to bring to the battlefield well fitted systems which function properly. If serial development (figure 3) is compared to integrated development it can be shown that serial development, i.e., developing the weapon system first, followed by the development of the battle system, causes a lag of many years in the development of new systems which are based on new technologies. For example, in spite of the impressive progress in the development of night vision equipment, there have not been any developments of battle systems to utilize them properly 24 hours a day.

The integrated process of developing advanced systems joins the two processes together: the process of developing the weapon system and that of developing the battle system (figure 4).

This process integrates the tactical tests (figure 5) into the process of developing the weapon system.

The Proposed Organizational Solution

For years it has been accepted both in Israel and in the rest of the world that when a major weapon system needs to be developed, a management team is appointed in the defense system. The team oversees the plan from the point of view of the IDF and the Defense Ministry. It contracts the main contractor, who in turn utilizes a network of sub-contractors. For example, the development of a plane or a tank. Experience of many years has shown that this method is indeed necessary for the development of a complex system which includes many sub-systems.

The situation in developing a battle system is similar, or even more complex. From the point of view of the development, the difficulties in control, or, in other words, the coordination of all components such that the whole system will function as a whole, are even more pronounced than in the development of a complex weapon system, because of the complexity of the relationships among the various components. In many cases these relationships are not clear-cut and cannot be defined in terms of mechanical or electrical units. The relationships among the components of a complex system are usually those of communication systems, computers, etc. Therefore, it is quite difficult to coordinate all components. In addition, parallel to the technical development of the system, i.e., the development of the framework and the program as well as the integration of new methods, the structure and the battle methodology also have to be developed. Therefore, it seems that there is a need to expand the concept of project management from what it has been up to now such that management will be two pronged (figure 6). On the one hand the management of an advanced system will employ a major contractor for development, who will be responsible for the development of all technical components of the system, framework and program, and who will also have responsibility over sub-contractors. On the other hand the project management team will be responsible for the development of the force and battle methodology and field tests, and will determine whether the unit testing the system will be a regular unit or one which is only called together for the

duration of the test. The project management team is responsible for both aspects, the development of the weapon system on the one hand, and the development of the battle system, on the other hand. It is responsible for planning and synchronizing all phases so that the system is operational as soon as possible, with all its components: framework, program, structure of the force, training aides, etc. With this approach one can see from almost the beginning the funds and the resources necessary for the development of the system as a whole, and thus avoid the all too common syndrome of a "little bit of everything."

This cannot be accomplished in the framework of the usual command, both because of the need for close cooperation of all those involved and because of the regular heavy burden on the command.

The authors point out several subjects which require this kind of organization:

- Command and control in the unit
- Tactical intelligence
- Helicopter warfare
- 24 hour warfare

For example, the establishment of command and control in the unit does not just include the collection of auxiliary equipment, even if all equipment is first checked in regular units, but it requires the development of an integrated system of command and control.

If a project management team which is responsible for all activities as described in figure 6 is not established, it is possible that development will last a long time and that the end result will not even answer the needs.

Conclusion

Success in developing battle systems in the past was based on weapon systems and battle systems which were developed, for the most part, in other armies. The IDF had to modify and improve them. The success in developing weapon systems in the eighties and nineties--and in many cases Israel is in the forefront of research--depends on the IDF's ability to integrate them quickly and efficiently into sophisticated battle systems.

The process of developing such systems is full of uncertainties and risks. Proper organization will enable the IDF to execute these processes efficiently while, at the same time, saving many years.




Figure 1 -- Components of a Battle System

1. Framework--soldiers, weapon systems, equipment
2. Program--doctrine, structure, battle theory
3. Battle system
4. Carrying out of military mission

Figure 2 -- Functional Division During Development

	Formulation of ideas -- identify need	Decisions	Development
Weapon systems	Developer	Initial phase, developer joint Defense Ministry & IDF project	Developer
System	IDF (developer)	Initial phase, IDF System dev.- IDF & Defense	IDF




Figure 3 -- Comparison of a serial process to an integrated process

- 1 Serial process
- 2 Development of a weapon system
- 3 Testing the weapon system
- 4 Full integration in the system
- 5 Required changes in the weapon system
- 6 Changing the structure

- 1 Integrated process
- 2 Development of a weapon system
- 3 Weapon system tests
- 4 Full integration
- 5 Development of a battle system
- 6 Battle system tests




Figure 5 -- Tactical tests during development




Figure 6 -- Organizing for developing a battle system

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CSO: 4423/70

LEBANON

CHIEF OF PARLIAMENT HOLDS HOPE FOR NATIONAL CONCILIATION

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21-27 Oct 85 pp 14-18

[Interview with Parliamentary Head Husayn al-Husayni by Jubran Tuwayni, Hashim Qasim and 'Ali Hammadah: "In a Detailed, Frank Conversation with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI: Al-Husayni: International Detente Is on the Horizon and Will Have Good Repercussions on Lebanon"]

[Text] The chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Mr Husayn al-Husayni, proceeding from local, regional and international facts, is almost certain that a solution is now at hand.

In his conversation with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI has considered a solution to be something likely and imminent and therefore offered somewhat integrated points and principles that clearly expressed his view and goals.

While al-Husayni stands at the forefront of optimists among Lebanese heads and political leaders, his point of departure, regarding this optimism, is that the parties to the overt and covert struggle have fallen into a vacuum. In addition, he also proceeds from the premise that an open, obvious state of failure has existed in finding solutions which would coincide with people's will and desires.

Since Lebanon's crisis is tied to complex regional and international problems, al-Husayni proposes the solution which is both old and new of separating the Lebanese problem from the region's crisis, adopting a solution which Syria will oversee and guarantee.

What is noteworthy in the assembly chairman's thinking is his statement in answer to questions related to the foundations for establishing a state of modern, effective, just institutions. Between a formula focussed on factional equations and a formula which is capable of change and development, we see him choosing the latter, or taking note of its main principles and premises.

Hence his rejection of the further consolidation of the factional nature of the three chief offices.

The carefully-studied distancing of the chamber of deputies' role notwithstanding, al-Husayni considers that all solutions or plans will ultimately

reach the chamber, the legitimate constitutional body which approves all formulas and decides on all plans.

Here is the text of the conversation:

[Question] Now that a year has passed since your election as chairman of the chamber of deputies, what has been done to put a stop to the game of annihilation of Lebanese parliamentary life and what will you do to revive and develop this game?

[Answer] It is well known that our parliamentary system has caused the constitutional institutions to be integrated, since no institution can play its part by itself. Nothing proves this more than the inevitability that the cabinet must attend in order for the chamber of deputies' meeting to constitute a quorum. In the absence of the cabinet, these remain meetings among deputies, and constitutionally a chamber meeting is not valid unless the cabinet does attend. It is obvious that the chamber of deputies' function is to oversee the cabinet's activities and draw up the legislation necessary for cabinet activity to become feasible. In addition, the cabinet is the system's first line of defense. Parliamentary principles prevent the collapse of this line by creating a cabinet when it is apparent to the chamber and to public opinion that the cabinet that exists no longer has the confidence of the chamber and of public opinion. Therefore, in the course of this year, we had to put pressure on the current cabinet, which is a purely exceptional one, with the aim of urging it to greater and greater solidarity without our advancing in any way which would lead to a total vacuum. However, the security situation, which is directly related to the persons of the ministers, kept steps from being taken in its regard. It also kept quorums from being held in a continuous fashion. This perverse situation began last 16 April. In spite of that, I would like to emphasize that the inability to hold quorums has not in any way put a stop to parliamentary activity and the expression of opinions. The proof is that even if we meet today, we will not be able to take a decisive stand, because that will be in effect the elimination of the hopes we aim at through the conversations which are taking place with the various groups and through the security steps which started in Zahlah, then in Tripoli. On this subject, it is not wise to act recklessly with all these hopes by means of steps that could turn out to be the opposite of what we intended. In any event, I am not in a position to evaluate the past stage of my tenure as chairman of the chamber of deputies.

[Question] Do you mean that the cabinet's composition has inhibited the chamber from performing its role?

[Answer] What there is no doubt about is that it has inhibited the convening of the chamber of deputies more than the chamber of deputies' activities have.

[Question] In light of your assessment of parliamentary activity, don't you believe that there is a vast difference between parliamentary activity and the chamber of deputies' constitutional role?

[Answer] It is not possible to come up with any solution to the Lebanese crisis except through the constitutional institutions, especially the

chamber of deputies. I do not believe that the chamber has been remiss the past year in performing its role in the constitutional context, unless we want to give people the illusion that Lebanon's crisis is purely domestic and is not related to regional and international complexities which all in all Lebanon as a whole lacks the ability to deal with by itself.

Thus we must be aware of these things and work by means of the international, regional and local facts of the case to achieve our goal of liberating our land, firmly establishing our nation's unity and restoring our sovereignty and independence.

A Perverse Cabinet Situation

[Question] If the cabinet is inhibiting the chamber of deputies' activities, will you ask that it be dismissed?

[Answer] The whole cabinet situation is perverse and harmful and has inflicted great damage on the interests of the Lebanese. I do not believe that a single minister or cabinet member would not say this. However, that does not mean that the formation of a new cabinet will be altogether easy. Therefore, suitable circumstances must be provided to establish a new cabinet which will return to constitutional principles in terms of achieving the principle of ministerial solidarity without which it is not proper to establish any cabinet. Here it is necessary to refer to the great role the [former] prime minister Rashid Karami played through the effort, sacrifice and forbearance he exerted.

[Question] Does this statement of yours mean a specific conception of the composition of the cabinet and the conditions for national salvation?

[Answer] The real prelude to the formation of a new cabinet is for the groups to come up with common general notions concerning the framework of a Lebanese national plan for ending the Lebanese war, since the present cabinet's ministerial statement has not been able to achieve that but rather contains a list of the groups' views. In other words, you can infer something from the ministerial statement or its opposite. While the statement talks about the true unity of Lebanon, it also talks about decentralization along with the notion of partition which conflicts with Lebanon's unity. This prompts us to give the Lebanese national plan for ending the war concrete form.

New Facts

[Question] Your statement presupposes the presence of new facts.

[Answer] Proceeding from new facts which did not exist at the beginning of the Lebanese crisis, we see the first basis, which is the emergence of a Lebanese consensus on the rejection of the gamble on Israel, especially after its schemes became apparent and they inflicted their damage on everyone, as well as the emergence of a Lebanese consensus on the rejection of internal security for each Lebanese or non-Lebanese group, and the rejection of the illegitimate armed presence of any Lebanese or non-Lebanese group. When

we realize that these things are the essence of the Lebanese crisis, we will find that it is possible to proceed from these bases to give concrete form to the national plan to end the war, on grounds of which it will be possible to form an enlarged cabinet which will be in charge of taking the executive steps for this plan.

[Question] What new steps will be of help in a solution?

[Answer] I have sought to take off from what exists inside the country, which has a basic relationship to the regional development that has newly arisen in the form of the failure of the Israeli option and the withdrawal of Israel and its schemes through the action of the Lebanese people's resistance and assertion of the option of Arab Lebanon by means of the Syrian initiative, the distinctive relations with Syria and the national obligation which lies on Arab countries to extend a helping hand to Lebanon and save it from its impasse, now that it has become apparent in a way which admits of no doubt that the conspiracy which is aimed at fragmenting Lebanon and eliminating its social composition is aimed not just at Lebanon but also at all Arab countries. It has become apparent that Lebanon has not embarked on its own struggle against Israel and its schemes but that it has embarked on the struggle of the whole Arab nation, and it has a right, which this nation and these countries owe it, for them to extend their hand to help it bind up its wounds and enable it to play its true Arab role, since the great resources that Lebanon has, which it has offered and is still offering to this end, are no secret to these countries.

The Formula and the Arabs

[Question] Some people think that most Arab regimes do not want a prewar Lebanon, in terms of formula or role. How can you expect aid from these regimes?

[Answer] The formula I am talking about is the basis for the coexistence between Moslems and Christians. It is the foundationstone of the Arab option, since without it the option will be Christian or Islamic. The Arabhood of Lebanon will have no meaning if the Lebanese model becomes a failure, because the Israeli challenge lies in striking out at this model. Therefore, we say that the rule of coexistence in Lebanon is a sacred thing which one may not ignore or infringe upon. Likewise, we consider our democratic republican parliamentary system to be a necessity and consider that Lebanon can survive or prevail only in its context. Our differences among ourselves are confined to the formula of government which was set out during the transitional stage between the mandate government and the independence government, which we call the 1943 formula. This became petrified at that time and has not been developed in the direction of building a state of laws and institutions, creating a profound gap between the government and the people, since at the beginning of the ordeal we found ourselves faced with a strange contradiction, which was that of a people living in the mentality of 1975 and a formula governing them with the mentality of 1943. A state of dialogue of the deaf prevailed and consequently there was a failure to express the people's hopes and the process of expression shifted over to the streets, with the means at the people's disposal. While I would not confine Lebanon's

crisis to internal disputes, I certainly can hold only the domestic situation responsible for creating fertile ground for the emergence of the state of instability. Therefore we must be more precise in using expressions. What is needed is not to change the system but to create the formula of government suited to the notion of a parliamentary republican democratic system. In any case, the validity of any solution will be properly assured only on the basis of coexistence.

[Question] What about the free economic system?

[Answer] There is no parliamentary republican democratic system that does not have a free economic system. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the conspiracy has been aimed at the free economic system as a basic element in linking Lebanon to its Arab environment.

[Question] Are you in favor of having the premier elected by the chamber of deputies?

[Answer] When the constitutional document made provision for the principle that the prime minister would be elected by the chamber of deputies, the idea stemmed from the actual condition of the conflicts and from the actual condition of the disruption in the parliamentary democratic system. Although it gave the president the right to chair cabinet sessions and chair the executive power in its totality, the Lebanese system has exempted the president from any oversight except in the case of high treason, and it has also given the president immunity from criticism as he exercises surveillance over the cabinet and has restricted accountability to the chamber to the cabinet and nothing else. In other words, parliamentary principles require the establishment of a cabinet which enjoys the support of the majority of the chamber and the establishment of an opposition exercising the right to criticise and the right to direct [questions] to that cabinet. Consequently the loyal bloc is loyal to the cabinet, and the opposition is in opposition to the cabinet. However, when loyalty is to the person of the president, it is obvious that the opposition will stand against the president. Here the system will lose the first line of defense, which is the cabinet, and the struggle will be along the second line of defense, which is the presidency. Today, however, the facts of the case have changed greatly and the subject of the election of the premier by the chamber is no longer the true remedy. Therefore, we must observe this subject in terms of salvation and the policy directed toward salvation, which must have the result of strengthening party activity, which will in effect bring about real parliamentary coalitions, so that the chief of the parliamentary majority will in fact be the person who is qualified to form a cabinet without recourse to the election process.

The Appointment of Deputies

[Question] Are you in favor of having new deputies elected to the Lebanese chamber of deputies?

[Answer] We must proceed from an established fact, which is that we are not in a state of revolution where the victor can wholly impose his vision on others. Rather, we are in a state of disintegration, internecine fighting

and deterioration. As a result of that, in any salvation the mutual agreement of mutually conflicting wills is necessary if the desired solution is to be reached, and no group can impose its view alone on the other groups. This makes us realize that any agreement among all groups will be in the interests of Lebanon and will undoubtedly be pertinent to its salvation. Therefore, the appointment or failure to appoint deputies constitutes part of the anticipated national reconciliation. Such reconciliation might be decisive to the end of creating a state of security and stability which will permit the holding of new elections for the whole chamber of deputies, which is what we all intend, bearing in mind that the decision lies with the chamber of deputies and not the chairman of the chamber.

[Question] What about the further consolidation of the major factions' possession of the three chief offices?

[Answer] It is clear that Lebanese refuse to be described as factionalists, and, in our current state, it is necessary to achieve a climate which will make it possible to eliminate fears and create a state of security and safety for everyone. This is what we mean by the parliamentary democratic republican system, which will make it possible for all Lebanese groups to take part in administering the country. Every factional formula harbors the germ of its own demise, because the Lebanese aspire to a civilian society governed by the principles of justice, equality and equality of opportunity among all citizens, which conflicts with the restriction of any important position or job in the government to any group or faction to the exclusion of others. It is necessary to insist on preparing for such a climate and leaving behind the climate of struggle which has made things worse than they were in 1943.

[Question] Some people advance the issue of abrogating political factionalism in stages. What is your view?

[Answer] This is not a new proposition. A mere reference to the structure of the first independence cabinet will show clearly that the goal is to get rid of the factional bases on which the Lebanese system stands. In my opinion the petrification of the 1943 formula and the failure to develop it are what have prevented progress toward the elimination of this divisive ailment. It is necessary to create bases which will make it inevitable and binding on everyone to proceed with the policy of eliminating factionalism.

Syria and Relations

[Question] You spoke about distinctive relations with Syria. Could you specify them in detail?

[Answer] It must be plain that Lebanon's relations with Syria, which is the closest fraternal state, have not been normal since 1920. Here we are talking about official Lebanon and official Syria. Meanwhile cooperation between the two peoples has continued and led to positive results in the context of both countries. Nothing proves that more than that the two countries waged the war of independence against the French mandate and achieved great positive results. A state of mutual suspicion dominated Lebanese-Syrian

relations. In other periods, a state of enmity dominated, since Lebanon became a shelter for all elements which wanted to inflict harm on Syria, and the opposite has been the case. The difference is that Lebanon's relations with many Arab countries, even with the countries of North Africa, have become more than good, while the condition of these relations between the two closest brothers has remained deficient. When we say distinctive relations, our premise is that Lebanon in an ordeal will not find anything closer than Syria to save it as far as various causes and subjects go. The time has come for us to draw many lessons from the past, so that we can have this relationship governed by rules which will keep them from facing convulsions at every turn.

One of the greatest examples of the advantage of the distinctive relationship was that the Lebanese people confronted the Israeli occupation with full support from Syria, which led to the results that everyone knows, the least of which are that it threatened the majestic nature of the Israeli myth, and Israel was compelled to withdraw and failed to act as the policeman that those who supported its establishment and survival had in mind.

Factions and Concessions

[Question] The armed Lebanese parties and political forces have failed grievously to offer a plan of national solution acceptable to all Lebanese. What do you say, and what in your opinion are the features of the solution you would propose?

[Answer] The severity of the Lebanese ordeal and its long duration have resulted in the pigeonholing of everyone and the withdrawal of groups into specific factional crucibles, which has made all of them incapable of propounding a general national plan. This is what I meant by the presence of mutually conflicting wills. Here lies the importance of the constitutional institutions, especially the chamber of deputies, which can give concrete form to a national plan to end the crisis, taking into consideration all contradictory viewpoints and extracting from them common general premises lying within principles that will prevent fears from being stirred up among the groups. Here it is necessary to stress a political point, which is rejection of the logic of making allocations and apportionments among factions, because even if we arrive at some settlement by means of it, that will in effect be a time bomb which could explode at the first turn. Therefore it has been desirable to abrogate factional concessions and it has also been desirable not to transfer concessions from one faction to another. The relinquishment must be in the interests of the nation as a whole and one cannot hand over any gains to any group or faction at the nation's expense. The line of approach must clearly be in the direction of fusing the Lebanese society within a single Lebanese crucible and in the context of a single civilian society which will enable the Lebanese freely to reach out to opinions without distinctions and differences being created among citizens as a result.

Lebanon's Neutrality

[Question] You have spoken and written on numerous occasions about neutrality for Lebanon. How can you reconcile what is going on today with the

essence of the notion of neutrality you have proposed? In other words, will neutrality save Lebanon and will it allow its vigor to be restored?

[Answer] In confronting the Israeli occupation and trying to impose the 17 May agreement and hegemony on Lebanese powers, it was necessary to confront it with the notion of military neutrality which would not influence Lebanon's commitments in its Arab environment politically, economically and culturally, especially since in the past context of the Arab-Israeli wars Lebanon has been a country of support, not of confrontation. This is one of the meanings of military neutrality. This proposition has not met with any local, regional or international response. However, after Lebanon paid the highest price in confronting the Israeli occupation and it became more than a confrontation state, since it as a government and a people waged and is waging the struggle for the liberation of its territory, there has been no room for any proposition other than the option of resistance and liberation of the land from Israeli occupation. One should bear in mind that since the Israeli invasion it has been clearly apparent that Israel has been taking aim against Lebanon with respect to its social makeup, its territory, its waters, its economic and financial status, and its cultural role; therefore, Lebanon must defend itself and strategically conceptualize a struggle to protect its survival and perseverance. This can happen only through cooperation with Syria, which is directly concerned with this choice of a target because the threat to Lebanon is a threat to Syria.

[Question] Following the liberation of the territory and Israel's departure, will you adhere to the notion of Lebanon's neutrality?

[Answer] Israel's withdrawal from our territory is tactical, not strategic; Israel will not abandon the idea of fragmenting Lebanon and consequently the Arab region into racist factional entities similar to its own. As far as it goes, this would constitute a guarantee which would take the place of the Western guarantee of its survival and continuity. We must stress only our own will to defend our existence and survival.

The Syrian Initiative

[Question] The issue of closing the Lebanese file: how do you view the Syrian initiative in Lebanon?

[Answer] I previously said that we are not in a state of revolution, and I hasten to advocate the need for a solution to the Lebanese crisis that is removed from a solution to the crisis of the region, because the continuation of the crisis is Israel's doing, first of all, and it has been able to ruin and eliminate Arab forces in this crisis and to cause the demise of the Palestinian resistance by enticing it to enter in as a constituent element during the severity of the crisis; consequently Israel has managed to divert the Arabs from confronting it as they must. Therein lies the importance of the Syrian strategy, which has rejected the solutions of surrender and forms of separate peace embodied in the Camp David agreements and since 1976 has assiduously worked to try to close the dossier on the Lebanese crisis on the one hand and seek to establish a military strategic balance with Israel on the other. It has not changed this strategy one iota during the periods of

the crisis. While the Syrian initiative has been obstructed by Israel's action on the one hand and the action of some Arab parties on the other, it has continued to this day. Therefore Lebanon, after all that has happened, must hasten to benefit from this strategy, which has proved its validity, and close the file on its own crisis, and will thus be able to play a big role in solving the region's crisis on proper just bases truly guaranteeing the Palestinian people's rights, especially with the collapse of the logic of separate peace, now that it has become apparent that Israel does not want peace but rather wants the Arabs' unrestricted, unconditional surrender.

[Question] Do you believe that what happened in Tripoli might be repeated in some other Lebanese city or region?

[Answer] The Lebanese wound, which has been bleeding and open for more than 10 years, has attracted all sorts of diseases and germs. Any operation on the body of any sick person must entail pain, but it is to be judged on whether it saves this body from inevitable death. If Tripoli has paid the price it has because a broad view of matters on the part of groups has been lacking, in my opinion these pains have been payment for the nation as a whole, since the lesson will certainly benefit the other areas.

[Question] What about security in Lebanon and the arrival of Syrian forces?

[Answer] It is clear, in my approach, that I am against any internal security which will have the effect of subjecting the unity of the nation to danger and against any illegitimate armed presence which will have the effect of extending the life of the crisis, and am in favor of any legitimate security, especially when the goal is to save Lebanon, create national conciliation among its people and redeploy its state's authority over its entire territory. When Nazi Germany occupied France, France's military power collapsed and France saw nothing wrong with seeking the aid of its allies' armies, which enabled it to rebuild its forces, enabling it to regain its sovereignty and independence. We know the great differences between the French people and the peoples of its allies; what, then, would be the situation between two fraternal peoples where no stronger, deeper ties exist than those between them?

The Majority Is in Favor of a Solution

[Question] How and when will the solution occur?

[Answer] I do not consider it farfetched that there will be people harmed by a solution who will try to strike out at it, but in my opinion the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese in all areas are in favor of the solution and the national goal, which is to close the file on the Lebanese crisis. Suffice it for me in this regard to point to our economic and social situation, which no longer can tolerate any delay. We cannot compare our situation with any past period of administration of or experience with the crisis. We are now faced with a state of affairs which is either salvation or annihilation. We have the right, in the face of this, to adhere to survival in order to help ourselves and it is not natural that we should help destroy ourselves.

[Question] How do you evaluate the situation in Sidon, West Beirut, the south and the al-Shuf from the political and security standpoints?

[Answer] Any rule in any region is a general one which cannot be turned into a special case. There is no room for applying the opposite of what has been applied to Zahlah or Tripoli to the other regions. When we advocate closing the file on the Lebanese crisis, we cannot exempt any area or city from this goal. The logic of liberation, unification and political reform is our approach, and there is no room for any other line of thinking.

The Signs of Detente

[Question] Some forces find fault with you for your optimistic statements with respect to a nearby, imminent solution to the Lebanese issue. In this light, what are the features of the Arab, regional and international forms of detente which you use as a point of departure?

[Answer] Everyone working in the general field must stay away from efforts at clairvoyance and astrology, because the issue is not connected to his person but to the destiny and future of the people. The issue is not one of optimism or pessimism as far as a public person goes, but is an approach and determination to realize something specific related to the destiny of the country and the people. The will for salvation is the duty of every citizen so that he will not fall among people who betray their country and themselves. As for political action, that consists of bringing facts together and consequently examining their true nature. What there is no doubt about is that international detente is on the horizon; proof of this is the scheduling of an American-Soviet summit. The beginning of detente is apparent even if there is nothing in this summit's agenda that would indicate the possibility of a discussion of the Lebanese crisis, that would indicate a detente which would remove the two great powers from the struggle in explosive areas, one of which is Lebanon. This international detente constitutes a ripe opportunity which will make it possible to proceed along the road to solving the Lebanese crisis without protests or significant obstacles.

In the international context there also is a European approach which is in favor of ending the Lebanese crisis. The proof of that is the activity the Vatican is undertaking, in addition to France, West Germany and others. I am not spreading about a secret when I say that some European countries previously demanded to take part in the solution with Syria, but recently these countries have come to have the conviction that they must support Syria as far as the solution goes and not take part, especially since we are not dealing with the distribution of shares to people who want to help and take part in the solution. If we reject the logic of making allocations among ourselves as Lebanese, it is clear that we must reject granting shares to the outer world.

In the Arab context, the change in positions is clear, since the situation has been turned around, from attempts to isolate Syria and frustrate its role to positions of support and backing. The coming Arab summit, which will put great store by Syria's attendance, since it is the backbone and the basic front in confronting Israel, is one of the basic facts being taken

into consideration, in addition to the Israeli withdrawal as a result of the national resistance's determination and the obvious Lebanese will which has expressed itself in more than one area.

Through these things, in addition to the domestic facts I referred to at the beginning of the conversation, including the collapse of the Israeli option, the rejection of internal security and an armed presence for Lebanese and non-Lebanese, and the emergence of common general points which are aimed at bringing about the desired national conciliation, we will be able to determine that the circumstances are suitable for closing the file on the Lebanese crisis.

Fairness

[Question] Were we to ask you, as an observer, not a chairman of the Lebanese chamber of deputies, to give your opinion on what Nabih Birri, Walid Jumblatt and Ili Hubayqah want, what would you say?

[Answer] It has not been my custom to differentiate between my function as a citizen observer and as an official. I am in both cases responsible. My job is to investigate and examine what will benefit my nation through any group's position.

[Question] There is a statement by the head of the AMAL movement which holds that the problem will be solved when the Shiite faction is given its rights. What do you say?

[Answer] When we call for the rule of justice and moderation, we mean fairness to all groups and factions, since no formula can see the light of day and be destined to prevail, be stable and succeed except through everyone's conviction that it will realize justice and equality. On the subject of saving a nation and building a state, we are taking citizens into account as citizens without distinction or differentiation, and the mentality of pigeonholing regions, factions and citizens must be thwarted.

Israel and the State of Doubt

[Question] Do you consider that some threat exists to the Arab Gulf from the Shiite political tide, especially since there are people talking about a Shiite Arab Republic in Lebanon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran?

[Answer] One of the most important means as far as Israel goes in carrying out its fragmentation schemes in Lebanon and the region is to create a state of doubt and create fears among Lebanese factions in order to drive the divisions in deeper and create suitable circumstances for each faction to withdraw into itself.

That is the maximum Israeli goal. Lebanon consists of 17 factions and it is not possible to give the government in it any factional or religious character, because that will produce the result Israel is aiming at. As far as the Shiite faction goes, if it rejects the spirit of factionalism among others,

it will of course reject such a spirit within itself. This is not to offer a defense of what is said; rather, basically and in all situations we are against any Shiite identity and against any factional demand whether issued by the Shiites or other factions. Justice and equality are the two elements which will guarantee the interests of the Shiites and others. As regards the Gulf area, in my opinion the forces which trumped up the war there and the signs of Israel and those behind Israel are not far from it. These forces have relied on stirring up religious chauvinism and ethnic differences while the goal in this provocation is to strike out at the society as a whole and not back one group against another or one religion against another. It is necessary to recall the numerous attempts to stir up factional chauvinism among Moslems and Christians in Lebanon and subsequently among the Moslems themselves. We find that all the attempts have met with failure because of the strength of elements of solidarity, especially among Islamic ranks, which passed through a great test, God be praised.

As regards the Shiite Arab Republic, I envy the people holding this belief the peace of mind of their concern.

Salvation for Everyone

[Question] In the light of what has happened, is Islam in the traditional political sense losing its role and currently its status, or is Lebanon, with all its groups and factions, going through the same situation?

[Answer] It has become clear that no group can eliminate any other group in Lebanon. Salvation will either belong to everyone or there will be none. It has also become clear, too, that repression and deprivation in any region, group or faction will result in great harm to the person committing the deprivation and the deprived person, to the oppressor and the oppressed. Is it permissible and reasonable for me to help lay a time bomb which will blow up on my children in the future?

The Problem of Uprooted Persons

[Question] There are hundreds of thousands of uprooted persons in Lebanon. What is your vision of a solution to this problem?

[Answer] This issue heads the list of priorities in any national reconciliation. One obvious step in dealing with the most conspicuous points which were dealt with at the Lebanese-Syrian summit was the issue of the uprooted persons, since the agreement was clear that the uprooted persons should return to their homes and villages, because this issue specifically is part of the gist of dealing with the Israeli role, on the one hand, and is also part of the gist of the Lebanese makeup and the true unity of Lebanon on the other. It is one subject which one cannot negotiate or bargain over.

The law establishing the national council for uprooted persons' affairs was issued as part of the essence of the general budget law for 1985. The law has the goal of enabling uprooted persons to go back to their homes and villages and therefore helping them through the period of their dispossession on the other. This law is waiting for the council of ministers' meeting

so that the council board may be formed and a start may be made on the executive activities for it. One should bear in mind that the sum of 300 million pounds has been put at this council's disposal.

The other issue on which agreement was reached at the previous Lebanese-Syrian summit was compensation for Lebanese people harmed by the Lebanese war or by the Israeli occupation. The problem of the persons who were uprooted from their regions is bigger than any local group because it touches on the essence of the unity of the land and national and domestic homogeneity.

It is worth pointing out that when a limit is put to the crisis and the ending of the fighting and killing in Lebanon is declared, the Lebanese chamber of deputies must take the initiative of declaring Lebanon a disaster area and seek to collect international aid to reconstruct it.

[Question] How do you view the army's role in the current and coming stages?

[Answer] After all the sad developments domestically and after the Israeli invasion, it is necessary to rebuild the army, consolidate it and retrain it, especially since favorable circumstances have started to manifest themselves for drawing up a defense strategy based on Israel's designs on the Lebanese structure, in terms of its land, water and role, since the army is the army of the nation and has clear national goals in whose context alone it operates. Although the army has a security role in this stage, requirements stress that the role of the internal security forces should be strengthened and their number and materiel increased so they alone will be the means for ensuring security.

[Question] What about the private armies?

[Answer] When we say total consolidation and retraining, there is no room or influence for factional brigades.

[Question] Do you believe that resolution is underway? Will it be reassuring to the Lebanese?

[Answer] What has happened in Zahlah, the al-Biqah, Tripoli and the north are executive steps in the direction of a solution. We expect similar steps in the other areas. We fully understand that repeated accumulated disappointments have brought the Lebanese close to a state of despair and kept them from being convinced about an upcoming resolution, but we reject such capitulation and remind everyone of the duty of strengthening one's will, because the preservation of nations requires every sacrifice and determination in confronting the state of surrender.

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CSO: 4404/136

LEBANON

SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 14 Oct 85 pp 21, 22

[Interview with Parliament Chairman Husayn al-Husayni by Nuha al-Ghur: "The Cairo Agreement Has in Effect Been Abrogated in Practice and Internationally"; date and place not specified]

[Text] This conversation, which AL-DUSTUR's correspondent in Beirut held with Husayn al-Husayni, chairman of the Lebanese parliament, could not in its final form go against the excessive optimism for which Lebanese officials in general have been known for a whole decade of time -- the duration of the Lebanese civil war to this point. However, the important thing in this conversation specifically is that the official Lebanese position toward the Palestinian resistance and reservations regarding the Palestinian presence in Lebanon have found their appropriate articulation in the words of the chairman of the Lebanese parliament. The reader can deduce the dimensions and background of what is going on in the Palestinian camps now from this articulation specifically.

AL-DUSTUR: Would you prefer that an Islamic-Christian conference be held?

Husayn al-Husayni: The important thing is to arrive at reconciliation. This can be achieved through the holding of a Christian meeting, which would be followed by an Islamic-Christian meeting. We must strive and work vigilantly to make this meeting a success.

Although two conferences of dialogue have been held, in Geneva and Lausanne, the national unity cabinet has been formed and its ministerial statement has been declared, containing a graphic depiction of the national reconciliation, we find that the crisis of confidence still exists. On top of the crisis of confidence there is a crisis of persons who can speak on the Christian side, and this all constitutes an obstacle impeding the process of national conciliation.

These all portend the lack of a perspective for a solution. Since the possibilities exist, the setting out of broad outlines has therefore been settled on but a detailed formula for solving the crisis has not been entered into.

Now, we are in the process of translating the outlines agreed on in Geneva and Lausanne into a plan which can be carried out immediately, and this prompts us to accelerate the steps, out of fear that conditions will change.

Regarding the issue of the Christians who will speak, we ourselves play no part in having spokesmen or not having them; this is something which concerns our Christian brothers. The five-party committee which was produced by the Damascus meeting has not yet met to set out a platform of action for the anticipated contacts, and it is not possible to speculate about any subjects before we get to them.

AL-DUSTUR: What is the task of the five-party committee, which includes you as well as [former] premiers Karami and al-Huss, following Jumblatt's position "either kill or be killed?" Is it able to talk to the other side?

Husayn al-Husayni: Of course, as long as we have not set out any formula for agreement over which the parties can come together, the party can express its view as it wishes. We cannot oppose or agree with any party before initiating the actual charter process, because we ourselves are in a state of conflict. Each party can choose its way of dealing with the existing situation. The important thing is that the five-party committee's basic task is to give concrete form to the Lebanese national plan in order to end the Lebanese war. Of course, providing this concrete form will be the result of contacts the committee will make as a group or individually, according to the circumstances, in order to give this activity concrete form.

AL-DUSTUR: In your capacity as a statesman, not a member of a group, don't you believe that the Damascus agreement does not concern you as an official authority, since it was signed by militias and parties?

Husayn al-Husayni: What concerns us is that the agreement does not allow or recognize any armed presence for the Lebanese or Palestinians, or recognize internal security for either of them. This means that I am adhering to this principle, as the head of the legislative authority in Lebanon, in my name and in the name of the chamber of deputies and the whole Lebanese people.

AL-DUSTUR: The Liberation Organization has restored the validity to the Cairo agreement signed between itself and the Lebanese authorities, and this agreement still has not been abrogated officially, since it is the chamber of deputies that approved this agreement. What is your opinion?

Husayn al-Husayni: Who said this? The Cairo agreement has not yet been submitted to the chamber of deputies. In spite of that, this does not prevent me from getting into the basic point. In the science of law, it is known that there is a textual sequence to every section. An agreement was concluded between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine Liberation Organization which has two sections:

First, a section related to the presence of the Palestinians on the territory of Lebanon, which we adhere to and do not ignore.

Second, a military section which calls for the launching of the Palestinian resistance from Lebanese territory. This military section, in terms of the

Palestinian armed presence on the territory of the south, was abrogated by the international Resolution 425 for 1978 and it did not cite anything by the name of the Cairo agreement in its military section. There was an agreement between the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organization on ending the armed presence and the presence of armed persons on Lebanese territory after the Israeli invasion. Where is the Cairo agreement so that I can abrogate it? I cannot abrogate something that does not exist.

AL-DUSTUR: Since the Lebanese war began, Lebanon has been acting exclusively with a single front in its dealings, putting its cards in its hand, then moving over to another area. Don't you thereby consider that there are risks to this policy?

Husayn al-Husayni: Syria has an obligation toward Lebanon. We are not acting as beggars with Syria or anyone else. We are an Arab country and the conspiracy is against us because we are part of this Arab nation and part of the Arab land. Conspiracy is being carried out against us as it is being carried out against others. If Lebanon falls, Syria will not be far from collapsing. Syria must defend us and defend itself, and it is its duty, and also the duty of every Arab country, to help us. While geography has made Syria our big brother, that does not in any way mean that the responsibility has been broken up and confined to Syria. Rather, it is a comprehensive Arab responsibility, and every Arab everywhere must take the initiative of helping us and assisting us and of putting all its powers on our side, because we are waging the war of the Arab nation. Here it is necessary to remind the world that France was subjected to German occupation and its allies came and helped it end this occupation.

AL-DUSTUR: Attempts are being made to internationalize the issue of Jazzin and consider it an extension of the border strip. Doesn't the fear exist that that will be an entree for a resumption of the discussion of the Zionist approach, which calls for the deployment of the emergency [forces] north of the al-Litani?

Husayn al-Husayni: We note that the international emergency forces in themselves are not forces separating us from Israel; rather, they are forces which on the basis of the request of the Lebanese government are helping it exercise its authority. There is a difference, as far as we are concerned, and we might seek the aid of international forces wherever they are. However, the most important thing is that the activity of the emergency forces begin at the border strip, with the Lebanese borders to the north, and not proceed from the north to the south. We are not ready to repeat the experience of 1978 when Israel enticed us into deploying the emergency forces from the north to the south, and brought us to a specific point where it established the border strip, during which it hid behind what were called at that time Sa'd Haddad's forces. Now Israel has played the same role in terms of demanding the deployment of the emergency forces from the al-Awwali, passing through Jazzin to the south, in order to enable itself to establish a new border strip behind another facade, Antoine Lahad by name. We cannot accept such a premise. Rather, we want to assert Israel's withdrawal from our territories and the deployment of the emergency forces from the south to the north. That is something that concerns us, is between us and the United Nations, and has no connection with Israel.

AL-DUSTUR: The Lebanese newspapers appear to be subject to compulsory censorship and the emigre papers are subject to confiscation. Why don't you set off an initiative to save Lebanon's media face from disfiguration?

Husayn al-Husayni: Lebanon came into being and exists, has prevailed and is prevailing thanks to the freedoms the Lebanese people cling to the way they cling to their lives. It is one of the most noble duties, for us, to struggle permanently to preserve these freedoms, even if we pass through compulsory circumstances which have led to the suspension of basic constitutional institutions among other things. It is natural that the ordeal of the press and the media should have been a long one. Indeed, our adherence to these freedoms and our permanent effort to enable the press to convey the views of the officials and public opinion are clear.

AL-DUSTUR: The chamber of deputies has submitted a question to itself: no subordination, no opposition, no blocs. Is this the proper form for the parliamentary game to take?

Husayn al-Husayni: I believe that as soon as a minimum of security is attained, matters will return to their own course and the game will proceed according to their principles.

AL-DUSTUR: Your statement and those of [former] Premier Karami lie within the framework of the psychological treatment of the Lebanese people's state of aggravated crisis. Aren't these statements psychiatric in nature?

Husayn al-Husayni: Let me once again reiterate my preference for avoiding the word "optimism" and "pessimism." It is the official's duty to state the things he sees to public opinion so that there will be agreement on the part of public opinion and support for these steps. Our task, that of Premier Karami, me and others who are in the position of responsibility, is to direct public opinion to what will realize good for the country and bring about its interests. This is what we are doing and it is useful because it spares public opinion frustration and does not fall within the category of causing it despair with the result that Lebanon will collapse and we will lose all hope of saving it. I do not believe that that is anyone's opinion.

To sum up, I can represent the will of the Lebanese people in aspiring to salvation from the ordeal and longing for the restoration of sovereignty and independence and the restoration of Lebanon to its natural situation.

11887
CSO: 4404/128

3 February 1986

LEBANON

HIZBALLAH GUIDE DESCRIBES TRIPOLI SITUATION

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14-20 Oct 85 pp 20, 21

[Interview with Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizballah guide, by Subhi Mundhir Yaghi: "Comparing the Parties Statements From Tripoli With Ahmad Sa'id's Lies"; in Ba'labakk, date not specified]

[Text] Why Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli specifically? What is his connection with the events in Tripoli? Why him, when he headed the delegation negotiating in Damascus on the subject of the capital of the north?

Because he was one of the most prominent participants in the Damascus meetings held during the destructive Tripoli war, with the participation of the Iranian delegation, the Hizballah delegation and Shaykh Sha'ban on the one hand and the Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad and Syrian officials on the other.

Tripoli was the subject of our meeting with al-Tufayli, the Hizballah's guide.

At this meeting, al-Tufayli attacked the National Movement parties and denied that there were any Palestinian fighting men on the side of the Unification. He also expressed his pessimism about the situation in Lebanon.

Herewith is the text of the conversation:

Question: The battle of Tripoli had its local and international effect. In your opinion, what is its purpose, and who is behind it? Whose interests does it serve?

Answer: The fighting in Tripoli certainly does have a local and international effect, especially since Tripoli is a large Lebanese city and is well known for its Islamic policies in general. The fighting has had a great psychological effect on all the Lebanese and Islamic areas, because it has made Moslems in general imagine that there was a campaign against the Islamic policies on the part of the "nationalist parties," which led to a kind of wariness and doubt in people's spirits and caused a state of wariness in every section and village. Of course, this situation damages the unity of ranks and homogeneity regarding Islamic policies. We hope that the people

venturing on any action of this kind will think of its consequences, both short-term and long-term, because in Lebanon there is a mixture of people with contradictory whims, purposes and creeds. In Lebanon there are the world's agencies, the secret ones and the open ones, which are earnestly striving to fragment every sign of unity and homogeneity in the Moslems' ranks. As to the international effect of this fighting, that has been serious, and in general the impression has been that there is an attempt to annihilate a historic, important city in Lebanon.

Of course this has clearly been reflected in the methods that have been used to strike at this city, since all forms of artillery have been used intensively in all its sections. The goal of this fighting has been to strike at the Islamic current and attempt to restore the parties' dominance of the Moslems once again, now that events had established these parties' failure of credibility over the years in which they held sway among the Islamic men on the street. This war is proof of the fact that these parties have failed, because of our belief that no one who harbors love for his city and his people in his spirit can do what the parties have done in Tripoli, although they could not prejudice it in any way large or small, since all attempts they came up with have been dashed on its gates. What has been said about the military advance on the gates of Tripoli was a pure lie, in the manner of Ahmad Sa'id in 1967.

A Service to Israel

Question: You have not told us who this fighting is serving.

Answer: It serves only Israel.

Question: How do you assess the Hizballah's relations with the Islamic Unification Movement?

Answer: The guiding premise in the Hizballah's relations with the Unification Movement is rule by Islamic law which binds every Moslem to act for all Moslems in all areas of the world, side with Moslems who are oppressed, bring their people together and unify their statements. Part of this Islamic legal duty of ours is our action to nip strife in Tripoli in the bud and repair what can be repaired of this blessed city. Our relationship with the Unification Movement is made strong and rendered firm to the extent of our commitment and theirs to the holy Koran.

Question: Since you took part in the Damascus meeting with the Iranian delegation and Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban on the one hand and President al-Asad and Syrian officials on the other, could we find out what went on at that meeting, and what the form of its results were?

Answer: Of course, we thank the Syrian brothers for the aid they provided in order that this agreement could be reached. It is true that the attempt to reach agreement was hard, but it bore fruit!

As to the sections of the agreement, these have been broadcast verbatim and are clear. If good will is present, and I believe that it is, this agreement will be the end of Tripoli's sorrows and problems.

In our meeting with President Hafiz al-Asad, he was clear regarding his respect and affection for Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, and affirmed to him that Tripoli, with its Islamic countenance, embodied in Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban, was very beloved and honored by him. I believe that we have reached a sort of psychological mutual understanding which will have a basic effect on the application of the sections of the agreement, and this is something important.

No Positive Features

Question: What are the negative features of the fighting in Tripoli? If there are any positive features, what are they?

Answer: There are no positive features to the fighting in Tripoli. What are the positive features in the killing of Moslems? The destruction of their homes? Yes, the intervention by the Hizballah has had an effect in clearing the heavily-charged air as a result of some practices in Beirut. As far as the negative aspects go, these are many, among them the shaking of trust in Islamic ranks, the great losses of life and property, and the reflection of this on the course of the struggle with the Israeli enemy. In any event, we can transcend this problem and eliminate its effects.

Question: Some people believe that the spark of war in Tripoli has spread to other areas of Lebanon such as Ba'labakk, for instance. What is your comment on this belief?

Answer: I would not give this question serious significance unless Israel had a very strong presence, by means of which it could force combat to occur everywhere, at which point this question would acquire significance. Assuming that Israel managed to do something of this sort, I believe that its fingers would be totally burnt. It is true that we do not enter into any war of struggle among Moslems and we bear up under every aggravation and excess, but when the question concerns Israel and its agents, the situation is totally different.

Question: In a recent speech of yours, you said that Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban has been exposed to a vicious attack whereas Elie Hubayqah is "pampered and cosseted." What is your position on the Jumblatt-Birri-Hubayqah meeting?

Answer: My conviction is that Elie Hubayqah is one of Israel's men, however much he might attempt to plead that he is innocent of that, and is a basic contributor to all the hardships the Moslems have suffered from in Lebanon. His vile acts included the great massacres in Sabra and Shatila. This man in our view is just a criminal and agent who deserves nothing but a trial. For him to be a party to the establishment of the Lebanon of the future is something we do not accept in any event and if we accepted it that would be real treason to our basic causes, our martyrs and our future. The meetings taking place in Damascus are rejected by us in whole and in part and I do not believe there is an honorable person in Lebanon who would argue at all with us over this view. I advise that things be dealt with in a proper manner and in a manner which will bring us to real solutions, far removed from deals with Israel's agents.

Question: Do you agree with me that Yasir 'Arafat is behind the outbreak which has occurred in Tripoli? What effect or change has the war in Tripoli brought to the course of political affairs?

'Arafat Is Present

Answer: 'Arafat is present in almost all Lebanese cities, the Islamic ones in particular. It is true that 'Arafat has surrendered much at the expense of his cause, his people and his land and is now hurriedly seeking American satisfaction with him and Israeli forgiveness of him, but I have not myself seen what has been said about Yasir 'Arafat's influence in fanning strife in Tripoli, for example. We have heard of the presence of officers and fighting men of his, but have not seen that ourselves.

Question: What about the Palestinian al-Yarmuq Brigade in Tripoli?

Answer: I stress that we have not seen that ourselves, and Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban has asserted that there are no Palestinian fighting men with the Unification [Movement] in Tripoli and that the goal of the fighting that went on in Tripoli was not to expel 'Arafat or straighten out Tripoli's political policy; rather, it was "so that champagne could be drunk in some sections of it."

It is true that there have been some erroneous practices which disturbed security and some minor skirmishes from time to time. We had hoped that they would not take place, but these acts were not a justification for the destruction which occurred in Tripoli, especially if we measure these practices by those which occur in Beirut, because the practices in Beirut cannot be endured, and the vile acts which take place there are disgraceful. In spite of this, the situation and treatment with regard to Beirut differ from Tripoli.

Question: What about the effect of the fighting on the course of political affairs?

Answer: I do not believe that there has been a political effect regarding what has taken place, especially since the agreement which took place is close to the substance of the previous agreement, with slight modification.

Question: How are your relations with the Syrian forces in the al-Biqa' these days?

Answer: They are very good and are improving.

A Visit To Mend the Rift

Question: It has been said that your recent visit to Iran was in order to mend the rift between you and Husayn al-Musawi. What is the truth of that?

Answer: There was no rift to mend.

Question: So what was the objective of the visit to Iran?

Answer: The objective of the visit resulted from the Israeli withdrawal from most of the Islamic areas in the south. There are obligations which must be met as far as our people's condition in the south goes. It was necessary to

visit the Islamic Republic in order to help our people in the south of Lebanon and review ways and means of pursuing action against Israel.

Against Detention and Murder

Question: Are you in favor of the execution of the Soviet diplomat Arkady Katakov at the hands of the Islamic Liberation Organization and the execution of the political counsellor of the American embassy, William Buckley, at the hands of the Islamic Jihad Organization?

Answer: We are not in favor of the detention of the Soviet diplomats, not to speak of the murder of some of them, and we believe that those who carried that out are persons who do not know their own interests, or an entity which sought to cause harm.

As for the American diplomat and his murder, I do not know the circumstances and the truth of what has been said in the media on this matter. If what was cited in the news is correct, that occurred as a reply to the American position regarding the Israeli bombing in Tunisia.

Question: Some people say that international intelligence agencies were behind the execution of the Soviet diplomat, not vindictive individuals! What is your reply to this?

Answer: It is a very strong possibility.

Question: Let us go back to Tripoli. What, in your view, is the next stage, in the context of Lebanon in general, what will its consequences be, and are the solutions that have been proposed for the city of Tripoli radical and feasible, or are they like the solutions that preceded them?

Answer: In general, the situation in Lebanon always progresses from bad to worse. Things that are or were possible a few months or a year ago become impossible as time passes because of the proliferation of complexities and ramifications that befall them. Therefore I am not optimistic about the general situation in Lebanon, although I have been optimistic about the state of the Moslems, whose power is growing, whose awareness of things is growing, and whose orientation is being set right, causing them to orient themselves toward the proper goal, which is to build an Islamic society resisting Israel as a basic objective.

Question: What about the solutions that have been proposed for Tripoli?

Answer: Regarding the solutions which have been proposed for Tripoli, I believe that they are feasible, and radical, especially with the confidence we have felt in them among the parties. Of course, we must know that everything will collapse in the face of ill will.

Who Will Provide Compensation!

Question: Who will provide compensation for the relatives of the victims, the owners of destroyed homes and the oppressed families in the capital of the north?

Answer: The losses are very great and a single body cannot evaluate the compensation. However, for our part, we will try as far as possible to make compensation. I believe that Iran has taken an initiative with something of this sort, by sending an airplane with supplies, medicine and some doctors.

Question: What do you expect from the upcoming Soviet-American summit?

Answer: We expect more difficulties looming over us and conspiracies against our people.

No Trust in the Army

Question: We are left with a final question, peripheral to the interview, which is:

In the security context in Ba'labakk, do you intend to hand the Shaykh 'Abdallah barracks over to the Lebanese army? Then, do you welcome the entry of the Lebanese army (the first brigade) into the city of Ba'labakk to maintain security there, although its experience in the west al-Biq'a' has been a success, though the Hizballah is present in these areas?

Answer: As far as handing over the Shaykh 'Abdallah barracks goes, this subject has not been raised and no one has talked with us about it. On top of that, they are not fit to be used. Moreover, who would we relinquish them to? We have no trust in this Lebanese army. Indeed, to the contrary, as long as its command is in al-Yarzah, it is an enemy army.

Question: But it is present in the western al-Biq'a' and is performing its national duties.

Answer: The presence of the Lebanese army in the west al-Biq'a' is one of form, and it must be said that there is an entity which is maintaining security.

Question: And in Ba'labakk?

Answer: In Ba'labakk we do not need this sort of presence, especially since the Syrian brothers are performing the duty! Indeed, to the contrary, we are afraid that the Lebanese army will plant booby-trapped cars among our people, because it is an enemy army. When we say that it is an enemy army, it is an enemy and we are not joking! We expect it to do what we expect enemies to do. In the course of investigations, it became apparent to us that officers of the Lebanese army were behind many of the explosions which took place in Beirut in 1983.

Question: But the Syrians have supported the deployment of the Lebanese army over all Lebanese territory, so that the legitimate authorities might extend their authority.

Answer: I do not believe that the Syrians are supporting it in this direction, but they depend on it in some exceptional cases.

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CSO: 4404/128

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MOSLEM NATIONALIST LEADER DEFINES POLICIES

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14-20 Oct 85 pp 15-18

[Interview with Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd, secretary general of the Nasirist People's Organization, by Khalil Abu Antun and Edward Ashi; date and place not specified]

[Text] About 10 years ago, on 26 February 1975, specifically, the spark of war was touched off in Sidon with the assassination of the former leader Ma'ruf Sa'd, the chairman of the Nasirist People's Organization, who had been leading a mass demonstration in Sidon to which he had summoned fishermen to protest the grant of a permit to the Protein Company stating that it would be given a fishing monopoly the length of the Lebanese coast for a period of 99 years.

In Sidon, which in times past was nicknamed the Mother of Science and Mines, we paused to ponder the bitter situation it has been suffering through. Its neighbor Jazzin has shared its concerns and destiny now that the lines of contact in Kafr Falus, Lab'a and 'Ayn al-Mir, where are situated the Army of Southern Lebanon, under the command of Staff Maj Gen Antoine Lahad, on the one hand, and on the other the People's Liberation Army, Forces of the Martyred Ma'ruf Sa'd, under the command of the secretary general of the Nasirist People's Organization, Eng Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd, have drawn apart from one another.

After the statements we quoted 2 weeks ago by Lahad, who said "There will be no retreat from the decision to return the uprooted persons to their villages by force of arms in the event the peaceful efforts that have been made in more than one context fail," and after the deterioration of conditions on this front, we quoted the position to Eng Sa'd in order to learn about his opinion and hear his answer to Lahad's statements. We had the following conversation with him:

Question: What is your reply to the statement by Staff Maj Gen Antoine Lahad, commander of the Army of Southern Lebanon, concerning a military solution?

Answer: We had hoped that talk of that sort would not have been uttered by Lahad, because it provokes sensitive factional feelings and consequently

sabotages the pattern of common life that historically was present in the area.

Question: In Lahad's view, a peaceful solution consists of the withdrawal of all fighting men from the region they have occupied east of Sidon, definitively, without restrictions or conditions, provided that the inhabitants be returned to their villages in the context of an effective force chosen by the Lebanese government. What is your view?

Answer: We are in favor of any peaceful political solution to the Jazzin issue following the departure of Lahad, the "Lebanese Forces" and the Chamounists who have come into the area. In the face of a peaceful political solution to the Jazzin issue, I cannot get into a discussion on the issue of the return of uprooted persons to the villages east of Sidon. Who drove the people out of the area?

Question: That is what we want to learn about from you, precisely.

Answer: I hold everyone responsible for driving the Christians out of the mountains, and he himself is responsible for driving the Christians out east of Sidon. Who wants to drive the Christians out of Jazzin today? Lahad? Chamoun?

Question: How do you view a peaceful solution to the issue of uprooted persons?

Answer: A peaceful solution will lie in the withdrawal of Lahad, the "forces" and the Chamounists from the Jazzin area. We in our capacity as nationalist forces will guarantee the political solution in Jazzin, after the other matter related to the people driven out of the villages east of Sidon is resolved, because it is the "Lebanese Forces" and Lahad who drove the inhabitants from the area by means of bullhorns and started "squeezing" the villages and shouting to the people "Come on, get out!" That is not reasonable. There are things which cannot be "crammed" into one's head. The bullhorns of the Lebanese Forces and Lahad would "insinuate themselves" into the villages and tell people, "Come on, move out." That is not reasonable.

Question: You are asking for Lahad's withdrawal from Jazzin and state that you will guarantee the political solution in Jazzin. Conversely, you are accused of causing extensive vindictive acts against the east of Sidon, such as the sabotage of villages, uprooting of inhabitants, levelling of houses, destruction of churches and altering of property signs. How do you defend yourself against these charges?

Answer: As I told you, the people who drove people out of the east of Sidon are well known. War, any war, leaves behind destruction, ruin and so forth. However, following a political solution for Jazzin, we will guarantee the protection of Jazzin and its people, who are also our people. We are also in favor of having every uprooted person who has no relationship to Israel, the "Lebanese Forces" and Lahad return to the area east of Sidon. I call on all Christians who are not connected to the "forces" and to Lahad to return. This is a region of coexistence and we want it to become so again.

Question: Lahad accuses the influential people of Sidon of not being in command of things; he says "They cannot make a statement and bear the responsibility for it in order to give people guarantees and ensure their peaceful return to their villages." What is your response?

Answer: In whose hands are his decisions? He moves by Israel's hands. We praise God are not in anyone's hands. I mean that he takes his decisions from Israel, obeys their orders and carries out their designs. We, praise be to God, are not carrying out any decision if it is made, except for Lebanese decisions.

Jazzin and Intentions

Question: In Lahad's opinion you will not spare Jazzin in the event you get there because you are scheming against its region and have the intentions in its regard that you consummated east of Sidon. What do you say?

Answer: We are holding Ja'ja' in the first place, and Lahad and Israel certainly, responsible for the consequences of what happened east of Sidon.

Question: The people uprooted from the east of Sidon wonder whether that is the conventional punishment for all the positive actions they carried out toward the people of Sidon when they received them in their homes during the Israeli invasion and also for standing by your side when they condemned and deplored the attempt to assassinate you.

Answer: Is it Sidon's punishment to be subjected to bombardment for 38 days, indeed 45 days, in populated areas? Is this the form of their punishment?

Question: Isn't a peaceful return through a political resolution better than confrontation and a military decision, since that will create a kind of intrinsic confidence in both parties?

Answer: Undoubtedly.

Question: Therefore, to demonstrate good will, why don't you return the Christians the courtesy and guarantee them a dignified, honorable return to their villages?

Answer: We are very concerned to have the uprooted persons return to the east of Sidon, following a political solution for the town of Jazzin. They will then go back to their villages to live with one another as in the past, without any problems.

No Red Lines

Question: Lahad talked about a military decision.

Answer: That is true.

Question: In the event they get to Sidon, as they are intending to, will you then give them a justification to act there as you did east of Sidon?

Answer: Lahad follows Israel's orders. They have perpetrated many things; you all know that. Israel and the "forces" brought Father Salim Ghazzal in for investigation three times. The man was imprisoned and there were drunks in with him.

Question: When did that happen?

Answer: As soon as they came into Sidon together, at the time of the invasion.

Question: All signs along the Kafr Falus-Lab'a-'Ayn al-Mir axis give warning that the security situation has been taking a new turn recently.

Answer: What is the turn? What do you mean?

Question: I mean that it is feared that the outbreak of combat on this front will go beyond the red line set out to freeze the situation along this axis.

Answer: Where are the red lines? I do not consider that there is a red line separating me from the south, or even a green line. I do not recognize red lines.

As I always say, I do not accept small cantons. I want a big canton, from the Gulf to the Atlantic, in stages.

Question: And after that, what next?

Answer: Oh, that is a very big story.

Question: How so?

Answer: For God's sake, we could reach the Islamic world then the American and Russian worlds also.

Question: Will that take place in the framework of a specific religious regime?

Answer (intently): We are seeking a national union where everyone will live in equality with one another.

Question: Could you explain further?

Answer: I am not working to establish a canton and I do not even accept any cantons. Our effort is focussed on the national and Islamic level and not on building cantons.

Question: What I mean by my question is, is what is sought by the initiation of combat along this front a change in military positions?

Answer: To be truthful, I ask that that question be presented to Lahad.

Question: Put another way, does it mean bypassing the political solution the influential people in Sidon and the region are working for with the influential people in Jazzin?

Answer: Israel's interests demand this. It is Israel that is escalating the situation through Lahad, who carries out the Israeli decisions.

Chamoun on the Line

Question: Where then do the efforts toward peace stand now?

Answer: We are still waiting. We have informed our brothers the influential people of Jazzin. Our position is clear with respect to the political solution, but it appears that they are helpless.

Question: Helpless from what angle?

Answer: Israeli pressure, and Chamoun has come onto the line again.

Question: Who do you mean by Chamoun, the father or the son?

Answer: There is no difference. The father, the son and the holy ghost, too.

Question: Could you explain to us how Chamoun came onto the line?

Answer: By getting the fighting men under Lahad to move by orders and support from Israel. Consequently they are also escalating the situation on the front.

Question: There are sources which have spoken about the recent creation of new military groupings in the Rum-Kafr Falus area, and also about the arrival of new military equipment and materiel along the contact lines at Kafr Falus-'Ayn al-Mir. Have you taken any practical steps to cope with this emerging situation?

Answer: I would like to cope with all these possibilities. Brother, I would like you to ask Chamoun why he has come onto the line at this time.

Question: What is the purpose in this, in your view?

Answer: Why Chamoun "wanted to" uproot Jazzin, you mean?

Question: Do you imagine that he is trying to do this?

Answer: So that the construction of the border strip will be completed.

Question: Will driving out the inhabitants solve the problem?

Answer: Yes, of course. I hold Chamoun responsible, and certainly Israel behind him. Lahad is carrying out the orders of Israel and Chamoun.

Question: Pierre Tannus, chairman of the central committee of the people uprooted from the villages of the al-Zahrani and Jazzin coast area, called for the condemnation of discrimination and close unity to declare an Islamic-Christian holy war to purge the land of saboteurs and aliens.

Answer: That is true.

Question: He has also called for sanctification of an Islamic-Christian charter to condemn all fanaticism, in order to turn over a new leaf in good relations and neighborliness between Sidon and the area east of it. One thing he has said is "We want to cooperate with Mustafa Sa'd and take his hand in ours." What is your response?

Answer: No doubt you all know that in the most difficult and gloomiest of circumstances, our Christian brothers formed the "Christian National Grouping" to confront Israel along the border strip, and also the "Tanyus Shahin" forces in Jazzin and in other areas. For God's sake, they are not from China. They are Christians who are concerned about the land and are protecting the nation's soil.

Our position is very clear: We, Moslems and Christians, are for holy war against the Zionist enemy.

Question: You said that you do not recognize the presence of red lines on the Kafr Falus-Lab'a-'Ayn al-Mir axis. As long as the possibility of military combat exists, are there peaceful solutions under discussion?

Answer: There are no red lines. Although they have had it in mind to set out red lines, we do not want that, because we have basically rejected the concentration of a Christian army in this region because it is Christian, or a Moslem army in this area because it is Islamic. We have rejected this because it is a sanctification of a specific situation on the Lebanese stage and it is our duty to reject it. Brother, I do not know what is with them.

Winter in Bakasin

Question: Winter is coming.

Answer: That is correct.

Question: Will there be peaceful solutions under discussion in the near future which will lead to some solution for the conditions of the uprooted persons?

Answer: My own home is in Bakasin. I would like to go to my home in Bakasin and spend the winter season there, as father accustomed us to doing in the past, when we would go to school in the morning and return in the evening to our home in the mountains because my father always said that the winter "changes form" up in Bakasin.

Question: How do you want to go there?

Answer: By ordinary means.

Question: How?

Answer: Peacefully, after a political solution, certainly.

Question: You demand Lahad's withdrawal from the Jazzin area.

Answer: And the "forces" and the neo-Chamounists, also.

Question: They give you the answer that they are defending their homes.

Answer: Where is their territory?

Question: In Jazzin and the area around it.

Answer: Brother, if they are the people of Jazzin, we will settle it with them, but they are all from outside Jazzin.

Question: The uprooted people consider that the people who occupied their villages, trod their land under, destroyed their homes and leveled their churches are "a group of aliens who do not have a foothold in our area," as they put it. What do you say about that statement?

Answer: Where did the aliens come from? Maybe they are Americans, Frenchmen, Soviets or Iranians who came to the region?

Question: So who trumped up the incidents in the area of Sidon and the east of it?

Answer: Who besides the "Lebanese Forces," Lahad and Israel? The issue is very plain.

Beirut and Tripoli

Question: Let us move on to the events in Beirut. It has been said that the objective of the clashes which occurred earlier in the western section was to uproot the Sunnites from West Beirut. What is your comment?

Answer: "Where are the Sunnites we want to send away? That's all talk on top of talk." We are without a doubt in favor of a united Lebanon dominated by justice, equality and equality of opportunities among all the existing parties, and consequently we reject the dominance of one party by the other.

Question: What is the purpose of these demonstrations which have been organized and the sitdown strikes in the mosques of West Beirut, in your view?

Answer: These sit-down strikes and demonstrations in West Beirut and Sidon are against the fighting and our position in this regard is clear and frank.

Question: Do you believe that the Tripoli fighting is an extension of the West Beirut incidents?

Answer: We are against the fighting.

Question: In your opinion, who does the bloodbath in Tripoli serve?

Answer: As I told you we are against the fighting and in favor of the condemnation of all disputes, so that we will be enabled to confront all American Zionist plans and schemes on the Lebanese stage.

Question: In your view, who lies behind the detonation of the situation in Tripoli?

Answer: We are against dominance and hegemony and want everyone to make concessions and take responsibility for things.

Question: Do you believe that what has happened in Tripoli could "shift over" to Sidon?

Answer: No, but if that happens I will withdraw from political activity.

Question: Are you in favor of the extension of competent government authority over all Lebanese territory?

Answer: National decisionmaking, certainly.

Question: Not the current government?

Answer: The current government? Where does one exist?

The Camps

Question: A "strike force" has been formed in Palestinian camps in the Sidon area. Don't you consider this internal security in the camps? Are you in favor of that?

Answer: Not at all, we do not consider it internal security in the camps because everything is done by our decision.

Question: Do you consider it farfetched that what happened in the Beirut camps might happen in the Palestinian camps in Sidon? Do you expect that the contagion of the war of the camps will spread to Sidon?

Answer: No, God willing. We are taking all eventualities into account, in order to cope with any situation which might arise.

Question: So this issue enters into the calculations?

Answer: All eventualities enter in. However, our people, whether in Sidon or the Palestinian camps, refuse to have anything of this sort happen, because our security is the Palestinian people's, and the Palestinian people's is ours.

Question: What Palestinians do you mean?

Answer: The Palestinian people who have been present on our territory since 1948, that is, before I was born.

Question: By my question I mean, 'Arafat's supporters or those who broke off in the form of military forces?

Answer: We have a clear position against the approach of abject surrender.

Question: Against whom, exactly?

Answer: Against Arab organizations taking approaches of abject surrender.

Question: The security police belonging to the People's Liberation Army, forces of the martyred Ma'ruf Sa'd, are in effect a strike force for preserving security and stability in Sidon and its outskirts, as you say. Are you trying to create internal security and establish a civilian administration in Sidon along the lines of what was done in the mountains?

Answer: Brother, send me the police. Bring them to me. Let them be so kind as to come and work. I asked the internal security forces to "be so kind" as to come and watch vigilantly over security and protect the citizens, because I am not prepared to bear the great cost burdens as far as security police are concerned. But neither the internal security forces nor the army want to act. For this reason, we have been compelled to form security police to guarantee security and stability and reassure the citizens.

Question: Did they refuse to come, or did you refuse to have them?

Answer: They do not want to come; it is not us who rejected them.

Question: Now you have said that you do not recognize them. How do you want them to deal with you?

Answer: In spite of that, I want them to act as internal security forces which are present, but that is not enough.

The War Will Be a Long One

Question: Don't you consider that adherence to rigid positions means prolonging the war?

Answer: I always say, in my personal positions, that the war will be a long one.

Question: So there are no early signs of an imminent solution on the horizon, in your view?

Answer: It is possible that there might be something, but that does not mean that a solution is imminent.

Question: President al-Jumayyil has said, "Our problem in Lebanon is that each group wants a solution on his scale."

Answer: On his scale. Our scale, brother, is very large.

Al-Bizri and the Cabinet

Question: What is your comment on the news that Dr Nazih al-Bizri will be running for the next premiership?

Answer: We will not participate in any cabinet in the context of the current regime. In the last one, everyone, whether a politician or not, had ambitions. We in our turn tell everyone, help yourselves; as far as we are concerned, as long as the regime exists, we will beg off.

Question: You said "We refuse to participate in the new cabinet." For whom are you speaking? For yourselves as a people's Nasirist organization or for Dr al-Bizri?

Answer: As far as we are concerned, ourselves as a people's Nasirist organization and an Islamic political platform. I tell Dr Nazih al-Bizri, help yourself; let him make the attempt. We hope, during this difficult, delicate stage the country is passing through, that everyone who wants to be in this position will impose a solution on the Lebanese stage so that we can reach safe ground.

Question: So you are in favor of the holding of a national conference in Damascus to get out of this crisis you are suffering from?

Answer: Without a doubt.

Question: In your view, will the intended result be achieved?

Answer: I said that the war will be a long one.

Question: Therefore you rule out a peaceful solution at the present time?

Answer: I am in favor of any peaceful solution which will have the effect of eliminating political factionalism and am in favor of having a new constitution for Lebanon along with it, and having this a country of justice, equality and equality of opportunity, far removed from dominance by any faction -- all this, certainly, after the abrogation of political factionalism, first of all.

Question: What is the extent of your relationship with Walid Jumblatt and the Socialist Progressive Party?

Answer: Actually, the Socialist Progressive Party and Walid Jumblatt sided with us more than the others, in the most difficult and gloomy circumstances.

Question: More than who, for example?

Answer: I said, more than the others.

Question: How would you describe living conditions in Sidon at present?

Answer: Good. Sidon, like other Lebanese areas, is suffering from an economic situation which is grinding down the country as a whole, and not just Sidon, and indeed every home as well. There is no "difference" among everyone who has dealt in dollars, even if things get worse.

Question: In your view, how much longer will the war last now?

Answer: Ten more years, God willing.

Question: Will the situation remain as it is 10 more years, with people enduring the hardships they are?

Answer: That is, is the situation in our hands?

Question: In whose hands is it then?

Answer: There is no doubt that there is a regional and international situation we must take into consideration, at which point we will realize how long the situation will last in the context of the war.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI

Question: Don't you believe that you are helping kindle the flames of war in this area?

Answer: It is AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI that is helping kindle the flames of war.

Question: How is that?

Answer: By the rumors you are constantly spreading. I would like this to be pointed out.

Question: What rumors?

Answer: I mean by the articles and comments and the way of raising questions by way of provoking conflict. "It is as if they wanted something to get going, and such and such a thing did start to get going."

Question: We draw people's attention and sound the alarm so that the people responsible might perhaps make remedies. Unfortunately, no one is doing this. Unfortunately, again, developments confirm the validity of our information.

Answer: What are these developments? What has happened that people had warned would happen?

Question: Hasn't anything happened in Lebanon, in your opinion? Don't you see that the fighting moves from one area and comes down on another? Yesterday in West Beirut, today the bloodbath in Tripoli, before that in Zahlah, the situation is tense in the south, tomorrow we do not know where and yesterday in the al-Kharrub region and east of Sidon, and before that Beirut and the mountains?

Answer: There is no bloodbath in Tripoli. The situation to us is clear: we are against the fighting.

Question: The explosive situation in Tripoli between the Unificationist Movement and the left-wing parties could lead to serious repercussions on the Lebanese stage.

Answer: As I told you before, we want everyone to take Sidon as an exemplary model of coexistence.

Question: Conversely, Lahad considers the border areas subject to the Army of Southern Lebanon in effect a vivid model of honorable coexistence among all Lebanese factions. What is your response?

Answer: How can you ask me to represent him? There is Israel. Is it our conclusive evidence that he is Montgomery? Ultimately, he carries out Israeli decisions.

Question: You say, let them take Sidon as an example. Meanwhile, there are Christians.

Answer: We have Christians in Sidon. There are Christians in the political council also. "That tells you something." By the way, they are not Communists, lest you say that they are Communist Christians.

Did you see the pictures of the archbishopric the day Father Salim Ghazzal was appointed patriarchal director of the Roman Catholics in Sidon? The truth is, every Christian in Sidon, or more accurately the majority, was there.

Question: But Father Salim Ghazzal condemned the acts of destruction and sabotage which took place east of Sidon.

Answer: Certainly he must express condemnation. We have democracy. "What is more complicated than you?"

Let Lahad Withdraw

Question: Maj Gen Lahad pointed out that the will to bring the uprooted persons back to their villages exists and that any military action he carries out will be confined to the liberation of the villages of the al-Zahrani area and east of Sidon, and nothing more. What is your response?

Answer: We actually tie this issue to the existing situation. We have the right to tie it to the political resolution in Jazzin. The things that remain will be resolved and will become secondary in importance.

Question: As long as good will exists, why isn't there a rapid political remedy which will guarantee the return of the uprooted persons as soon as possible?

Answer: As I told you, I do not want to keep repeating, let Lahad, the "forces" and the Chamounists withdraw, and all other things will become secondary in importance.

Question: But Lahad has said, "If the political negotiations do not yield the desired result, we will return by force of arms. Will you confront him?"

Answer: Of course we will confront him. We consider that he is carrying out Israel's orders.

Question: Do you have the military wherewithal to confront him?

Answer: With thanks to God.

Question: So military confrontation is a possibility?

Answer: That is Israel's decision, especially since Israel has an interest in the suspension of the dialogue taking place in Damascus. The people pursuing a course of capitulation have an interest in that. I tell Lahad, if he wants war, we are prepared for him and for war with him.

Question: How then can we restore confidence to the spirits of the inhabitants living in Jazzin in the event Lahad withdraws from the region? They think that they will meet the fate that their brothers in the east of Sidon met.

Answer: We are not the ones who drove the population out of the east of Sidon. I told you that it is the "Lebanese Forces" and Lahad who drove our Christian brothers out.

Question: Who wrought destruction and ruin in the villages?

Answer: That is war.

Question: Would you repeat, war?

Answer: Yes, it is war.

Question: Is there any final statement you would make?

Answer: I ask the people who have been uprooted from the east of Sidon to put pressure on Lahad, the "Lebanese Forces" and the Chamounists to leave Jazzin, and welcome to them. If Lahad and his aides leave, they will spare Jazzin conflict.

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CSO: 4404/128

3 February 1986

LEBANON

HARD-LINE SHIITE LEADER DISCUSSES POSITIONS, POLICIES

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 28 Oct-3 Nov 85 pp 17-19

[Interview with Hizballah Leader Husayn al-Musawi by Hanna Daww: "Al-Musawi: Birri Deals with America and the Shiite Scholars Do Not Swear Allegiance to Him!"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Husayn al-Musawi is one of the leaders of Hizballah and one of the primary members of the delegation which negotiated between Damascus and Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban during the Tripoli fighting.

In an interview he held with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI al-Musawi asserted that Sha'ban was in conflict with the Moslem Brothers and that he was connected to Imam Khomeyni's leadership and authority. He said that none of the Shiite religious scholars who were connected to the policy of Islamic revolution swore allegiance to Minister Nabih Birri "who deals with America." He also considered that the people who kidnapped the Soviet diplomats were not concerned about Tripoli and that the continued detention of the diplomats contradicted the goal which had been set out after the kidnapping.

Herewith is the conversation with him:

Question: Was the fighting in Tripoli between Moslems and Christians, as stated in one of the Unification Movement's declarations?

Answer: We consider that the people who took part in the Tripoli fighting and the people who caused this fighting and participated in it ought all to have avoided it, because the priority in the struggle must continue to be against Israel and the people who deal with it.

As to names, there may have been "atheists" among the people taking part in the attack on Tripoli, but we cannot consider that all the people who attacked Tripoli are atheists, because perhaps people who are not atheists did participate. The names are not a problem; the important thing is that the fighting is at the wrong time and place, and on this basis we have acted to stop it.

Question: Why were the leftwing parties prevented from establishing offices for themselves in the capital of the north?

Answer: What I know, and everyone knows, is that some of these parties up to the hour the skirmishes started, specifically the Syrian National Socialist Party, had offices in Tripoli. However, some of the other parties, which I cannot name because I do not exactly know them, perhaps the Communist Party, for example, were compelled to leave Tripoli because of the severity of the conflict between themselves and the Moslems, or preferred to leave. The important thing is that Tripoli as I am aware and have noted has not been deprived of parties. Some of them have been present and some have not been present.

Question: Therefore the argument in the statement that Unification prevented the leftwing parties from opening offices for themselves in Tripoli is weak?

Answer: You know, and everyone knows, that the Syrians have an office, and even more than an office. In the Syrian Nationalists' declarations, for example, they defended their office, which had been surrounded. In addition to that, there previously was some security coordination between the Unification and the Syrian Nationalists, and the people of Tripoli know when this coordination took place. Therefore the issue that the presence of parties in Tripoli was proscribed, as has been said, is not valid in my opinion, it is not permissible for the parties in Tripoli to be proscribed because if I am not worthy you must proscribe me in positive ways, that is, by political, intellectual and social competition. It is not right that you should proscribe me by the force of arms.

The Moslem Brothers' State

Question: It has been pointed out that the city of Tripoli recently became "the Moslem Brothers' state." Is that true?

Answer: We know that the Moslems' commander in Tripoli is our brother Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban. Shaykh Sha'ban is a Moslem and a man of Islam, and the people with him are Moslems and men of Islam, but if what is meant are the Moslem Brothers, some deviants who engaged in practices which Islam does not approve of most of the time, that is not true, because Shaykh Sa'id is in opposition to the Moslem Brothers group the question spoke of, and everyone knows that he is connected to the policy of the Islamic revolution and the authority and leadership of Imam Khomeyni. How could he then be a commander of the Moslems in Tripoli and we should say at the same time that Tripoli is now under the control of the Moslem Brothers? What is this incorrect expression? Perhaps there are some persons we could call Moslem Brothers, but the main people in Tripoli as we know and can confirm are good fighting Moslems.

Question: If according to your statement there are some individuals with the Moslem Brothers in Tripoli, that means silence about their presence on the part of officials in the city!

Answer: I have not heard that Shaykh Sa'id and the leadership of the Islamic Unification Movement have declared that Tripoli is all now the Unification Movement, in other words that they have purged it of all people who do not believe in what the Islamic Unification Movement believes.

Question: Why this sympathy between you as the Hizballah and the Islamic Unification Movement?

Answer: We are linked to the Islamic Unification Movement, the fighting man Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban specifically, and our brother officials and people fighting with him, by loyalty to Imam Khomeyni's command. Our commander is the same. Before Imam Khomeyni our commander is the prophet of God. Now we are proceeding with a policy which Imam Khomeyni leads, and perhaps we are in theory claiming commitment to Imam Khomeyni's command, but in actual conditions we might not be in harmony. That is, we do not advocate a single line of progression of holy war. The fact is that Shaykh Sa'id and the people with him propound what we propound and engage in what we engage in as regards fighting Israel in the beloved south and fighting the people allied with and dealing with it. Therefore we are joined together by the matter of loyalty to a single command and a single field of combat, although we may not perhaps be 100 percent in agreement as far as other details go.

Question: Do you believe that the Tripoli war has ended?

Answer: We cannot discuss what is in the realm of the supernatural. We believe that the conspiracy against Lebanon and against Tripoli as a part of Lebanon is ongoing. The conspirators will not abandon the search for new lines, new forms of strife and new stories. However, I am optimistic and believe that the "sensible persons" in Tripoli, including our brothers in the Unification Movement command and people who are concerned with the subject of Tripoli, such as our Syrian brothers, are determined to cooperate so that Tripoli may avoid further losses and destruction.

Question: Some groups are stating that the Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad, gave warning that there were Moslem Brothers in Tripoli during his meeting with Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban. What specifically went on at that meeting?

Answer: Of course the Syrian brothers, headed by President Hafiz al-Asad, have always complained that there was a group of brothers or people in the company of the Moslem Brothers in Tripoli and they mentioned this at more than one meeting. However, we sensed confidence in Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban on the part of President al-Asad and our brothers in Syria. This is a great confidence and reliance was placed on this confidence and it was the basis for the success of the dialogue which took place in Damascus, one result of which was the agreement now being put into effect in Tripoli.

Question: Isn't the kidnapping of the Soviet diplomats by Islamic organizations and the killing of one of the hostages strange, and similar to a deep-rooted, ancient enmity?

Answer: We all know the intellectual contradiction between Communism and Islam. For our part, we cannot assert that the body which kidnapped the Soviets and killed one of them is Islamic and totally committed to its faith in Islam. This might be the case and it might not. However, our view specifically is that dealing with the Soviets along the lines of what was done in Beirut is not at all suitable. We as Moslems must restrict ourselves to the scale of priorities in the struggle. Our struggle is with Israel and it must

be restricted to Israel. It is not proper that the scope of the struggle should be broadened to include bodies which we do not want to say are friends of the Arabs or the Moslems, at least that we should broaden the scope of the struggle in a manner which is not in keeping with the priority of the struggle with Israel. Therefore the Moslems must think on this basis and the kidnapping of the Soviets is not proper in my view. If my statement is published and the Soviets are not then released, I would like to say that their continued detention contradicts the goal which was set out after the kidnapping. They said they would not be released before a comprehensive cease fire in Tripoli. Five days have passed since the application of the cease fire in full in Tripoli; what is the justification in continuing to detain the Soviets? I can accuse the body that committed the kidnapping of not being concerned with Tripoli's situation. Perhaps there is another reason besides Tripoli and perhaps it is a matter of international intelligence agencies playing their game in Beirut.

Question: Do you believe that the body which kidnapped the Soviet diplomats is the same one that is detaining the American and French hostages?

Answer: The people who are detaining the Americans say that they are the Islamic Jihad, and the people who are detaining the Soviets claim that they are the "Islamic Liberation Organization." Therefore the Soviets are in one place and the Americans are in another. This is what we can infer from their declarations which have been made.

Question: It was recently rumored that the place where the American hostages are detained is Ba'labakk, the Shaykh 'Abdallah barracks specifically, and that they are under the jurisdiction of the Hizballah. The AMAL movement officials have said that they are making contacts with the Hizballah officials for the release of the kidnapped foreigners in their presence. Is that correct?

Answer: If I said that they are not in Ba'labakk, I might not be accurate in my statement. They could be in Ba'labakk, they could be in Beirut, they could be in the sea. That is, they could be anywhere. The important point in the matter is that the Islamic AMAL, or the Hizballah, has no connection with the question of the Americans, and the Islamic Jihad has declared its responsibility in this issue. At the beginning, we believed that no organization calling itself the Islamic Jihad existed because we did not know anyone bearing that name and title inside or outside Beirut. However, it appears that that organization actually does exist, because it issues declarations. We had believed that the title Islamic Jihad was used with respect to stands which in fact were related to some devout Moslems and sometimes in stands which we do not believe have any connection with Moslems at all. In any event, if the Islamic Jihad is an existing organization, it is the one that says it is responsible for the kidnapping of the Americans. What is the relationship of the Islamic AMAL or the Hizballah to this matter? As I said before, neither Hizballah nor the Islamic AMAL, which is part of the nation of Hizballah, claims that it is the king of Ba'labakk or the king of the al-Biq'a', or that we are a canton in this region either. You know that everyone is present in Ba'labakk but as far as Shaykh 'Abdallah (the barracks of Imam 'Ali) or the centers with which we are connected are concerned, the Americans are not present in these places.

Our proof of that is that the American who was said to have fled Ba'labakk some months ago, which we actually heard over the radio and from some people who were speaking near the place where the Syrians handed the American over in Ba'labakk, they were saying that there was an American or a Frenchman, the important thing is a foreigner, in the hands of the Syrians then, and afterward it became clear that he was one of the Americans who had been detained. That meant that he had other colleagues there in Ba'labakk or that they were not there. The fact is that we do not know anything at all about this subject.

Question: The Sunnite-Shiite-Druze sectarian rifts became very apparent during the Tripoli fighting. Are steps being taken to restore solidarity?

Answer: I do not know how they became apparent.

The Druzes Have Their Own Situation!

Question: They became apparent in the course of the strike in solidarity with Tripoli, since the Sunnite regions went on strike while conditions in the other areas remained normal.

Answer: As far as our Druze brothers go, they have their own situation and their own state of affairs, and they express it. As regards the Shiites, since we are among them, I do not believe that attention should be restricted to whether shop doors were locked or not locked. Among the Shiites there were people who came into Tripoli under bombardment because of their connection with the Moslems' situation there and their readiness to sacrifice themselves on behalf of those people. On that basis, we cannot say that the Shiites were not sympathetic and the Sunnites were. There were Sunnites who enjoyed themselves and went about their business while Tripoli was burning, and there were Shiites who went in in order to join in solidarity with the believers who were subject to bombardment in Tripoli to help in the matter of the cease fire and cause understanding to prevail. The Shiites are not all of one mind and the Sunnites are not all of the same mind or conduct. There are Moslems who are concerned with the affairs of Moslems and Moslems who are not. God has included us among those who are concerned with the affairs of the Moslems and downtrodden persons of all groups.

Question: So there are no sectarian rifts?

Answer: Rifts exist, in the sense that if you want to give them a sectarian label you can, as well as a political label, and there is another label. We are Shiites. Do you see that the Shiites follow a single political policy, for example? Are the Christians following a single political policy, and are the Druzes really following a single political policy?

Question: But it appears that the Shiites have pledged their political position to Nabih Birri.

Answer: Are you correct in this assertion?

Question: I say what the Shiite religious leaders are asserting.

Answer: Who, for example?

The Pledge of Allegiance

Question: Most of the Shiite religious figures. His Eminence Shaykh 'Abd-al-Amir Qablan.

Answer: We will not be upset if Mr Nabih Birri succeeds in following an approach which will enable him to get the support of the majority of the Shiites and the majority of the Moslems. We want every working person to get support. However, the fact is that in the absence of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon, people who represent the Shiites, if in reality we want to classify them among religious scholars in terms of representation in religious law and leaders who are among the religious scholars, and Mr Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din and Shaykh Hasan Tarad -- the basic Shiite religious scholars and specifically those working on the ground, Mr Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Shaykh Shams-al-Din, who have a relationship to the political situation in Lebanon, know that none of these and none of the other religious scholars who are fighting in Ba'labakk or in the south, the major scholars connected to the policy of the Islamic revolution under Imam Khomeyni's leadership and authority, none of them pledges allegiance to Nabih Birri or anyone else. The real Moslems and real Shiites have pledged allegiance to Imam Khomeyni and people who are under Imam Khomeyni's policy in the field and in reality. That is the actual situation. In any event, we are not talking about elections or referenda. Let each of us work, and each work in his own way, and, if he wants, continue to be better and persevere more truthfully until the end of the journey.

Question: Is Nabih Birri a downtrodden person?

Answer (laughing): Am I God that I should know? God alone knows who is downtrodden and who is arrogant. We are not intending to make a categorization of that sort. I have a great objection to Nabih Birri's policies and his political behavior, objections which may be numerous, and he may perhaps have objections to me, but whether he is downtrodden or arrogant, that is a matter which does not concern the Moslems and does not concern the downtrodden much. Let us ask God to guide him and guide us.

Question: It has been pointed out that the tour you and Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli made to Tehran and Damascus was for the sake of conciliation and the search for mediation on the subject of serious disputes which occurred between you and that there was renewed financing for the Hezbollah. Is that true?

Answer: That is what people who are behind the news agencies are dreaming up. Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli is an honorable fighting brother and we have been bound to him by a relationship of brotherhood in almighty God for a long time, that is, for more than 12 years approximately. There are family ties and long-standing brotherhood between us. There is no ultimate problem between me and Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli or any other brother. We, as people who believe in God, cannot waste time on things such as those you mentioned. We are agreed and in cooperation over a single policy, are faithful to a

common imam and put our trust in a common God. This is all empty propaganda and news with no basis in truth. They want to see weaknesses in the Hezbollah's procedure, and invent this news, which in their view might reflect an illusion or disapproval among the devout, but we can stress, and the devout know this, that we are on a closely interlinked, intimately bound course and only death will separate us, God willing.

Question: What went on in Tehran and Damascus?

Answer: By the nature of the case, we have numerous ongoing meetings with our brothers in Tehran, since our loyalty, as I said, is to Imam Khomeyni as he is the representative of the chaste imam. Our connection with Imam Khomeyni regarding executive and practical matters is of course carried out through the command of the revolution, which is our command. In Damascus, we met with our Syrian brothers in confrontation with a single enemy and a single imperialism, that is, America. It is natural that people who have been brought together on a single field of battle should effect coordination. We are constantly meeting with our brother officials in Syrian also to effect coordination regarding the common struggle.

Question: What is your opinion about the slogans the people accompanying Minister Nabih Birri at Hawsh al-Umara' in Zahlah uttered, such as "Either this or Mecca" and "Christians are pigs?"

Answer: While we differ over some basic things with Mr Nabih Birri, this does not mean that we can pass judgment on him and some of his companions regarding things we do not know. I heard of this only from you yourself, now. I consider it farfetched. However, if it happened it was a mistake. Whoever has a relationship with Imam al-Sadr's school cannot disdain values, and these slogans you mentioned are far removed from values. I indeed consider that farfetched, although a dispute exists between us and Mr Birri and some people working with him. However, if that happened it was a mistake and is not at all acceptable. I believe that even Mr Birri would not accept it. How can someone consider a Christian a "pig?" How can a follower of Muhammad consider the followers of the Messiah pigs? That is not acceptable in God's law or in Muhammad's law. In the law of Islam, that is not acceptable. In the holy Koran we read "You will surely find the nearest of them in love to the believers are those who say 'we are Christians.'" The Christians, in our Koran, are the people nearest in love.

Question: Some people have pointed out that the Ba'labakk festival the AMAL movement held awhile ago, where Minister Birri gave his well known speech, was interpreted as defiance of the Hizballah and the AMAL Islamic Movement, to which skirmishes in the south and in Beirut could be attributed. Is that true?

Answer: There is no doubt that most unfortunately the Ba'labakk festival on 31 August had defiance as a motive, since Ba'labakk was chosen; this is certain and there is no debate about it. However, we felt great responsibility before almighty God, which was that if we had succumbed to a reaction that would not have been in the interests of Lebanon, the Moslems, the Shiites or any downtrodden person in this country. We would be like a person

falling into a trap. If it is so-and-so, or someone else, who set that trap, we have the political maturity and feeling of responsibility and we have the concern for the safety of the children, we are upright enough not to accept that the child should be torn apart. On this basis, we will not struggle with any Shiite, Moslem or Christian faction which does not have a relationship with Israel. We are not at war with Christians who have no relationship with Israel, and those who do not declare war on us. Our war is with Israel. Therefore may God be tolerant with those who almost fell into the trap and almost made us fall into it.

Question: What is your condition for reconciliation with Minister Birri?

Answer: That he should submit to reality and commit himself in the field and in reality to the command of Imam Khomeyni, to whose command he asserts that he is committed. When his faithful commitment is to the command over which and with which we are in theory unanimously agreed, there will no longer be any argument.

Question: The argument therefore is just over loyalty to Imam Khomeyni?

Answer: Loyalty to Imam Khomeyni, which assumes form in the field, on the ground. The Islamic revolution asserts rejection of America and the refusal to deal with it. Mr Nabih deals with the Americans. Imam Khomeyni and the Islamic revolution assert the continuation of the struggle with Israel until its elimination. The gentleman, or some other people, say, "We are not concerned with fighting Israel only; it is enough that it has left the south." The important thing is that there are many things, not just loyalty to the notion of formalities. What is meant is true loyalty regarding political positions.

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CSO: 4404/167

LEBANON

VARIOUS FORCES IN SIDON ANTICIPATE PEACE

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 30 Oct-5 Nov 85 pp 20, 21

[Article by Zaki Shihab: "The People of Sidon Cast a Vote: We Do Not Want It To Be a 'Second Tripoli'"]

[Text] During the eruption of security conditions in Tripoli and the break-out of skirmishes between the political parties and the Unification Movement group, many people imagined that the virus of these skirmishes would move over to the region of southern Lebanon, specifically to the city of Sidon. However, this city has overturned all predictions and so far has preserved its cohesion and thwarted strife and the people advancing it.

How has Sidon resisted factional strife and succeeded in curbing incidents which were aimed at touching off clashes? How has it prevented the spread of skirmishing to the Palestinian camps in its area?

AL-MAJALLAH visited the Sidon area, toured the inside of the Palestinian camps and met with influential Lebanese and Palestinian political and religious figures. Herewith is the outcome of these meetings.

Last Sunday morning, visitors to the south were surprised when the gates of the al-Awwali were closed off to them and a Nasirist People's Army group prevented cars from passing on toward Sidon for unknown reasons which were not explained or revealed that morning. The news was related by the media and the people's spontaneous reaction constituted an endorsement of the rumors which had long held that a struggle would take place in the city of Sidon in the Lebanese-Lebanese and Palestinian-Lebanese contexts following the events in Tripoli and the battles of the camps in Beirut.

At that time, more than one source asserted that the early signs of conflict could be found in Sidon and that the arsenal of Palestinian and Lebanese weapons was being mobilized to resolve the situation on behalf of one of the two parties, specifically the Nasirist People's Army and the AMAL movement, as in the confrontation of the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp forces. Strengthening these rumors was a group of security problems and individual or collective assassinations which the Sidon area and surroundings witnessed recently, including the killing of the four Palestinians, the results of the

investigations into which have not yet been published. However, Sidon thwarted many people's assumptions, in view of the solidarity existing among the nationalist organizations there and the cohesion that exists in the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp, once all the Lebanese nationalist leaders and the Palestinian command had become aware of the magnitude of the conspiracy being hatched around the capital of the south. Therefore, fighting did not flare up that morning, as some people had expected; rather, Sidon appeared on the scene as a forward position surrounded by questions which the influential religious and political figures in the city have answered.

In his office, we met with the Mufti of Sidon, Shaykh Muhammad Salim Jalal al-Din, to discuss the state of the situation in Sidon. He summarized the discussion by saying, "The situation in Sidon and its surrounding area is extremely delicate, and requires wisdom and wariness from everyone. None of the influential persons present on the scene can use the language of arms. Rather, they must control themselves, and this requires tolerating all the excesses which some elements hired or paid by Israel and its aides might commit. It must be assumed that behind every incident which occurs in the city and its surroundings there are agents who want to generate strife and create conflict among brothers, because Sidon's situation differs from that of the other Lebanese areas. First of all, it is confronting Israel and its forces and its agent Antoine Lahad in its drive to carry out and push through its schemes, and secondly there are parties in Sidon which must always and permanently take the interests of the city into consideration and spare it any clashes. Any clash which occurs in the city will bring flagrant harm on its people and the national cause. I urge all the parties which have organizations on the scene bearing arms to take respect for these weapons into consideration and use them only against the enemy which is lurking east of Sidon and on the Kafr Falus-'Ayn al-Mir front. The arms should be used only there. Among citizens and brothers present on the stage in Sidon and its region, it is not at all permissible to use weapons. Rather, the language of logic and dialogue must be made to prevail over all languages."

[Question] There is a demand on the part of most influential persons that the "Zahlafication" or "Tripolization" of Lebanese cities must be endorsed, that is, that there should be a security instrument while the Lebanese security instruments are not operating, that is, the Syrian forces. What is your eminence's position on that?

[Answer] Objectively, Zahlah and Tripoli are different from the issue of Sidon. As you said, an enemy which is lurking on its borders is lying in ambush against Sidon. Therefore, the presence of this enemy must be taken into consideration before we enter into the subject of the entry of the Syrian forces or the deterrent forces into Sidon. We as Lebanese want normal life to return to Sidon and all Lebanon, and the legitimate forces to return also. In the event our Syrian brothers help the legitimate authorities preserve security, that is help for which one must be most grateful. We have sensed this in many of the areas which these forces have entered and have found that having Syrian brothers preserve the security there is in Syria's interests, because Lebanon's security is Syria's, and Syria's security is Lebanon's.

With Al-Bizri

AL-MAJALLAH met Deputy Nazih al-Bizri, who had recently returned from London, in his home and held a conversation with him.

[Question] All eyes are on Sidon and Beirut. What do you expect will happen in this area, as far as security is concerned?

[Answer] Every day the domestic and foreign media are warning that disturbances and explosions may break out in the region of the south, especially in the region of Sidon and the camps. We will not permit this, considering it an Israeli violation, and we are vigilantly watching over every incident that occurs in order to prevent it from extending and spreading. I do not say that we are so immune that the conspiracy will not penetrate into our ranks, but I do say that we are prepared to confront the conspiracy and confront any violation in the ways we relied on in the past, managing to control things and prevent them from exploding and spreading. There have been enough warnings and threats that an explosion will occur in Sidon, that the conspiracy will move over to Sidon, the strife will move over to Sidon and so forth. People must come to Sidon to study the security situation and the social situation and also thoroughly to study the situation in the camps and find that the situation in Sidon is different from any other place.

[Question] Are we to understand from your statement that there is an undertaking on the part of all armed persons not to rush into the city or the camps during any conflict?

[Answer] There is an undertaking on the part of all the Palestinians, including the partisans of 'Arafat and others besides 'Arafat. We view the Palestinians as brothers of ours and view the Palestinians not as refugees but as people with a cause and as our brothers in our nationalism and our Arabhood.

[Question] The situation in Jazzin recently escalated greatly after Lahad declared readiness to "liberate the villages east of Sidon." What is your opinion about these threats?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to state that the east of Sidon has not been closed off to our Christian brothers and that they can stay among us freely and with a welcome, except for the people who helped destroy Sidon and commit aggression against it. There is no need for the retired general who joined Israel to be enthusiastic about destroying Sidon in order to bring back the people who left it. The east of Sidon is opening its doors to all our Christian brothers to come back to their villages and homes. We are wholly prepared to deal with them and deal with any other citizen, since there is no dominant factionalism in Sidon and we consider that proper Lebanese Arab citizenship is the guide.

[Question] There is unanimity on the groups' part over the need to change the cabinet situation or change the cabinet. What is your own view?

[Answer] I do not believe that a change in the cabinet is at hand or a matter of priority. The cabinet was formed as a result of an agreement, and if

they do not reach agreement, to change the cabinet would be diversionary and manipulative. They must reach an agreement on the foundations for reform and change before thinking of changing the cabinet, because the people who are present in the government represent the influential conflicting forces on the ground. After the solution Tripoli devised and the solution to the problem of Zahlah, there is talk about the "Zahlafication" or "Tripolization" of Lebanese areas in general, in other words, the entry of Syrian forces into these areas. It will certainly not be possible to carry out any solution unless Syrian forces join in preparing to do so, because a review is required of the Lebanese army in its present condition and this matter cannot be totally consigned to the Lebanese army. Rather, a fraternal army must help it, and such an army is the army of Syria. No other one exists.

Shaykh Hammud: Sidon Is Immune

Shaykh Mahir Hammud, chairman of the Federation of Moslem Scholars in Lebanon, replied in turn to AL-MAJALLAH's questions on the truth of what is being circulated concerning the shift of the fighting into Sidon by saying "The talk is correct in theory but in practice there is no basis to it, if we take into account that the movements existing in Tripoli exist in Sidon and that the popular support that exists for the movements in Tripoli exists in Sidon also; rather, there are objective differences which make Tripoli's situation 100 percent different from Sidon's. In Sidon, Islamic movements exist and coexist with the non-Islamic movements and are in harmony over at least a minimum of understanding and agreement over common denominators. In Tripoli there are objective circumstances and historic circumstances which have made the Islamic current take a unique form in the case of certain decrees in a manner which could be defensive and in Sidon that has not yet happened. I do not think that anyone has the intention of making the experience repeat itself. That is on the one hand. On the other hand, we can say that the political plan which has now been applied to Tripoli following the recent war is being applied in Sidon, in the sense of coexistence, freedom of political action and the pointing of heavy and other weapons at the enemy, who is closer to Sidon than to Tripoli, as well as the agreement that security is also a common responsibility and not a responsibility of an individual or group. Alongside all that, the ultimate point actually is that what is preventing an explosion in Sidon is the presence of Lahad, who reminds us from one day to the next by his rockets that he is not far away and that he is also thinking of course of whether he can return to Sidon. More than that there is the activity among Lahad's agents to get in contact by telephone from their control points with some residential and commercial places in Sidon, to tell them 'Prepare yourselves, we will be coming into Sidon in 2 or 3 days.'"

From the headquarters of the Islamic Society in the al-Sitt Nafsiyah section in Sidon, we went to the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp near al-Mahallah. An armed guard inspected the cars entering the camps and ascertained their passengers' identities. The driver said that this was the mutual security force, which is made up of all the Palestinian forces in the camp.

At the main square of the camp, we descended from the car and asked about the people's committee office in the camp. A man gestured to the

headquarters. We went up. The people in the room greeted us after we specified our mission and introduced themselves: Abu Sa'id, the Democratic Front's official in the camp, Anwar Raja, the general command's official in the Sidon area, and al-Sa'iqah's official in the south, 'Abd Muqdi. Anwar Raja said "We hold almost daily meetings here to conduct the camp's business. Therefore, it has been easy for you to meet with us." We asked them about the possibility of a conversation. They expressed receptivity and we started:

[Question] After Tripoli, the focus of interest has been Sidon, in view of its nationalistic stance, the Palestinian presence there, and the presence of contradictions there, which constitute fertile ground for the emergence of conflict. What is the possibility that this might happen, in the intra-Palestinian context?

[Answer] It is certain that the Tripoli conflict has had results and repercussions, positive and negative, and that the Damascus agreement has had positive results in the other areas, but the issue of murders in the context of the camps in the south, specifically, has been very much a part of the experiences of the Palestinian leaders and the masses of our people, especially after what happened in Tripoli. Therefore, it has been fully understood that what was happening in the capital of the north should not shift over to the area of the south. The interests of the Palestinian and Lebanese national leaders, headed by Mustafa Ma'ruf Sa'd, as well as the contacts the Palestinian leaders made with the Islamic forces and groups, have been focussed on that goal, to prevent the outbreak of any strife. The awareness among the Palestinian, Lebanese and Islamic leaders in dealing with the aftereffects of the events in the intra-Palestinian context has been very high, and the Palestinian leaders within the camps of the south are still keeping a grip on things. At the same time, there is agreement that internal fighting should not take place.

[Question] That is an assumption that there will be no possibility of fighting among Palestinians?

[Answer] That is prohibited and we will not allow it, and will try to prevent it in cooperation with all parties and the people's committees. If hostile parties attempt that, we will stand up to them on the basis of Palestinian security, which cannot be infringed.

[Question] In periods when the camps were subjected to convulsions, what is your interpretation of the assassinations perpetrated against specific symbols?

[Answer] In terms of principle, we consider that it is the enemies who benefit from the matter of the conflict, with the negative repercussions that imparts. Any fighting will have negative repercussions on our presence in Lebanon and our role in the fighting, especially since previous relationships no longer bind us to many political and party forces in Lebanon, as they are governed by an obvious program of action.

[Question] What is your interpretation of the failure to hand suspicious persons over to the court in the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp?

[Answer] As far as most incidents go, they have been apprehended and it has been discovered who was standing behind them. The matter is restricted to specific names.

[Question] What about the gathering up of weapons?

[Answer] We consider the political negotiations to be tentative ones which were dictated by circumstances, since there is no permanent friendship or permanent enmity. Our friendship with our brother Syria was within this context, for example. When we bore arms our goal was to resist the Israeli occupation and protect the camps, not to confront the nationalist forces. We consider that it is our right to bear arms to defend ourselves, out of fear that what happened in the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp will be repeated, and experience has proved this.

[Question] What about the agreement with the Lebanese?

[Answer] We have previously said that Lebanon is a jungle of rifles, and we are part of this situation. The conflicts have involved us and if agreement is reached among the Lebanese, we are part of the national and Islamic forces in this country, and will commit ourselves to this agreement, provided that we oversee the agreements concluded between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Lebanese authorities.

[Question] However, these agreements have been abrogated, as some people consider.

[Answer] We have enough flexibility to deal with actual circumstances and what is going on on the Lebanese stage. We are in favor of Lebanese national decisionmaking and the revival of Lebanon. We have a number of demands, among them freedom of political action and movement and the abrogation of work permits; I do not believe that these are demands that are difficult to meet. This is what we must engage in discussion over now.

Among the Lebanese and Palestinians, Sidon continues to be the awaited plan for a solution, because all the parties there have decided not to be drawn into strife and not to repeat the experience of conflict among groups on the Lebanese stage.

Rumors, and worse, are a weapon that Sidon rejects, as is the case with all nationalist areas.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

REPORT ON HIGH-LEVEL PALESTINIAN MEETING

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 30 Nov 85 p 16

[Article by Diyab Nabhan: "Palestinian Leadership Meetings: No Decisive Positions Yet"]

[Text] Meetings held in Baghdad Thursday evening, 12 November 1985, by the PLO Executive Committee, the Fatah Central Committee, and the PNC chairmanship ended after extensive discussions of several topics regarding which a number of resolutions and recommendations were adopted with a pledge that they would be followed up and completed during meetings convened in Baghdad Sunday morning, 24 November 1985, by the 75-member Palestinian Central Council representing various Palestinian tendencies.

The Palestinian leadership discussed an agenda containing key points, some of which were the joint Jordanian-Palestinian political initiative; the results of 'Arafat's Arab tour; the Cairo declaration which included a Palestinian condemnation of terrorist acts outside the occupied territories; and the Zionist raid on Tunis. This is in addition to the Geneva summit, developments in the Arab arena, and the Arab position which transpired following an Iraqi initiative calling upon Arab countries to adopt a unified position toward the Washington-sanctioned Israeli aggression against the PLO and to warn the United States about the perils of persisting in its anti-Arab policy, a move Palestinian circles viewed as a qualitative shift in the Arab position which will influence the course of events in the Arab arena.

A responsible Palestinian source informed AL-TADAMUN that these Palestinian meetings were within the compass of the periodic meetings, especially since the time between the previous and current meetings was over 2 months, and that the Central Council had not met since its 22 May 1985 meeting in Tunis 5 months before.

AL-TADAMUN has learned that the communique to be issued by the Executive Committee and the Palestinian Central Council meetings will not go into Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in any positive or negative way. This is contrary to press and political reports about the importance of the Palestinian meetings to the effect that they were a crucial turning point in Palestinian activity.

Reliable diplomatic sources told AL-TADAMUN that American Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, who is touring the area these days to explain the results of the summit conference between the two giant in Geneva, carries specific points to which the PLO is expected to reply. One of these points is that the United States is not asking the PLO to recognize Israel's right to exist and that it is still interested in Palestinian representation in any negotiations for a political settlement. This is viewed as American reneging on a previous commitment contained in the secret addendum to the second Sinai agreement which was concluded between Egypt and Israel in September 1975.

The United States is asking the PLO to recognize the two Security Council resolutions in exchange for an invitation to participate in direct negotiations as part of a point Jordanian-Palestinian delegation under international supervision which may call for a discussion of the Palestinian right to self-determination and not for the adoption of a resolution affirming this right.

It appears that the Palestinian leadership may have paused before this point at its recent meetings and decided that the time was not right for adopting a decision on this matter, particularly following the Geneva meeting between the two superpowers. This is because the international conference issue, according to Palestinian circles, is not a purely regional wish, but basically an international one, in addition to approval by the concerned parties of such a step. AL-TADAMUN has received information to the effect that PLO Executive Committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat had rejected an American offer to participate at a later phase in an international peace conference with low-level representation.

Therefore, the Palestinian leadership does not see any political changes warranting a reexamination of PLO positions, particularly with regard to American and Israeli positions. Such changes must reflect a recognition of the Palestinians' right to repatriation and self-determination. Furthermore, the Palestinian leadership appears to have formulated its position on the basis of saying neither "no" nor "yes" to the two Security Council resolutions, a concept Palestinian circles call "la'am" [no/yes combined in Arabic] and has left the matter of getting close to these resolutions contingent on circumstances and on guarantees it may be able to obtain either from the international conference or the United States.

Political and press sources in Baghdad say that the PLO may agree to these two resolutions if they included a direct invitation to participate in an international conference. That is provided that they are coupled with a recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination rather than a discussion of this right or a recommendation concerning it.

Observers wonder about the effects of the Palestinian position of the joint political initiative with Jordan, which uses the February accord as its basis, and about the fate of this accord, particularly since King Husayn is asking the PLO to show more flexibility toward political settlement endeavors while emphasizing that Jordan will not enter into direct negotiations with Israel and will not assume any role in behalf of the PLO.

The Palestinian leadership, for its part, confirms its adherence to the February accord and its commitment to the fixed principles it contains, a position held as well by the Jordanian leadership. It appears that the abrogation of the accord has not been a consideration of either side because, basically, it expresses a joint wish between them.

It may appear to observers that Palestinian disregard of Resolutions 242 and 338 may lead settlement endeavors to an impasse. There are indications, however, that widely differing positions may be drawing closed together, especially following the Cairo Declaration condemning terrorism, a precondition Washington had set for opening a dialogue with the PLO. This is in addition to another condition represented in PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist. This is one step closer to the American position, which took a similar step by dropping the precondition of PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist and demanding that the PLO enter into direct negotiations and recognize the two Security Council resolutions, a move Shimon Peres did not oppose in his testimony before the Foreign and Security Affairs Committee of the Israeli Knesset.

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CSO: 4404/144

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO'S ABU IYAD COMMENTS ON AMMAN AGREEMENT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Dec 85 pp 32-34

[Interview with Abu Iyad in Amman: "Design To Destroy the PLO Continues; We Are Preparing for Changes"; date not specified]

[Text] Attempts to bypass the PLO on the Arab and international levels in any political initiative have become quite manifest. As an Arab official told AL-HAWADITH: "The peace vehicle has begun moving in the dark without the PLO and it is not known who is in the driver's seat." The official added that the American tendency is to try to find a peaceful solution to the problem with the participation of Arab countries neighboring on the occupied territories and some traditional Palestinian leaderships inside the occupied territories. This was the purpose of the recent meetings between the American envoy, Richard Murphy, and a number of Palestinian personalities in the occupied territories. These traditional leaderships informed him, however, that they would not work without the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

AL-HAWADITH met with Salah Khalaf, (Abu Iyad), Fatah Central Committee member, to seek an explanation about all the ambiguous points. Following is the interview:

[Question] Ten months after the signing of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement which was associated with contradictory interpretations on the Jordanian and Palestinian level, what is your appraisal of it today?

[Answer] I believe that the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement came at a stage of mutual Jordanian and Palestinian misgivings, notwithstanding good relations, contacts, and dialogues. Jordan was afraid that the agreement would not survive. On the other side, many people, including me, had reservations because of the trust issue. Will the agreement be limited to the articles already included in it or will there be other articles calling for concessions at a future stage? This raised the fear of many Palestinians. But I believe that the agreement has survived because the circle of suspicion was shrinking and that of trust expanding until the Italian ship incident, the Larnaca incident, and then the London affair. These events in one way or another have narrowed the circle of trust and have widened the circle of suspicion. Some people claim that the Larnaca incident was undertaken to sabotage King Husayn's talk's in Washington.

On the Palestinian level, some people counter that sabotaging the London affair was part of the American-Israeli anti-PLO campaign, which labels the organization as terrorist. Both sides have overcome their doubts, but the present situation suggests that the whole affair has returned to square one where trust and confidence are lacking. I think that the situation calls for frank discussions whose aim is not to extract additional Palestinian concessions or to raise additional Palestinian or Jordanian doubts.

Hence the agreement is surviving on the basis of Palestinian as well as Jordanian fixed principles which do not allow for mutual concessions every now and then.

[Question] You have stated that there will be no more Palestinian concessions. What concessions did the PLO make in the agreement?

[Answer] The agreement does in fact contain Palestinian concessions because, first, there is no mention of an independent state; second PNC resolutions do not call for joint representation while the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement provides for that; and, third, the principle of territory in exchange for peace is considered a Palestinian concession for they are now talking about UN Resolutions 242 and 338, something I view as blackmail. The first article of the agreement deals with the matter of territory in exchange for peace in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Therefore, the agreement contains concessions, and even if these concessions were not at the expense of the Palestinians' fixed principles, there is nonetheless a fear of having to make other concessions.

Furthermore, America is pressuring us to offer preconditions while it has not pressured Israel for any conditions. The Arab side has been making concessions since the Camp David talks. Therefore, we are compelled to call for an international conference with two powers around the table, not just the American power which is pressuring us but also the Soviet power so as to have a kind of balance.

[Question] The cause of the London crisis is still unclear. What was the reason for this anti-PLO campaign concerning the visit of the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to London?

[Answer] Although we have discussed the London affair with King Husayn and Zayd al-Rifa'i, we prefer to close the book on it. I say, however, that we did not agree on the concessions issue. Otherwise, we would have made such concessions to America. This is what Murphy asked us to do through our recognition of Resolutions 242 and 338, which would allow America to recognize the PLO. This is more important with due respect to Great Britain, which is supposed to be the first European country to play a role in order to cover up its treachery and conspiracy against the Palestinian people since 1917. But Britain has not been compelled by any reason to adopt an honorable stand.

According to our information, there was a plan to sabotage the joint delegation before it got to London, based on reliable Arab reports which we will

announce at the proper time, because the London incident came amidst the American anti-PLO campaign, which described the organization as terrorist. Everything that happened in London was a contribution to this campaign in an attempt to harm the organization's credibility and reliability.

[Question] And do you think that the relationship between the PLO and Jordan today is linked to the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement?

[Answer] We must get used to honoring any accord. I, for example, have some reservations about the agreement but I respect the Central Committee's decision. Respect for the agreement has to be mutual. Many people are telling us that Jordan's relations with Syria are at the expense of the agreement. But if such agreements are shaken by one country's meeting with another, the relationship must be very fragile. We in the Central Committee disagreed over the agreement, but the PNC was precise in advocating special relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, regardless of whether an agreement existed or not. Hence, I view the agreement as a factor that reinforces Jordanian-Palestinian relations but not as its basis.

[Question] How does Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement affect these relations?

[Answer] These relations must not in any way be shaken by any relationship or initiative undertaken by Jordan or the PLO. At the Casablanca conference, which resolved to form two committees to clear the air between Jordan and Syria and between Iran and Syria, as well as between Libya and Iraq and between Libya and the PLO, we were a party to these resolutions and had no fear or apprehension about this relationship.

The new factor or surprise is King Husayn's message to Zayd al-Rifa'i. Of course, this is an internal affair and the king is free to say whatever he pleases. He knows why he said it in the way he did. But I, as an observer, have the right to explain why the message was put in this form for it has become public domain, open for analysis, giving the impression that the king, in his relations with Syria, had in mind more than a clearing of the air.

Therefore, many changes will take place in the coming days, changes that are not supposed to affect relations with the PLO. Hence I say that the wager is on Jordan.

[Question] What kind of things are you expecting?

[Answer] We are not fortune tellers. I am confident, however, that what happened in the PNC regarding Palestinian-Jordanian relations, be it on the popular or official level, was actually the first time that the September leaf had been turned over in Jordan as well as in the Palestinians' favor. Any attempt to undermine these relations will be at the expense of a common cause, keeping in mind that neither Jordan nor King Husayn nor the PLO nor Abu 'Ammar nor any of us has anything to gain from re-aggravating the situation. Even with our differences, we must be in agreement.

Disagreement is a natural thing. It is not possible for us and Jordan to follow the same policy. We, as an organization and one movement, disagree among ourselves, so how can we not disagree with Egypt or with Jordan?

[Question] Should the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative come to a half, what other option does the PLO have?

[Answer] We must be optimistic about the future and believe that this will not happen. Otherwise, we will deal with it when the time comes.

[Question] It is being said that the PLO is getting closer to Egypt in anticipation of possible strained relations with Jordan.

[Answer] The principle of relations with Egypt has passed through two phases. In the first phase, we abided by the Arab boycott decision to which we were a party. However, the goal was not to boycott Egypt but rather to hasten its return because all the Arabs, and we in particular, need it. When Husni Mubarak came to power, we had to turn over a new leaf, a step which, to my thinking, had been long overdue. We are in the year 1985 and since he assumed office in 1981, we have been very timid in our relations with Egypt because of Camp David. Should we turn Camp David into an idol, thus preventing ourselves from moving among the Egyptian people, in the Egyptian establishment, and with the president himself? The fact is that we have destroyed this idol, stating that we must come together with Egypt on the basis that each of us has his own stance and position. Furthermore, we adhere to Egyptian stances toward the Palestinian question, which are expressed in official statements.

Our recent visit to Egypt was the result of an internal dialogue, be it Palestinian or Arab. Some people tried to place it within the frame work of deteriorating relations with Jordan. I affirm that this had nothing to do with the visit, for relations with Jordan have not deteriorated. The Cairo visit had already been planned and was good from the official as well as the popular point of view, both in its publicized and unpublicized sides.

[Question] The Cairo Declaration has been described as embodying the disagreement with Jordan and therefore was announced in Cairo rather than here and appeared to be the beginning of an Egyptian-Palestinian initiative, as some people said. What is your appraisal of this viewpoint?

[Answer] From the beginning of our official visit to Cairo, we noticed the presence of some wings within the Egyptian press critical of the PLO's line through the American campaign. Therefore, we decided to issue a declaration from Cairo saying that we are not terrorists and that we distinguish between terrorism and struggle and affirming our unalterable principles in our pursuit of peace as well as in our armed struggle.

The initiative was ours, but it happened to be announced in Cairo where we addressed world public opinion and made a distinction between terrorism and armed struggle within the occupied territories. At the same time, the PLO maintains that it had embarked on its peaceful political initiative since the Fez summit, the Geneva conference, the Jordanian-Palestinian accord, and many other accords. It also maintains that what we want is an international conference.

Also, the importance of this declaration lay in President Husni Mubarak being on our side the day we issued it in order to have Egypt's impetus behind us. We wrote the declaration without any thought to relations with Jordan or any side.

[Question] Could it be said that the Italian ship incident hastened this declaration?

[Answer] Not the incident itself, but the ensuing American campaign against the PLO, portraying the organization as a terrorist group whose only goal is murder. We had to reply to this charge.

[Question] Syrian circles claim that Abu 'Ammar offered President Asad the abrogation of the Jordanian-Palestinian accord in exchange for restored Syrian-Palestinian relations and that Abu 'Ammar perceived this offer as a ransom for restoring Syrian-Palestinian relations. How true is this?

[Answer] This is falsehood at its worst, but it does allow the observer to see clearly that the scheme to undermine the PLO goes on. This is a very inexpensive operation which is impossible for us to undertake.

[Question] But Yasir 'Arafat has stated on more than one occasion that he is ready to go to Syria should President Asad agree to receive him.

[Answer] We are not the ones who started the battle with Syria. The PLO is keen on building up its relations with all Arab regimes. But the question posed here is: What price the relation with Syria and is the PLO ready to pay the price? I still believe that the scheme is aimed not only at polarizing Yasir 'Arafat but also at fighting and destroying the PLO.

[Question] How do you describe other Palestinian-Arab relations, relations with Libya particularly, and what do you expect from the two Arab conciliation committees?

[Answer] There is a plan to form a committee to clear the air between Libya, the PLO, and Iraq so as to pursue contacts with a Libyan delegation composed of al-Humaydi and 'Ali al-Turayki. There is also an Iraqi delegation composed of Taha Yasin and Tariq 'Aziz.

About our contacts with Libya, they are nothing new. A dialogue has been going on since the war of the camps and in the wake of Libya's position on it which we met with telegrams of thanks to Qadhdhafi and with a visit to Libya by brother Abu-al-Luft. Even during our visit to Cairo, we were in touch with Colonel Qadhdhafi in an attempt to find a way to restore Arab harmony between Egypt and Libya. We succeeded in our attempt to put Egyptian-Libyan relations on the right track (that was before the hijacking of the Egyptian airliner). The task of the conciliation committee is to create a rapprochement between us and Libya, after which a direct meeting would follow. I am very optimistic about the Morocco meeting.

[Question] How do you appraise PLO relations with the Soviet Union at the present time?

[Answer] There has been some estrangement due to the Jordan-Palestinian accord, which the USSR thought would lead to direct negotiations with Israel and, consequently, to a unilateral solution. The Soviets believe that the best solution is a comprehensive solution while America and Israel are trying to break it up at Arab expense.

However, in the wake of developments and following the Casablanca summit, which adopted a resolution that considered the international conference as the basis of any solution, and after the Soviets realized the PLO's role in adopting this resolution, the picture became clear, confirming that there would be no direct negotiations. We sensed this during visits to the USSR by Abu-al-Lutf, Abu Mazin, and myself.

Also, the Tunis strike had clear positive effects on our relations with the Soviet Union, for its aim was to strike at brother Abu 'Ammar and the political initiative for which he was working. Had this initiative been satisfactory to America, Israeli planes would not have dared to hit PLO headquarters in Tunis. This was a political, not a military, strike.

Recently we directed a message to Gorbachev prior to the Gorbachev-Reagan summit. It was a clear message which talked about Palestinian national rights as we see and understand them. We are confident that the Soviet Union, through the principles it declared in the Brezhnev initiative or the amended Soviet peace treaty, is concerned with the Middle East problem, particularly since it is armed with Warsaw Pact resolutions supporting the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and their right to set up their own independent state and to return to their land. The same resolution confirmed that any international conference for settling the Middle East conflict would have to include the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

This position, which the Warsaw Pact countries announced in a meeting devoted to the discussion of the Gorbachev-Reagan encounter, has great significance, but the Arab information media ignored it unfortunately.

12502/13045

CSO: 4404/144

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PALESTINIAN GROUPS' FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES DETAILED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 18-24 Dec 85 pp 17-18

[Article by Salih Qallab: "The Truth About 'Arafat's Financial 'Empire'"]

[Text] From time to time provocative investigations into the PLO's financial circumstances appear in the Western press. Recently, one British newspaper went so far as to say that the organization's investments amount to 4 billion pounds sterling (about US\$6 billion), and mentioned that the production of a single Palestinian farm in Africa could meet the egg needs of all the armies of all the Arab countries.

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu-Jihad) and Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad) described the British paper's remarks as sheer fabrication and a flight of fancy intended to cut off Arab aid to the PLO so as to place a new burden on it in addition to its political, military and organizational burdens.

However, as the popular proverb has it, there is no smoke without fire. One thing that is sure is that the PLO and its various groups have engaged in investment activities in recent years, although not in the manner suggested in the West, and not with such imaginary sums as mentioned in that British paper.

The fact is that delving into this topic is a hard, thorny process. Besides the PLO, there are eight other Palestinian groups, each with its own budget and financial organization, and even its own investments. In addition to Fatah, there is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front, the Popular Front-General Command, the Palestine Liberation Front with all its branches and offshoots, "Sa'iqah," the Popular Struggle Front, and the Arab Liberation Front.

The PLO is known to have become, over the past 10 years, a wide-spread quasi-state with its own army, financial organizations, and more than 120 offices (embassies) scattered around the world. Furthermore, it supervises a number of cultural and social organizations inside the occupied territories and elsewhere. Ever since its founding, the PLO's finances have been supervised by

a body called the National Palestinian Fund, which has a board of directors composed of several trustworthy Palestinian personages. In recent years, a number of financially and administratively skilled persons known for their reliability and propriety have been responsible for supervising this fund.

Except for regular interest on funds deposited in banks as part of its financing and disbursement operations, the National Fund, which is subject to the control of the National Council and the Executive Committee as well as the board of directors, is not permitted to engage in the investment field. Certain limited, unsuccessful attempts have deviated from this guideline, including an attempt to purchase a well-known British school for use as a boarding school for well-placed children of martyrs; the school would have paid for itself through installments received from other students.

Investigations have confirmed that the PLO does not enter into any investment project unless it has some political or social advantage. The construction projects undertaken in Lebanon in order to maintain Palestinian camps and set up military fortifications in Southern Lebanon and in the front-line villages might fall under this heading, as might the purchase of some buildings for use as offices.

But where does the PLO's money come from, and how is it spent? Until the mid-Seventies, deductions from the salaries of Palestinians working in Gulf countries formed the mainstream of the National Palestinian Fund, in addition to Arab aid. However, as its burdens and responsibilities have swelled, the PLO has begun to basically rely on Arab support in accordance with the resolutions of successive Arab summits.

In this context, the 1978 Baghdad summit adopted a resolution whereby those Arab countries that could would give \$300 million in aid to the PLO over a period of 10 years, in the same manner as the enormous aid this summit allocated to the confrontation states, especially Syria and Jordan. According to this resolution, the United Arab Emirates would pay \$34.3 million, Algeria \$21.4 million, Iraq \$44.6 million, Saudi Arabia \$85.7 million, Qatar \$19.8 million, Kuwait \$47.1 million, and Libya \$47.1 million.

The report presented by the National Palestinian Fund to the National Council session held in 'Amman, Jordan in November 1984 indicated that of all the Arab countries, only Saudi Arabia had met its 1983-84 obligations. Some Arab countries had not paid a penny since the Baghdad summit, while other countries had paid part of last year's installments and still others had stopped paying anything more than 2 years ago.

These funds, not amounting to even half the figure mentioned by the Western press even if the entire 10 year sum had been paid at once, have gone to meet the vast commitments incumbent upon the PLO by virtue of its responsibility towards the occupied territories, the Palestinian camps in several Arab countries, and an army consisting of more than 12,000 combatants in Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Jordan and the Sudan. In addition, there are air and marine forces, not to mention the information, education and health agencies.

The man responsible for the Children of the Martyrs Organization, Abu-'Ala', confirms that obligations towards the families of martyrs alone amount to \$60 million a year. He points out that the National Palestinian Fund, especially since the departure from Beirut, has paid for several schools, among them the Perseverance School in Beirut, the As'ad Nursery School in Suq al-Gharb, Lebanon, the Martyrs' Children's Town in Damascus, and kindergartens located wherever there are Palestinians.

In addition to schools, there are several hospitals for which the PLO is financially responsible, among them the Ghazzah Hospital in Lebanon, the Liberation Army Hospital in 'Amman, a hospital in Cairo, and another in Damascus. All these hospitals, in addition to scores of clinics, provide free services to the citizens of the Arab countries in which these hospitals are located.

The Truth About the Financial "Empire"

This is the financial "empire" on which the sun never sets and over which Yasir 'Arafat reigns. However, does this mean that, since the organizational resources and statutes of the PLO prohibit it from investment activities, the other groups have no investments of their own?

From the outbreak of the Palestinian revolution until the mid-Seventies, the funds of most of the Palestinian groups consisted merely of contributions and organizational subscriptions barely sufficient to cover the expenses of the combatants and their families, with a limited ceiling for information and organizational needs.

In the Seventies, this picture gradually began to change. New alliances and ideological and political commitments caused some countries to shower money on some groups, without requiring any accounting and regardless of whether these organizations had an actual presence in the occupied territories.

This new situation forced those organizations which move suddenly from place to place to look for fields in which to invest the money which had dropped on them out of the sky--even fields outside the Arab world, since for a thousand and one reasons it might be difficult to mention names and figures here at home.

However, for the main organizations, including Fatah, there are countless areas for activity in this field, especially in Lebanon. Travel agencies can be acquired, either to provide services or for security reasons, and printing presses can be acquired to meet organizational and information needs, not to mention the purchase of flats for use as offices or housing for officials in leadership positions.

We may be revealing a secret to say that with the growth of Palestinian action and the increase in obstacles between the Palestinian fighters and their occupied homeland, some Palestinian agencies and organizations have been forced to set up fictitious companies overseas, such as shipping companies and the like, through which they can purchase arms or boats for use in marine war operations.

In 1981, journalist circles in Beirut picked up rumors that one of the Palestinian organizations was acquiring airline companies and airplanes from abroad. Less than 2 months later, it was confirmed that the purchase involved only airborne-type gliders, which were sent over the occupied territories on a new type of operation which had loud repercussions at that time.

The Main Investment Sector

In 1969, in order to create a nucleus for a Palestinian economy, Fatah set up the "Samid" organization, on behalf of children of Palestinian martyrs. Within 10 years this organization became a major sector for investment. Its list of goals included training and employing sons of martyrs of the Palestinian revolution and providing them with opportunities for respectable employment; preserving, defining and developing the Palestinian folk heritage; helping the occupied territories to stand firm, and setting up production and commercial projects; and developing commercial and technological relations with Arab and foreign countries.

At present, the organization employs, in Lebanon alone, about 3,500 workers, most of them from the camps, who work in 43 industrial production units. The organization has 26 showrooms and 20 commercial offices in several Arab, African and Eastern European countries. This organization's activities embrace the industrial, agricultural, commercial and motion picture production sectors. It produces documentaries and dramas about the Palestinian struggle, and has also entered the sound recording field, its latest production being an ode by the poet Mahmud Darwish, with music by the famous Lebanese artist Marcel Khalifah.

Abu-'Ala', a Samid organization official and member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council, says that developments over the past 3 years have seriously hurt the organization, since its installations in Lebanon have been damaged twice, the first time in 1982 during the Israeli invasion of Lebanese territory, and the second time during the war of the camps.

The basic concentration has obviously been limited to the industrial sector; in addition to the industrial units in Lebanon there is a tailoring shop in South Yemen and another in North Yemen, in addition to two furniture factories, one in Tanzania and the other in Guinea-Bissau. However, the agricultural investment experiment has been remarkably successful, especially in African countries.

Farms In Africa

The first Palestinian agricultural project employing modern methods was established in Uganda, and was intended as a pilot, model project. However, the civil war which raged in this country, continuing in one form or another from then until now, dashed the hopes for this project. It rapidly failed, and its assets, machines and equipment were plundered.

After that, Fatah turned to Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia and the Sudan, and set up model farms staffed with experts and engineers and equipped with modern machinery. Reports indicate that they have been remarkably successful, although a marketing crisis has prevented these projects from becoming a major field of investment.

In this context, ever since the departure from Beirut and the settlement of Palestinian forces in the Yemen Arab Republic, there have been persistent efforts to reclaim Kamaran Island, but these attempts have been unsuccessful because of the harsh climate and saline water.

It seems that Abu-'Ammar chose this island, situated in the middle of the Red Sea facing the Bab al-Mandab, for basically military, not economic, reasons, since it controls this waterway and constitutes a jumping-off point for marine operations against Israeli targets in the occupied Eilat area.

While the Kamaran Island experiment has failed, and even the herds of gazelles brought in to prove that life can exist on this island have perished, the experiment on the al-Hudaydah shores just across from the island has been very successful, and the Palestinian farm there has begun providing the area with some of its citrus fruit needs.

But is this everything? Surely the investments by Fatah and the PLO do not outstrip the achievements of the Samid Organization and the farm projects in Africa?

The reports here are varied and contradictory. Some point to the existence of an investment authority headed by a senior Palestinian official, and some speak of shipping and airline companies, hotels, restaurants and banks. On the other hand, there are those who deny everything which is said, and who stress that the sources of finance, whether for Fatah or the PLO, are insufficient to meet their responsibilities and obligations. Still others say that the PLO carries the burdens of a state while its assets barely cover its daily needs.

8559

CSO: 4404/174

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

FRAYJ: OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ARE BEING SWALLOWED UP

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 18-24 Dec 85 p 11

[Interview with Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj, Conducted by 'Abd-al-Barri 'Atwan: "I Advise 'Arafat To Recognize Resolution 242"]

[Text] Mayor of Bethlehem Ilyas Frayj is a Palestinian personage known for his opinions, which are controversial because of their frankness and unequivocality. 'Abd-al-Barri 'Atwan reached Ilyas Frayj by telephone and conducted this interview with him.

[Question] How do you view the present Palestinian situation, from where you are in the occupied West Bank?

[Answer] I feel that Israeli annexation is growing and increasing, and is gobbling up Arab territory with insane rapidity. I can see Israeli planes moving about freely in the skies of Lebanon, and the Arab states are divided among themselves. The picture is completely black.

[Question] But you haven't spoken of the American peace moves.

[Answer] The proposed peace process is just talk. I doubt that there will be any peace negotiations in the true sense of the word.

[Question] You have been one of the most fervent supporters of this process. Why this frustration?

[Answer] The Arabs are proposing peace from the standpoint of an innocent, oppressed man seeking the sympathy of others, while the Israelis look at it from the standpoint of strength, for they are speaking of secure borders and prior recognition. In actual fact, Israel has no intention of withdrawing from the areas occupied since 1967.

[Question] If Israel does not intend to withdraw, how do you explain Peres' activities and initiatives, which have convinced some Westerners and Arabs?

[Answer] Perhaps Israel has some notion of creating some sort of phased, provisional peace, such as a limited, powerless administration, with this administration being permanently linked or connected with Jordan. In my opinion, Israel will never give in on the question of sovereignty.

[Question] What is going on in the minds of the people of the occupied territories right now? Are they as despairing as you are?

[Answer] The people of the occupied territories are completely convinced that there can be no Arab military solution at present, and that the political option is lacking, since the Arab side is weak and fragmented, and America and Israel present a united front against this weakness and fragmentation.

[Question] What was the result of your meeting 2 weeks ago with American Delegate to the Middle East Richard Murphy?

[Answer] The meeting did not include anything new, but was a repetition of previous meetings. Murphy insisted on his country's conditions: the need to recognize UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Throughout the meeting he gave the impression that the Palestinians were the obstacle on the road to peace, whereas the real obstacle is Israel and its expansionist ambitions.

[Question] But at its recent meeting in Baghdad, the PLO rejected Resolution 242. Does this mean that the road is blocked?

[Answer] It is my belief that the PLO would lose nothing by recognizing Resolutions 242 and 338, because by doing so it would forestall these American pretexts and excuses. I believe that a year from now, what territory is left will be lost and we will reach the point of no return.

[Question] But Resolution 242 deals with the Palestinian people as refugees, not as a people entitled to determine their own fate and establish their own independent state.

[Answer] I agree with you on this interpretation of the resolution, but the problem is that things have gone from bad to worse within the occupied territories. In less than a year's time, the Likud bloc will come to power, and no one will dare to speak of peace. With the Likud, the occupation will continue, annexation will expand, unemployment rates will rise, social corruption will increase, and health and educational services will get worse and worse. I am afraid that the people's perseverance will be eroded, because slogans by themselves are not enough to guarantee perseverance. Arab support is still limited; the joint committee needs US\$100 million to support the occupied territories and has not gotten a single piaster.

[Question] Do you think the United States is serious about its peace proposal?

[Answer] It may be that by clinging to these PLO-rejected conditions, the United States intends to waste time and strengthen the Israeli presence!

[Question] Do you think that these demands for recognizing Resolution 242 will meet with acceptance within the occupied territories?

[Answer] Not only I, but several West Bank leaders think so. A delegation composed of Rashshad al-Shawa, Mustafa al-Natshah, Hanna Sanyura and others will go to 'Amman soon to meet with Yasir 'Arafat, to urge him to recognize Resolution 242 and forestall the American pretexts. The Americans are saying that they are ready to talk with the PLO if the PLO recognizes Resolution 242. As for where all this talk will lead, I don't know.

[Question] What if such talks fail, and the Americans make other demands, and the two sides don't agree?

[Answer] I believe that dialog is better than no dialog. When the negotiations begin, the action will begin.

[Question] The Americans have attempted to bring Syria into the movement towards peace. What do you think?

[Answer] Any real, serious peace process will just limp along without Syria. If the Syrians are guaranteed Israeli withdrawal from Golan, they will not hesitate to join. However, the West Bank is not like Golan; in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip there are about 1.5 million Arabs living in very close quarters. Our presence on the land is what has maintained its Arabism. When we lose the land, we lose our cause. Maybe this is why we are in a hurry.

[Question] Before Muhammad Milham went to London as part of the joint delegation, you advised him to seize this opportunity to facilitate a meeting with the British. However, Milham refused to sign a British document recognizing Resolution 242 and denouncing armed struggle. Were you surprised?

[Answer] There is a document written by Muhammad Milham in his own hand mentioning recognition of Resolutions 242 and 338. I brought with me from 'Amman a copy of the statement which had been agreed upon and the statement written by Milham in his own hand; acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 was stated in both texts. Archbishop Elie Khuri and Muhammad Milham were not supposed to go to London before agreement was reached, and if agreement was impossible, from the very first they should not have gone and should have requested that the meeting be delayed a month or two.

[Question] Do I understand you to mean that you are for peace at any price, in order to save what can be saved, and not for armed fedayeen action, which has been stepping up recently in the occupied territories?

[Answer] I am not for peace at any price, but I am a pragmatic man who looks at things realistically. The settlements are continuing, and the Jews are building towns in Ramallah, Nablus, and the heart of Hebron. We are afraid that the day will come when we have no place to live. Therefore, I am for any movement which will halt this creeping annexation and free the people from the burden of occupation.

[Question] Are you for or against fedayeen operations?

[Answer] I cannot answer this question over the telephone.

[Question] How do you explain the increase in such operations?

[Answer] There is a hopelessness in the occupied territories. Many of these operations are carried out by individuals. Military action in the occupied territories requires Arab military action, which is non-existent right now.

[Question] What did you ask from the French foreign minister when you met with him recently?

[Answer] I asked him to convince the European Common Market countries to give \$100 million as aid to the West Bank, to be spent on service projects. He listened attentively to this request and promised to do his best.

[Question] Do you think that these opinions of yours could be described as capitulationist by some people?

[Answer] I have been expressing these opinions for 15 years now, and have never changed them and never will.

8559

CSO: 4404/174

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE--AL-TADAMUN has learned from a responsible Palestinian source in Baghdad that Mr Salah Khalaf, Abu Iyad, was the one who drafted the broad outlines of the Palestinian communique issued by the PLO's Executive Committee and the Central Council following the meetings which began Sunday, 24 November 1985. Salah Khalaf was also appointed chair of the communique-drafting committee in an attempt by the Palestinian leadership to tone down his opposition. The Palestinian Central Council, for the first time, debated the call for a Palestinian economic conference to discuss the acute financial crisis plaguing the PLO. The council is also discussing the matters of national unity, the financial situation, the occupied territories, and Lebanon, in addition to the political situation. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 30 Nov 85 p 16] 12502/13045

CSO: 4404/144

SAUDI ARABIA

CORROSIVE, IMMORAL EFFECTS OF BRIBERY CATEGORIZED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 11 Dec 85 pp 15-21

[Article: "Subject of the Week: Wary Eyes and Filthy Pockets: Bribery"]

[Text] On this subject, AL-YAMAMAH is sitting down in front of the "bellows," to learn to what extent sparks are flying and to measure the size of the spread and the intensity of the flame. However, the germ of "bribery" has gone into the larval stage, and we have a religion, have morality, and have a system and a religious law which act as a deterrent and "constrain through the authorities what is not constrained through the Koran." However, the larva of bribery continues to retain its own character of swimming slowly and attaching itself to the parasitic walls in the society, and this has prompted us to declare this vicious war against it.

The first fact about bribery, that grave social and national plague, claims that it has a particular historic nature which is marked by a character of continuity. It has been in existence, in varying degrees, in all societies throughout the ages and no society is free from its poisons, because it represents a side of the equation of life, between good and evil. If an adequate antibody is not available in a given society, "bribery" acquires a pestilential character which gradually infiltrates until it occupies all various aspects of activities and their undertakings. We have said that our society, praise God, has a strong intrinsic antibody against these types of illnesses, and it is this antibody which provides the kingdom with the distinctive, unique character of social security that has become rare in the world today.

However, the elements of rapid resurgence and the exemplary leap in development we have achieved in a record period of time have brought some side effects to prominence by means of which the phenomenon of bribery has infiltrated. However, our society has rapidly mobilized its intrinsic antibody to declare war against this new phenomenon. Then came the holding of the first conference of Saudi businessmen in Dhahran, where His Royal Highness Prince Nayif Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the minister of the interior, made a statement in which he called for the need to combat bribery and stressed that he, and the agencies of the government, would strike out with a hand of iron at all the sources of this phenomenon and those who promoted and rushed toward it.

Since that time, the germ has begun to retreat, to settle deep within some parasitic elements, and has abandoned them only rarely to meet its deterrent punishment or insinuate its vile face, at one point in one place and at another in another.

All these assumptions have made a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon an inevitable necessity, and we would be very mistaken if we succumbed to the desire to allege to people, anywhere, that Saudi society is totally devoid of flaws and is totally safe from sick people, people with complexes and people without consciences who take bribes, embezzle, steal or plunder public money. If we did that no one would believe us; indeed, we would be accused of thereby concealing scandals which were greater than the ones spoken about, or that it is permitted to speak about. There is nothing more exemplary than the society of Madinah in the first Islamic era, when the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and his glorious companions there, founded, through what God had revealed, the model society. That society was in no way devoid of criminals, thieves, embezzlers, impotent persons, hypocrites and traitors. This brilliant, clean society in our Islamic society was permeated by some of these people and had a view, founded on a large degree of logic, that if Islam had not presupposed the existence of such parasitic phenomena among Moslems themselves, it would not have created the provisions, penalties and Islamic penalties which act as deterrents. The Islamic punishment for theft presupposes that there are people who will commit this act. The Islamic punishment for adultery means that there are people who will commit this abomination. Our Saudi society like any society deals with itself and with events and developments in a normal way. There must be people in it who take bribes, people who embezzle and people who do other forbidden things, but the thing we want to salute ourselves for is that in spite of everything our society has continued to be the one with the lowest ratio of types of crime and aberrant acts linked objectively and in substance to crime. We are not praising ourselves; rather, this is a fact which has been said of us, and is said, in all areas of the world and in more than one conference on security; our friends have circulated it and our enemies have acknowledged and affirmed it.

Yes, there are people among us who have embezzled, people among us who have taken bribes and people among us who have stolen. Entering into this sort of subject ultimately flows into the "channel" of the awareness that is desired and sought after among people and youths by warning of these crimes which religion punishes, morality rejects and the nation takes sternly to account.

Yes, we are raising this "issue" here because it is connected to people's awareness and because it is related to conscience and trust, and in order that everyone will know that there are people who condemn such persons. A person who gives warnings of some consequence might lead some people into temptation; good and evil are offered up at the street corner, on the sidelines of the office, and each of them has its own enticement, its own brilliance and its luster; as a consequence the spirit incites one to evil.

This issue will show people that there are officials and competent authorities who are concerned about our social security and concerned about our consciences and honesty. It will show people also that there are agencies

which stay awake nights and spend days following up on and fighting such "incidents." If their activity is not apparent on the surface, that must not prompt some people to think that this sort of issue is not observed, that it passes before our officials without the necessary attention, or that it is ultimately considered a thing that "one should be silent about." The guests making contributions on this subject have said that the statements contain a vivid portrayal of the upright government's interest in prosecuting thieves, bribe-takers and their like. Here they diagnose the disease, then, as specialists, the elements of the remedy.

Ibn Baz: A Curse on Bribery

Faith in Islam is our major distinctive character, and it is that which has painted the true picture of this destructive beast for us. Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibn 'Abdallah Ibn Baz, the general chairman of the departments of scientific research, jurisprudence, religious appeal and guidance, has shown us the provisions of Islamic law regarding bribery and its moral harm to society. His eminence was so kind to be one of our guests regarding this important issue, and he said:

"Bribery is forbidden in scripture and by scholarly unanimity. It is what drives the ruler and others to turn away from what is proper and render judgment in favor of persons involved in it in a manner in keeping with their whim. It was proper that the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, cursed people who gave and took bribes, and it has also been related that he also cursed persons who feathered their nests, who were the mediators between them. There is no doubt that they are evil and deserve to be cursed, chastized and punished because they are an accessory to evil and enmity."

His Eminence Shaykh Ibn Baz then showed the social effects which arise from bribery as weakening faith and causing Satan to dominate God's servants by making them succumb to other sins.

He pointed out that these sins caused the fragmentation of society and the severance of bonds of affection among its members and caused rancor, enmity and a lack of cooperation with respect to what is proper. Among their most odious effects have been the appearance and spread of evils, the disappearance of virtues and tyranny and aggression against people's rights. As a result of these religious provisions and general moral premises His Eminence Shaykh Ibn Baz showed us, the conviction gained strength among us that we should sense the roots of this social ailment and measure the extent of its spread and the elements contributing to its existence, as well as the statutes and measures pursued to rout and contain it. In this regard a group of opinions of high scholarly and official status have been provided to AL-YAMAMAH:

The Attention of His Highness the Minister of the Interior

His Excellency Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, the minister of finance and national economy, supported having the subject of bribery presented for discussion. In his view, it deserves such attention, especially since it was

raised by his highness the minister of the interior at the inauguration of the first conference of Saudi businessmen.

His excellency the minister of finance believed that his highness the minister of the interior's presentation of this issue at the businessmen's conference was most timely and opportune, because bribery, by its nature, needs parties between whom some activity exists.

His excellency the minister of finance observed the interest of the people participating at that conference in what his highness the minister of the interior had raised by the pertinent questions they submitted to his highness; this meant that everyone realized the importance of the problem as an ailment which could become widespread and which all forces had to be mobilized to combat.

Points Brought to Prominence by the Leap Forward

Concerning the degree to which the phenomenon had become widespread in the society, his excellency the minister of finance measured that by the degree of society's awareness, as there were no scientific ways of measuring such phenomena. Therefore his highness believed that during past years, in which splendid achievements have been made in the area of building and construction, the leap forward, which has had many positive elements, was accompanied by some negative features as well, including the direct or indirect appearance of the plague of corruption as an anticipated consequence, because when demand for a specific thing increases, or need for a specific service increases, possibilities for exploiting this need in order to realize personal gain immediately appear. That is bribery.

Measures Followed To Fight back

It appears that everyone agrees that his highness the interior minister's presentation of the problem of bribery at the businessmen's conference constituted successful timing for initiating the remedy. His excellency the minister of commerce, Dr Sulayman al-Salim, emphasized that his highness had given a strong push in the proper direction for doing away with the phenomenon and that raising this issue did not just constitute an admission that the phenomenon existed but also had the goal of making businessmen aware of the efforts the Ministry of the Interior has been making in coordination with other agencies. The latest important step to take place has been the establishment of the agency of the administrative investigator, which was established to regulate activity in this area and distribute areas of specialization. This measure was also preceded by another important step, which was the publication of pictures of bribe-takers and forgers by the local papers to give them unfavorable publicity.

Special Circumstances

Accepting that bribery is a serious phenomenon which must be eliminated in any society, his excellency the minister of commerce found special justifications to make bribery in our Saudi Islamic society a perverse growth which it was necessary to join forces to eliminate because of our position in the

Islamic world, our importance as a country from the moral and economic standpoint and regional and international standing; in addition there was no excuse to justify the spread of such a phenomenon in our liberal society, which puts weight on relationships, starting with the highest official and ending with the lowest of them.

The Forward Leap Is a Common Denominator

There was repeated mention of the element of the "social leap forward" which has been realized in recent years and the point that the phenomenon of bribery was of necessity a negative result of it. From this, we can deduce that the phenomenon was not present in this magnitude prior to these years. Why, then?

Mr Ibrahim al-Tawq, vice chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh and a well known businessman, pointed out that the rapid progress of business in the past 10 years has highlighted the phenomenon because of the amazing rise in the volume of projects and contracts in government departments and bureaus, which has been matched by a corresponding increase in the number of people who had needs who frequented these departments and bureaus, putting great pressure on the flow of work and prompting some of them to resort to material enticements to have their work performed before that of others. In addition, the opposite has happened in the case of some people who have tried to exploit people's need for rapid construction to get money easily and quickly.

Second, the relatively rapid enrichment of large numbers of people working in liberal activities such as commerce, contracting, real estate and so forth and the relatively limited increase in the incomes of government employees, which has had a psychological effect.

Third, the severalfold increase in the volume of unexpected work, which was not accompanied by a rise in the performance level, in terms of the suitability of the systems in effect or the competence of the system itself, creating a sort of confusion and mediocre surveillance and discipline, which led to the spread of this phenomenon.

Direct Damages

Alongside the general moral damage from the phenomenon of corruption, Mr al-Tawq addressed himself to some direct negative aspects related to development work. He as a businessman believed that bribery put an end to honorable and just competition in work due to the neglect of competence and replacement of it by other criteria, as well as the negative effect on the quality of execution and failure to observe stipulated specifications, which caused neglect, laxity and indifference among workers in private sector companies. This is if we consider the public interest a secondary matter. [He said] "In addition, there is the lack of feeling of responsibility toward society, imposition on other people of the burden of mistakes and negative aspects, and other innumerable forms of harm, since I do not consider it farfetched that it finally could end up with the conversion of everyone into a group of thieves and frauds where sincere people would close themselves up in silence and alienation."

Bribery Is a Rule

Some people are inclined to the need to observe caution in defining the magnitude of the phenomenon, proceeding from the premise that a strict remedy to this plague is necessary. This inclination brings us back to the beneficial impact which his highness the minister of the interior's raising of the issue of corruption at the first businessmen's conference created. Many people were enthusiastic about this presentation and expressed readiness to take part in the struggle, including Mr Salih al-Tu'aymi, secretary general of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Riyadh, from whose talk we may deduce that he is part of the group which calls for more severely harsh penalties against the people propagating this phenomenon. He said,

"I can almost say, unfortunately, that bribery has become a rule and not a phenomenon. Bribery's seriousness lies in its being an evil, and in addition its spread has caused people to become accustomed to it, to the point where I might mention that I once advised a friend to deal with some entities where this plague had not become widespread, and there he was thanking me not because I pointed these entities out to him but rather answered me by saying 'I will not waste my time dealing with these people.'" It appears that this incident had an effect on the spirit of Mr al-Tu'aymi, who constructed on it the wise notion that dealing with bribery is the rule and proper dealings are the exception.

Bribery Is Nonexistent in the Private Sector

Al-Tu'aymi believes that bribery is almost nonexistent in the private sector, because its causes basically are not relevant in people's dealings with the private sector. Merchants do not need bribes to dispose of their goods. Moreover, competition eliminates monopoly and consequently the choices open to clients are numerous. However, he excluded dealings between some large foreign companies and purchasing officials in them and official bodies, and pointed out that these individuals and companies represented the other side of the equation of bribery. They are the ones who pay to the agencies, stating as justification for that that if they did not pay their work would come to a halt.

A Historic Continuity

Bribery is a phenomenon of social aberrance which exists in every society, old or new, although its forms and degree of its spread differ among societies in accordance with their stage of development and economic, social and cultural circumstances. Sociologists attribute this historic continuity of the phenomenon to innate instincts of resistance to statutes or laws within the individual since ancient times because of his feeling that they limit his personal interests.

However, Dr 'Abdallah al-Bunyan, a specialist in sociology and a businessman, considers that this continuity has assumed a prominence, widespread nature and numerous forms in our modern era, since the appearance of the system of organizations and companies and their complexity have led to the appearance of the phenomenon of attention to personal interests. In the

system of institutions, the individual does not encounter an opportunity to answer his needs and interests by himself; rather, an intermediary or intermediaries are necessary; these in our era are the army of employees in the various departments. In their absolute form, Dr al-Bunyan lists the causes for the spread of bribery as follows:

The complexity of financial systems.

The complexity of administrative systems.

The absence or mediocre quality of administrative oversight.

Economic differences and the change they lead to in values and in systems of social status.

Local Causes

Dr al-Bunyan assumed the existence of these causes in any society, but he added other causes of the spread of the phenomenon in our local society.

First, the sudden enrichment of some individuals and groups, which has resulted in the appearance of economic differences of a sort which have been accompanied by a change in these groups' values and style of consumption, creating some material aspirations and tendencies among other individuals and groups.

Second, the ambitious development projects, bringing foreign companies into the arena of the struggle for the sake of rapid gain and bringing new methods of transactions which our society was not familiar with along with them.

Third, the presence of a multitude of backgrounds of culture and civilization among workers in the private and government sectors.

Fourth, the diversity of family needs and their increased consumer requirements, which on many occasions are greater than the head of household's income.

The Weakness of Spirit of Loyalty

Dr al-Bunyan then went on to ascribe to these provisions a general character which might appear in any society without distinction, saying "If the system of values and behavior is shaken, that will without a doubt influence the fabric of social relations which constitute the social structure, and will weaken the spirit of loyalty to the country among individuals, which is reflected on their other loyalties, to the family, friends and groups, leading to fragmentation and also the predominance of the material bent in the individual, causing him to give greater weight to material values."

It Is Not a Phenomenon

The grievance office, as an executive body for penal measures against people committing the crime of bribery, assuredly has the most accurate estimates

of the magnitude of the phenomenon. In order to give the issue its proper perspective, we met with His Excellency Shaykh Muhammad Ibrahim Ibn Jubayr, chairman of the grievance office, who started out by saying:

"Bribery does not constitute a phenomenon in our society. I know this through my long experience in the grievance office and my prosecution of many bribery cases. Bribery exists but not to the extent people imagine, because the total bribery cases we review are not sufficiently numerous to call for anxiety. We must also understand that bribery has appeared in our country with the arrival of large numbers of people coming from non-Islamic countries or countries that are not interested in Islamic law's ruling on these matters. These people unceasingly test the consciences of some people working in government jobs and organizations by offering bribes."

Where Clients Are Numerous, Bribery Is Common

His Excellency Shaykh Ibn Jubayr agreed with us that bribery is a natural extension of what is called mediation or patronage. [He said] "Indeed, the anti-bribery statute considers all forms of mediation and patronage to be a crime, and provisions have in fact been issued by the board of verdicts penalizing persons who have mediated for others in order to get work they had done at the expense of the interests of the whole, because we view mediation as giving a right to someone at someone else's expense."

He believed that these cases proliferate where the clients of service facilities are numerous, where the suitable environment for the occurrence of such a crime exists.

Small Bribes Are More Dangerous Than Large Ones

On the basis of crimes reported in the local papers, we cited an observation by the grievance board that crimes of major bribery remain concealed while small crimes are publicized.

Shaykh Jubayr considered that small bribes are the more dangerous. His excellency was gripped by understandable amazement at the appeal for deep thought about the matter in order to discover that it was small bribe amounts that constituted the whole threat. It will become implanted in the conscience of the citizen who pays and receives and in the consciences of thousands of citizens that their work and their interests can be realized only in this way, meaning that the society will gradually accept bribery as a fact, which is where the danger lies.

As for major bribes, although the government agencies prosecute and try people who make them, they do not account for the same seriousness and are not as widespread as small bribes. Nonetheless, Shaykh Ibn Jubayr agreed that publicity and publication of the verdicts must be applied to everyone, especially since there are some people who prefer prison to publicity and therefore that must be part of the punishment, especially in the case of major bribes.

10 Riyals or 10 Million

We can cite this additional definition of bribery, also from the board of grievances, from Shaykh Mansur Hamad al-Malik, the vice-chairman, who said that bribery is not restricted to what is paid to the ruler but that everyone who performs a government job and receives compensation, asks for something or receives a promise for the sake of his job and his work is a bribe-taker and should be punished for his sin. However, he also agreed with others that the spread of bribery is connected to the progress of work, the spread of construction and the increase in the volume of services.

[He said] "As regards the fact of bribery, there is no distinction between 10 riyals and 10 million; the important thing is to prove the guilt of the person to whom the crime of bribery has been attributed through proof and facts; in the light of the circumstances, concomitant facts and gravity of the case, I will determine the suitable punishment for the crime within the limits of what the statute stipulates."

Shaykh al-Malik agreed with the chairman of the board, Shaykh Jubayr, that crimes for small sums which we might think little of are more serious than major bribes.

Bribery Is Widespread in Non-Saudi Circles

Shaykh al-Malik pointed out that the cases he has reviewed have not been restricted to minor employees; rather, he has reviewed and rendered verdicts on cases for sums of more than 1 million riyals, and he has handed down verdicts on employees of various ranks and sectors.

Through his working experience with most verdicts issued, Shaykh al-Malik stressed that the degree of frequency of bribery among non-Saudis was greater than among the circles of Saudis. In this regard, he determined that the rate of commission of crimes of bribery by Saudi employees was no more than 20 percent of the total cases.

However, in spite of that, he also confirmed that the phenomenon as a whole was starting to regress as a result of the religious deterrent and fear of punishment.

No Bureaucracy

In addition, Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, minister of finance, believed that the phenomenon would decline because our society is capable of being guided. However, he believed in the feasibility of applying more indoctrination. As regards the belief some people hold, that red tape, bureaucracy and the complexity of procedures constitute a major feeding ground for the spread of the phenomenon, His Excellency Aba al-Khayl stressed that that was not true, and explained that by saying,

"The measures and rules on the basis of which executive action is carried out are what can prevent bribery or limit it, and are not the cause of the spread of the phenomenon. The clearer and more precise the statutes and

laws, the more they spell out the rights and obligations of each party, since in the context of this sort of well-defined, clear statute, when the person requesting service knows his rights exactly, as the person offering the service knows the limits of movement in which he exercises his function, the opportunities for malfeasance and exploitation of authority and use of influence founded on conduct or flexibility will be reduced. This means that precise provisions will prevent error because they will not leave room for individual theorizing which might be incorrect or biased.

"Flexible, unclear, bombastic provisions give an opportunity for an interpretation which is not correct and permit broader scope of freedom of movement, error and exploitation of positions by public officials and people offering services. Therefore, the more we develop the rules of executive activity and the more precise we make them, the less the opportunities for individual theorizing and the opportunities for error will become. That is the experience I have concluded with in my long employment career."

His Excellency Aba al-Khayl then warned of another important feature, which is that the discussion of bribery must not just draw attention to the government system and government employees, because the possibilities for mistakes also are relevant as far as company employees go, to the same degree.

It Is Natural That Bribery Should Become Prominent

His excellency the minister of finance agreed with the point addressed by the people carrying on the discussion, that people sense small bribes more than major ones, for a simple reason, first of all because they are more numerous, then they have wide currency, are spread about and enter into the fabric of people's ordinary everyday lives.

As for the major bribes, they lie under the jurisdiction of specific agencies, including the anti-bribery agency in the Ministry of the Interior. His excellency concluded, from this notion, that the society is in one of its stages of development, the expansion of the process of life and construction in it has experienced an improper social phenomenon, and quickly this phenomenon has got out of hand. This society could only rise up to fight the phenomenon, then; the prominence of bribery in this stage is a natural thing and fighting it in this manner is also natural.

Not a Defense

His highness the minister of commerce, Dr Sulayman al-Salim, rules out that there is a disruption in the administrative systems which might result in the aggravation of the phenomenon. He said,

"The kingdom's administrative system does not encourage the bureaucratic swelling of government agencies, and many economic activities are left up to the private sector. In addition, bribery is not restricted to government agencies and must be prosecuted in private agencies."

In response to our observation on a phrase present in government tenders, which states "the department has the right to accept or reject this tender

without reference or protest to the department," and that this sort of provision might constitute a pretext for the presence of some bribes, Dr al-Salim said "These provisions exist in many statutes but exist to protect the government departments and I do not believe that they lead to the spread of bribery. More important than that is the assertion of this system's openness and its receptivity to all complaints."

Elements Favorable to Oversight

However, the presence of a liberal administrative system and rules lessening the possibility of erroneous interpretations do not prohibit the presence of factors helping guarantee ease in the public's dealings. Dr Muttalib Ibn 'Abdallah al-Nafisah, chairman of the branch of experts in the prime minister's office, embraces the assertion of the need for these factors by stating,

"Oversight, as is well known, has numerous forms, among them the performance of sudden visits by officials, hearing of relevant complaints and the submission of reports from the lowest to the highest levels. In order to reaffirm this, a number of statutes, instructions and lofty orders have been issued, including the anti-bribery statute in effect in accordance with royal decree 15 dated 4 July 1962, founded on the basis of protecting the government system from corruption and punishing government employees who do harm. In addition, a new draft is currently being prepared for the anti-bribery statute; one of the most important differences between it and the current statute is the intensification of the penalties and expansion of the scope for applying the statute, with the provision that it includes the environment of private activity."

In order to assert the need to intensify the punishment, Dr Muttalib al-Nafsiyah pointed to the presence of some private organizations which are run by employees who do not own them, where it is in the interests of protecting the society and the owners of these organizations that the employees in them not traffic in their positions and exploit them, since most of these organizations have a connection to the government.

Sales Representatives and High Officials

Mr Salih al-Tu'aymi again made his assertion that the rate by which bribery was proliferating in government offices was greater than in the private sector, but he could almost restrict the types of bribery in the private sector to sales representatives who are in charge of procuring their companies' requirements from local markets.

He offered some recommendations which he believed might help limit the phenomenon in general:

Stimulating administrative surveillance, codifying deterrent statutes and providing publicity on everyone giving and taking bribes.

Considering senior officials in all government or private agencies responsible as far as the spread of corruption in their departments is concerned.

Eliminating the causes of bribery by developing statutes and facilitating measures so that weak-spirited people will not find loopholes through which to exploit their positions.

The Difference between the Two Anti[-Bribery] Statutes

Shaykh Mansur Khalid, vice chairman of the grievance board, reviewed the most important sections in the anti[-bribery] statute in effect at present to show the probable differences with the new statute under study. He said,

"The present statute devotes attention to the diversity of crimes of bribery and the proliferation of different forms of violations. It consists of 17 articles, which in their totality have dealt with the crimes of bribery in all their forms and the imposition of penalties."

"According to this statute, the board of oversight and investigation is in charge of investigating and prosecuting these crimes and trials are the area of competence of the board of grievances. The penalties stipulated in the statute are prison for periods of no more than 5 years and fines of no more than 100,000 riyals, in addition to supplementary and subsequent penalties -- dismissal from one's position, expropriation and so forth. Moreover it has been noted that working to publish these cases in the papers is in the public interest and a factor which will reduce the spread of this type of crime. That in my opinion is a good function and will achieve the purpose.

"It is worth pointing out that the bribery statute is being restudied with the goal of covering all aspects of the crime and what is considered the equivalent and covering everything that practical application has revealed during past years. These additions which are now being prepared are what will be called the new anti[-bribery] statute when they are issued and it is expected that they will include changes in the penalties that have been set out at present."

We Will Not Reach the Point of Degeneracy

It is impossible for bribery to be converted into open dealings among people, because basically it is a latent crime by type. It is converted into open dealings among people when a given society reaches a degree of degeneracy where the person giving or taking the bribe sees no embarrassment in declaring his crime openly.

His Highness Shaykh Ibn Jubayr commented on this point with the categorical assertion that our Islamic society will not reach this point at all and pointed out that the struggle against bribery in the kingdom depended on two things, in order for the crime to be proved:

Either the existence of specific information concerning a given person engaged in bribery through circumstantial evidence, notification or arrest of the parties to the crime in a wholly flagrant state.

Restriction, Not Amputation

Also regarding the struggle, sociology states another opinion, which is that the subject of eliminating bribery is a controversial one. Bribery, as an

aberrant phenomenon, is difficult to eliminate; as long as society exists, there will be crime and there will be punishment.

Therefore combatting means restricting and confining bribery to the narrowest scope, not amputating it, because that is out of the question.

Proceeding from this premise, Dr 'Abdallah al-Bunyan concurred with sociology in the recommendation others also have cited, to stimulate administrative surveillance and back it up with capable persons of integrity.

However, Dr al-Bunyan gave special importance to the effectiveness of publicity via papers, seminars and conferences.

Internal Surveillance Is out of the Question

Mr Ibrahim al-Tawq revealed some exemplary recommendations which have been proposed in businessmen's circles and thus pointed to what some people had advocated in order to put businessmen on a moral level and have a feeling of responsibility, for instance internal surveillance, the collective boycotting of businessmen who give and take bribes and notification of the bodies concerned.

Mr al-Tawq described these theories as merely nice optimum conditions which presuppose collective action and unity of purpose and goal, as businessmen make up various contradictory groups. He categorized them in accordance with these four groups:

The first refrains from paying bribes no matter what the reason might be, but how great is their percentage, does one suppose?

The second group pays bribes when needed.

The third group pays bribes out of naivety, sometimes calls them a necessity and sometimes a clever procedure.

The fourth group works and plans on the basis of them. Al-Tawq then asked, "How can one bring these people together to agree on collective action? The first group, as is clear, is peaceloving and fears God, and might be prepared to cooperate if it meets with a consensus. Likewise, the second group might cooperate but is hesitant. The third group is opportunistic and seems to vary in what it does, and the fourth group will resist by various means because it considers bribery to be one of its skills and believes that it has contributed to its development."

On the basis of this analysis, which we believe is logical, al-Tawq considered it most far-fetched that a collective role of this sort could be played in businessmen's circles. Therefore, he referred back to recommendations others had presented on eliminating the causative factors of bribery, such as red tape, administrative complexity and some formal measures and token pliant rules which could be interpreted at whim. He then recommended that serious studies be done which could look deeply into cases which have called for the payment of bribes and underline the locations where these

cases have been numerous. He also asked that no exceptions in the anti-bribery statutes be admitted and said that it had to be applied accurately and decisively, because in his opinion any exception (for any reason) would in effect be considered a big avenue through which a camel and its load could pass, and so forth. In addition to decisive punishment, he believed that the bodies concerned with supervising the application of the statutes and bills should be combined in a unified central place and provided with competent people who would have an effective role.

The Philosophy of Punishment

The particular nature of the crime of bribery, in terms of the difficulty of finding proof through evidence and the element of testimony, made it necessary to get in touch with scholars of Islamic jurisprudence to establish the Islamic legal basis for prohibiting bribery, in order to thwart miscreants who always hold onto the final cry of claiming that they are not miscreants.

His Eminence Shaykh Salih Ibn Sa'd al-Luhaydan stated that the bases for imposing the prohibition were the book, the pure sayings and doings of the prophet and the consensus of scholars. The Koran has stipulated that it is to be forbidden; although he did not refer to it by name, the almighty said "Do not consume your money among yourselves vainly" and "We see many of them rushing after sin and aggression."

In addition, there are many other characterizations which almighty glorious God has conferred on people who engage in bribery. The prophet, may God's prayers and peace be upon him, said, "God has cursed the givers of bribes, the takers of bribes, and the featherers of nests."

Shaykh al-Luhaydan, pointing out that it was not permissible to pay bribes to commit folly or to deprive a person of his rights, then referred to an example that bribery could be a way of defeating a person who had rights but was weak. Intercession by words and feelings is proper if the purpose in the bribe is to save an oppressed person from the hands of an affluent, potent oppressor, and it might also be paid in case of need if the situation depended on it, for instance a person's paying what was requested of him in order to save a sick person.

The principle and the approach, with respect to bribery, is that it should take place only in the case of oppression. The person paying and the person paid both oppress themselves. In the general context, the spread of bribery leads to bewilderment in the society, chaos and the predominance of the strong over the weak.

The Usurpation of Rights

His Eminence Shaykh Salih al-Nasir, chairman of the department of religious jurisprudence at the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, added another item of evidence on behalf of these provisions: "If a person has a right that he must carry out, such as a debt to a person, and fails to acquit it, except by paying some of it, then he may get a waiver for part of his money and the person making the payment will not be considered a giver of bribes."

Shaykh al-Nasir laid emphasis on the serious nature of bribes in shattering the bonds of brotherhood among Moslems if they become widespread as a plague. Bribes cause the deterioration of unity and cohesion in society, with oneself and one's enemies, laying waste to the interests and future of Moslems, reducing confidence among them and usurping their rights.

In Conclusion

From this review, it is apparent that all persons of high social and official status are in agreement over the incentives for dealing with this phenomenon, although the degree of their diagnosis of it, in terms of its severity and remission, differs.

While bribery, as cited in most of the statements, is one secondary result of the years of economic leap forward during which the government firmly established all the basic foundations of these manifestations and civilized activities the citizens are blessed with now, the national duty of moving over to the current stage in the development plan, the stage of maintaining the basic accomplishments established during these years, demand that all the flaws accompanying any great action of this record volume be shaken off.

Perhaps "bribery" is one of these flaws, whose destructive characteristics require that their cells which proliferate in rotten, stagnant places be amputated rapidly and severely.

These incentives require that haste be made in issuing the new anti[-bribery] statute which we expect will be more stern and broader in scale, since it will deal on an equal basis with government and private agencies, and that at the same time that be accompanied by the attainment of a degree of administrative smoothness and discipline in government agencies, with emphasis as well on punishment through publicity and its application to bribe-takers, large and small alike, who threaten the government's higher economic interests.

Finally, the change which has occurred in economic conditions during this stage locally and internationally calls for some awareness and consciousness so that their new details, such as guidance and maintenance of accomplishments, the protection of domestic industry, the provision of a national strategic food reserve and all alternatives to oil resources, may be grasped --these details must be spared all loopholes through which one of the plagues of the age can seep in, as bribery has seeped in along with the machinery and equipment of the first leap forward.

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CSO: 4404/147

3 February 1986

SAUDI ARABIA

MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, ENERGY ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 24 Nov 85 p 4

[Interview with 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil, minister of industry and energy, by TIJARAT AL-RIYAD; date and place not specified]

[Text] The Saudi minister of industry and energy, Engineer 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil, announced that when all the companies belonging to SABIC begin production, the income expected from the Saudi petrochemical industry is estimated at about 4 billion riyals, which will lead to an improvement in Saudi Arabia's balance of trade. Concerning talks with the nations of the European Common Market on reducing the high customs duties that are now imposed on Saudi methanol and polyethylene, he explained that these talks would go on for years, since no progress has been made in the matter, because the voice that is heard in the European Common Market's secretariat is that of producers in the petrochemical industry.

In an interview with our fellow magazine TIJARAT AL-RIYAD, Engineer al-Zamil mentioned that industry's percentage of total local production in Saudi Arabia during the second 5-year plan reached 6.6 percent, and increased to 10 percent during the third 5-year plan. The plan is to raise this percentage to 13 percent of total local production by the end of the fourth 5-year plan following the completion of SABIC companies and national factories that are now under construction, and of supporting projects in al-Jubayl and Yanbu'.

Herein follows that text of the interview:

[Question] What is your opinion of industry's percentage of the total local production in Saudi Arabia, and what do you think about increasing this percentage?

[Answer] During the second 5-year plan, industry's percentage of total local production in the kingdom reached 6.6 percent, and increased to 10 percent during the third 5-year plan. By economic standards this percentage is considered to be low compared to the economic position that the kingdom occupies among world nations, but at the same time it is high among developing industrial nations that are dozens of years ahead of us in the industrial field.

This low percentage is attributable to several factors:

1. The kingdom's newness to industry when compared to the time the process of industrial growth takes in world nations.
2. Most of SABIC's factories have begun actual production in recent years, and the production from manufacturing industries has not yet stabilized in the markets.
3. Unjust competition faced by national products.

The plan is to raise this percentage to 13 percent of total local production by the end of the fourth 5-year plan following the completion of SABIC companies and national factories that are now under construction, and of the supporting projects in al-Jubayl and Yanbu'.

I should not fail to point out here that this percentage will increase by the grace of God, and with the awareness and continuous support of the citizens, and the realization by our brothers working in government installations and national establishments -- which secure what they need from national industries -- of the importance of giving priority to the products of national industry.

[Question] The government gives industry facilitations, incentives and support, but in spite of that we often find that imported goods are cheaper. How do you explain that, and what is the solution?

[Answer] Indeed some imported goods in the kingdom have prices that are lower than those of national products, and this is attributable to several reasons:

1. Our factories are new and so far have not reached their full productive capacity, and so fixed costs are high, this imposes a burden on the products which increases as production decreases, and vice versa.
2. Some imported goods that are found in three markets are cheap either because there is no demand for them in the areas where they were produced, or because they are of poor quality and do not conform to international standards.
3. When some companies learn that one of the national firms has been given a license to produce similar products, they deliberately increase their exports to the kingdom at prices as low as half of what they had been before the national firm went into production. Their aim is to affect materially and psychologically the national firm so that it feels despair and abandons production.
4. Flooding policies that are followed by some international companies that are facing marketing or financial problems in their own countries, and which would like to acquire hard currencies by any means, legal or illegal.

As for solutions, some of them will come from the government by supporting and encouraging the industries that have demonstrated that they are serious, that their products are of good quality and appropriately priced, and that they are able to meet the needs of the citizens, and also by confronting international companies that use questionable methods in marketing their bad products in the kingdom.

Others will come from the owners of the national factories by their displaying patience and wisdom, maintaining the quality of their products, working to lower costs by using modern production methods, participating in local and international fairs, and using new marketing methods.

Many Investment Opportunities

[Question] Which is the most feasible: investment in industry, commerce or real estate? And what would you say to someone who hesitates to invest his money in the industrial sector?

[Answer] In reality, such a comparison cannot be made. All of these sectors are feasible, and they all complement one another, and no sector can continue without the other. The industrial sector depends on the real estate sector for its installations, and on the commercial one to market its products, and the real estate sector depends on industry and others as a source of income, and the commercial one depends on both of the sectors. Thus the three sectors, along with others, represent one of the links in the national economy.

If we were to take each sector by itself and study its economic feasibility, that would fill many volumes. It can be said, however, that although the industrial sector may not yield rapid material returns, it is the essential pillar upon which the progress of any society is built.

As for hesitation when it comes to investing in industry, experience would prove to any investor that those who preceded us did not hesitate to invest in industry, and they have met with great success and they all excelled, and the positive achievements for those who invested in it do not call for any hesitation, especially since the opportunities for investment are many and the products of some national factories cover only 15 percent of the people's needs. I would only hope that whoever wants to get into this field would choose the commodity that he wants to manufacture and prepare a realistic economic feasibility study for it. It would not be bad if he participated in its preparation himself so he could become acquainted with every large or small detail of the project and ask about whatever is not clear to him so he would not be surprised by large differences between the study and scientific reality, thus subjecting the project to problems that he could have done away with at the beginning.

Electricity Expanded to All Corners of Saudi Arabia

[Question] When do you expect that electricity service will reach all corners of the kingdom so that there will not be a single place without light? And what are the phases of the plan to achieve this goal?

[Answer] The government has attended to extending electricity to the regions of the country by offering financial support to electricity companies in the form of loans to enable them to carry out expansion in the areas of production of electrical energy and to establish electrical networks, in addition to the electrical projects that the public electricity foundation is implementing. With the implementation of the projects of the electrical companies and the projects included in the second and third 5-year plans that the public electricity foundation was in charge of, the number of subscribers in the kingdom reached 1,752,726 by the end of 1405 AH, after having been 351,531 in 1395 AH, or an increase of about 500 percent. More than 80 percent of the people have come to enjoy electricity in more than 2,200 towns, villages and settlements throughout the kingdom.

Because the government is anxious to extend electrical service to every village and settlement, the projects included in the fourth 5-year plan aim at bringing electricity to about 800,000 new subscribers.

Future of the Food Industry

[Question] What is your view of the future of the food industry in the kingdom?

[Answer] The government of King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz has paid a lot of attention to the agricultural sector in past years, which has led to an increase in agricultural production and the realization of surpluses in some products, such as wheat, dates, dairy products, chickens, and eggs. The industries that can be built upon the products of the sector are many, such as processing milk and its products, preparing meat and dates, manufacturing carbonated and bottled waters, in addition to making juices and soft drinks and canning vegetables and other things. In 1395 AH the number of factories producing in the food industry was 73, and by the end of 1405 AH it had reached about 291, which shows the extent of the demand for this sector, in view of the abundance of some of the primary materials. A quick glance at the products, including dairy products and their derivatives, pastries and dates, of national factories available in the markets will give you a picture of the future of the food industry in the kingdom, and it bodes well, God willing.

Spare Parts for Factories

[Question] Following this tangible growth in the industrial sector in Saudi Arabia, are you thinking of establishing a spare parts industry for factory equipment?

[Answer] Thought of establishing a spare parts industry for factory equipment has in fact begun, and there are several projects that are being studied by the National Industries Company, the Arab Axle Company, and the Arab Industrial Development Organization. I call upon chambers of commerce and industry in the kingdom to adopt such projects and to work towards promoting them among investors, in view of what such industries require by way of large,

intensive capital, the participation of international companies specializing in this field, and advanced and constantly developing technology, especially since these parts cost million of riyals. It is a wide open field for investment.

A Role for the Private Sector

[Question] SABIC basic industries is calling for the establishment of complementary and supporting industries. What role do you envision for the private sector with respect to these industries?

[Answer] The government has paid a lot of attention to the role of the private sector in the field of industrial development. The strategy of the fourth development plan calls for the field to be opened up to the private sector to pursue many of the economic functions, and that may come about by way of granting the opportunity to invest and participate in the ownership and administration of basic industries that the government sets up. This is in addition to the opportunities currently available to investors to set up projects that are complementary to or supportive of SABIC projects, using their products as primary materials necessary for production.

Petrochemicals Income: 4 Billion

[Question] What is the income expected from the Saudi petrochemical industry when all of its factories begin production? Can this income improve the situation of the kingdom's balance of trade?

[Answer] The income from sales of basic industries in the kingdom, when all companies belonging to SABIC attain maximum capacity, is estimated at about 4 billion riyals. Since most of SABIC's products are for export, they will therefore improve the kingdom's balance of trade. In addition, the products that SABIC markets domestically, such as iron products and raw material for plastics factories, will save the kingdom from having to import them, and therefore that will also improve the balance of trade.

Petrochemicals and Europe

[Question] Following the meeting that was held recently in Brussels between the general secretariat of the Gulf Cooperation Council and a committee of the European Common Market, what are your expectations with respect to decisions by the countries of the European Common Market pertaining to the high customs duties that are imposed on Saudi methanol and polyethylene?

[Answer] We hope for the best for these meetings, but these talks will go on for several years, and we do not believe there will be progress in this matter as long as the voice that is heard in the secretariat of the European Common Market is solely that of the producers of petrochemical industries while there is no regular representation of consumers of these products, and as long as Europe is greatly concerned with pursuing policies that are protective of their industries.

[Question] The profits that were made by SABIC factories in 1984 as well as the first half of 1985 were greatly affected by the losses suffered by the iron company, and a royal order was issued that government purchases of iron and rebar should be made from SABIC production, and a committee of the two ministers of industry and finance was formed to implement this royal order. Are things progressing in this direction as planned?

[Answer] Royal proclamation number 7/507/M, dated 25/12/1402 AH, was issued to the effect that all ministries, government offices and public establishments should meet their requirements for rebar from products of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), and in fact committees were formed to set the prices of Saudi iron, after which SABIC began to implement the noble royal proclamation, which showed positive results that led to a decrease in the losses incurred this year by the iron company. It also gave strong impetus to turning to Saudi iron, both on the government sector level and the private one, in spite of the existence of strong competition from imported iron in local markets offered at dumped prices because of the drop in the demand for building and construction jobs.

Foreign Markets

[Question] With respect to petrochemicals -- if European nations continue to be stubborn and not review the matter of the obstacles which they lay down to keep our petrochemicals out of their markets, are there plans to absorb these products and to use them in conversion industries within our Arab nation?

[Answer] Throughout the past 5 years, during the preparation stage of SABIC's projects, it has become clear to us that local Arab and Islamic markets, and markets of developing countries in Asia and Africa, have good growth rates with respect to the consumption of petrochemical materials that are more than twice the growth rates in the markets of industrial nations. However, in spite of that there is a need to work closely with development and financial institutions to stimulate the process of consumption, perhaps even to resume the export of finished products to other markets. In any case, the markets of the industrial nations continue to be very important to us.

[Question] Is there a tendency in the ministry to support the computer industry? Why does the ministry not embrace the establishment of a company manufacture computers in the same manner as the pharmaceuticals company?

[Answer] The ministry's policy always is to support all industries that have demonstrated their economic feasibility or which can take the place of similar imports. The computer industry is one of the industries whose establishment the ministry is supporting, and a study is being prepared by the Saudi office for consultative services on the market for this industry in the kingdom. Moreover, the field is open to whoever wishes to invest in it. All that this industry requires is sufficient capital and expertise to go along with it. We have trained manpower, since there are 1,700 students majoring in computers in the kingdom's universities, and this number is expected to increase at an annual rate of 10 percent. For your information, a license has in fact been issued to one of the national companies in Jeddah

with the capacity to produce 1,500 small computer units, or what is called a mini computer, and it is about to begin production shortly, God willing.

[Question] The third fair for national industries in Riyadh is on its way to being opened. What thoughts are going on in your mind on this occasion about the progress that the national industry has experienced in recent times?

[Answer] The national industry has made great strides, and Saudi products throughout the world have come to speak for themselves. After there having been only 473 factories in 1395 AH, by the end of 1405 AH their number had become more than 2,000 with investments of more than 60 billion riyals. Marketing sales exceed 20 billion riyals, and the products cover many areas. One visit to any of the fairs held by chambers of commerce and industry will give you a quick impression of how far the kingdom has progressed in the industrial sector.

12929/12547

CSO: 4404/142

SYRIA

NATIONAL LEADERS HONOR OLIVE INDUSTRY

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 31 Oct 85 p 2

[Article: "Commander Al-Asad Oversees the Opening of the Olive Festival"]

[Text] The opening of the seventh olive festival was celebrated in Idlib yesterday in the auditorium of the al-Khansa' hall in Idlib under the supervision of the comrade and fighting man Hafiz al-Asad, the secretary general of the party and the president.

Dr Mahmud al-Kurdi, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, represented the president in overseeing this important productive economic exhibit.

Attending the opening were Comrade Hamdu Hajju, secretary of the party branch, Comrade Zayd Hassun, governor of Idlib, the commander of the governorate police, the comrade members of the branch command, some individuals concerned and an extensive audience of brother producers.

The festival opened with the al-Ba'th anthem, then Comrade Eng Ahmad Samaq, the director of agriculture and agrarian reform, gave a talk in which he discussed the development olive growing in the governorate has witnessed, stating that this tree accounted for 75 percent of the total fruit trees in the governorate, coming to 8.8 million in number, over an area of 86,000 hectares.

He added, "Just this year an area of 4,734 hectares was farmed in which 473,000 trees were planted. Thus the growth rate is 5.4 percent, while in 1980 it did not exceed 1.8 percent. This rate exceeds the world growth rate in this farming activity, which is no more than just 2 percent."

After that, Comrade Muhammad Sulayman al-Shaykh, head of the branch peasants' office and chairman of the governorate's federation of peasants, gave a talk in which he discussed the importance of this economic exhibit, which in effect has brought about creative competition among producers.

He reviewed the great development the agricultural sector is experiencing and said, "The peasants of the governorate, who yielded up the first martyr in the ranks of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party as they resisted feudalism in

defense of the lofty values and principles of our great party, and stood up to agents and traitors from the gangs of the Moslem Brothers, will always remain the loyal soldiers of the revolution, now that the commander of the journey has provided them with a dignified free life, has made them masters on their land and has considered any recommendation from the peasants tantamount to a decree, in honor and appreciation of them."

The minister of agriculture and agrarian reform then made a statement. At the beginning of it he conveyed the great commander, Hafiz al-Asad's, greetings and love to the masses of the Governorate of Idlib, the governorate of self-sacrifice and production. He went on, "The agricultural question has occupied a large part of the interest of officials in the party and the governorate since the establishment of the corrective movement, and it has considered agriculture the basic foundation of economic development in our country. This is what the decrees and recommendations of the party have asserted."

The minister stated that the ministry in past years provided the conditions for positive interaction among the main components of production. Efforts in this area have borne fruit and olive farming is now widespread among most governorates, which has led to a development in the area planted with this blessed tree from 180,000 hectares in 1975 to 380 hectares in 1985 and in the number of trees from about 20 million to 32.5 million.

He pointed out that about 1.3 million seedlings were distributed this year. He said, "In the sixth 5-year plan we intend to increase this figure to more than 3 million. We will also carry out a number of activities which will advance this crop, such as training in mechanical picking, and will follow up on the holding of a number of courses domestically and abroad in order to prepare personnel and increase their qualifications. We will cooperate with a number of international bodies for the sake of training technical experts, establishing scientific laboratories for analyzing oil and processing olives in the country."

At the conclusion of his statement, he saluted the producers, cited the most sublime verses of appreciation and recognition for our commander and the symbol of our struggle, the comrade and fighting man Hafiz al-Asad, the president, and promised to proceed behind his wise leadership to raise the rates of self-sacrifice and increase and develop production in a manner serving the attainment of our nation's goals of unity, freedom and socialism.

The minister of agriculture and agrarian reform and the comrades the secretary of the party branch and the governor then distributed prizes of commendation to the peasant brothers who were the top winners on a countrywide basis and the top winners within the olive-producing governorates.

After that he and his companions proceeded to the sporting auditorium, where the exhibit was held, and cut the silk thread of the exhibit, permitting it to be opened. He and his companions toured its sections and gained information from its wings and the samples of the best types of olives and orientation notices concerning the best ways of caring for this crop and fighting its diseases and pests which they contained.

It is worth pointing out that the Governorates of Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Tartus, Hums, Hamah, Dar'a, al-Suwayda' and Damascus are taking part in this exhibit in addition to the Arab Center for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Land, the International Olive Oil Council in Madrid, people's organization branches in the governorates, the Fruit and Vegetable Company, the Agricultural Bank and the Arab Cultural Center.

The exhibit will stay open until the third of next month, and the people concerned say that it will be extended 2 or 3 days more.

11887

CSO: 4404/167

SYRIA

VARIOUS TARTUS GOVERNORATE PROJECTS REVIEWED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 22 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Muhammad 'Ali 'Umran: "Tartus: 77 Million Syrian Pounds' Worth of Projects Inaugurated in the Governorate"]

[Text] In addition to the combative, fighting features characterizing national and domestic occasions in the country, which the citizens experience with joy, renewed determination and loyalty to the commander who forged great battles of heroism and self-sacrifice, the occasions have acquired a character of heritage of another type, since the masses are celebrating further achievements and acts of sacrifice in numerous areas, starting with the construction and foundation of the country's economic structure and ending with the conveyance of water and electricity to every village and home.

Tartus Governorate, which experienced the joys of 6 October and has renewed the pledge to the martyrs and the commander to continue along the road of struggle till victory or martyrdom, has experienced the joys of sacrifice and achievements that made up the occasions of the inauguration or laying of cornerstones in every village or farm, consisting of a mass festival in which the citizens showed their natural disposition as they embraced those who came on behalf of the commander to oversee these joyous celebrations and occasions.

Over a period of 2 days, Comrade Muhammad Yahya 'Ali, secretary of the party branch, Comrade Hamad 'Amr, the governor of Tartus, the members of the branch command, the members of the executive committee and a number of managers and chairmen of people's organization's and party branches inaugurated many vital projects which have become a symbol of progress and prosperity reaching the most remote village and farm in our rural areas of Tartus.

The value of the projects inaugurated came to 67 million Syrian pounds and cornerstones were laid for projects valued at 10 million Syrian pounds.

In the city of Tartus, the Khalifah school project was inaugurated and people's housing was inaugurated in the municipal playground and station sections at a cost of more than 14 million pounds.

In the Tartus area, lighting was inaugurated in the villages of al-Juwaymi-sah, Bani Nu'aym and al-Nawanis and the cornerstone was laid for the Jadiya-ti bypass water project and the road leading into al-Safasifah; in addition, the al-Hanafiyah school was inaugurated. The cost of these projects comes to more than 11 million pounds.

In the Baniyas area, lighting was inaugurated in the villages of al-Nawatif, Khirbat al-Qabu and Altun al-Qaraq, schools were inaugurated in the villages of al-Kharab, al-Zawbah, al-Tun al-Jarad and Dayr al-Bashal and the Qarqash-afti-Dahr Bayt al-Shaykh Ali road was inaugurated in addition to the al-Qadamus-al-Tuhin highway, with a cost of more than 6 million Syrian pounds for these projects.

In the Safita area, the Safita road, the broadcasting station, the Shaykh Hasan spring water project and the al-Mitras and Marizah-Dahr Bashir road were inaugurated at a cost of more than 23 million pounds.

In the al-Darikish area, the Ya'qu school was inaugurated at a cost of 67,000 pounds and the Fajlit secondary school at a cost of 1.1 million pounds.

Where the inaugurations took place, the masses held group dances and also made speeches showing the importance of the occasion, first of all, and highlighting the significance of the gatherings among the citizens as they witnessed further achievements of the revolution and acts of sacrifice by the commander.

11887

CSO: 4404/136

SYRIA

NEW ROAD, BRIDGE PROJECTS CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT COUNTRY

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 21 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by 'Ali Ma'ruf: "The Ministry of Communications Will Finish Road and Bridge Construction Activities Costing 2 Billion Syrian Pounds This Year"]

[Text] This year, 1985, the Ministry of Transport has constructed a number of international highways, about 1,000 kilometers in length and costing about 2 billion Syrian pounds, broken down as follows:

The Tadmur-Dayr al-Zawr highway, 104 kilometers long, with a total cost of more than 150 million Syrian pounds. This has been handed over, now that all the work to facilitate traffic on it has been completed, such as shoulders, signals, railings, overpasses and line-painting.

The first part of the Damascus-Jordan border expressway, 44 kilometers long, with a cost of 250 million pounds. This will be inaugurated and ready for traffic on the 16th of next month, November, on the occasion of the annual celebration of the corrective movement.

The Hums-Tartus highway, which is now ready for traffic up to the outskirts of the city of Tartus. This will also be inaugurated on that occasion, after all the finishing work on it has been completed.

Although this highway is no more than 90 kilometers long, its cost is greater than 400 million Syrian pounds, in light of the difficulty of the uneven terrain in it and the location of part of it in an area where the soil is weak, calling for a severalfold increase in construction costs.

The Aleppo-al-Bab-Manbaj-Qarquzak highway, 104 kilometers long, with a cost of 150 million Syrian pounds. That will be ready for traffic before the end of this year, 1985. One should bear in mind that the first segment, linking Aleppo to the town of al-Bab, 30 kilometers in length, has two roadways (is an expressway) and is now open to traffic.

The Qaraquzak-'Ayn 'Isa highway is also ready for traffic, as the director of roads and bridges in the Ministry of Transport, Eng Yasin Samarah, who

imparted this information to TISHRIN, asserted, and the finishing work on it will be completed at the end of this year, with the result that its approximate costs will come to 90 million pounds for a length of 70 kilometers.

The Qintari-Tall Tamar highway, 112 kilometers long, on which the major work has been completed; this has been opened to traffic and its estimated cost will be about 100 million Syrian pounds.

The Tall Tamar-al-Qamishli highway, 87 kilometers long, with a cost of more than 80 million Syrian pounds. Work on this will end completely before the first half of next year, 1986.

The al-Qamishli-Tall 'Uluww highway, 60 kilometers long, with an estimated cost of about 70 million Syrian pounds. This was opened to traffic after most of the work on it was completed.

Tall 'Uluww-al-Ya'rabiya, 24 kilometers long, with a cost of more than 35 million Syrian pounds. This has been opened to traffic with the completion of the major work on it.

The Hums bypass, the second branch of which has been built and opened to traffic. It is expected that the finishing work on it will be completed before the end of this year. This project, with the necessary completions to it, has cost about 120 million Syrian pounds.

The Hamah bypass, whose length, with offramps, is about 15 kilometers, at a cost of 75 million Syrian pounds. This will be completed, with the finishing work on it, at the end of this year.

The Beirut highway, from Damascus to the Lebanese border, with a length of 40 kilometers with two roadways (an expressway), at a cost of more than 175 million Syrian pounds. It is ready for traffic.

Damascus-al-Suwayda', which was levelled over a length of 50 kilometers. The repair and reinforcement of the remaining portion will be done subsequently in coming years.

The al-Ghab-coast highway, from al-'Asharinah to the vicinity of the town of Jablah, 40 kilometers long, with a cost of more than 190 million Syrian pounds. A stretch of 24 kilometers is now ready for traffic and work is underway on it now on both sides. This highway will complement the Sahlab highway connecting the cities of Hums and Hamah.

The al-Ghab agricultural and industrial projects.

Bridge Projects

The director of roads and bridges in the Ministry of Transportation went on to say, "We have also built a number of bridges, of which the most important are:

"The al-Bu Kamal bridge; about 70 percent of the work on it has been completed. The cost of this great bridge, which is more than 400 kilometers

[sic] long, in addition to onramps, offramps and walkways, has exceeded 40 million Syrian pounds.

"The al-Asad bridge in the city of Hamah, 80 meters long and 20 meters wide, at a cost of more than 25 million Syrian pounds.

"This is now open to traffic. In addition, there is the bridge of the town of Jarabulus, on which work will start at the beginning of next year, that is, in just 2 months.

"This will be 400 meters long and cost 40 million Syrian pounds. There is the Euphrates bridge between the cities of al-Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr, which has been assigned to the General Studies Company and on which work will begin as soon as the geological studies on it have been carried out.

Other Projects

"In addition to that there is the project for the Tartus-Latakia highway expressway 90 kilometers in length. Work is underway on it at high pitch, since the work on it must be completed before the end of 1987, along with other projects for branch roads to back up the main highways, some of which have been completed and others of which are being completed, and maintenance work on the basic highway system, which costs about 300 million Syrian pounds a year in the areas of roads and bridges." He went on, "In addition, the ministry has set out its next 5-year plan for roads broken down among various areas of the country, with an estimated overall length of about 400 kilometers and a cost of more than 1 billion Syrian pounds, and has presented it to the entities concerned for approval. Of course this plan has produced the completion of the road system in the country, and a number of important main roads constitute the framework of this approach, for instance:

"The second branch of the Hamah-Saraqib highway, 90 kilometers long.

"Dayr al-Zawr, Kilometer 47, 90 kilometers long.

"Ariha-Latakia, 90 kilometers long. One should bear in mind that these highways are international and are constructed alongside the rural roads, charge of whose construction is assumed by the technical service departments at the expense of local administration, as well as the agricultural and forest roads, and so forth."

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CSO: 4404/136

AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE EXAMINES MUJAHIDIN EFFORT AGAINST APATHY

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 85 pp 15-16

[Text]

While world leaders assembled at the United Nations headquarters in October for a self-congratulatory 40th anniversary, seven turbaned men were moving from delegate to delegate imploring them to raise an issue which they thought was encompassed by the moving spirit behind the formation of the United Nations. Their forty-year-old spokesman Gulbaddin Hikmat Yar was hopeful that countries in the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity who had supported the right of Afghan people to self-determination, would persuade the General Assembly to recognise his group as truly representative of the Afghan people.

Hikmat Yar was wrong. No head of state present in New York deemed it necessary to see the delegation that represented a Muslim people engaged for the past six years in a jihad against the Soviet Union. Not even the members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference at whose 1981 summit the Afghan leader Abdurrah ar-Rasul Sayyaf spoke, could spare time for Hikmat Yar. The world leaders' attitude towards the Afghan group at the UN is indicative of the apathy towards the jihad which prevails all over the rest of the world.

This apathetic attitude has led to two developments. The Soviet Union has further increased its military and political presence in Afghanistan, with the number of Soviet troops now over 150,000. The Soviet-installed regime has sharpened its attacks on the mujahideen, whom it terms "bandits" or "criminal counter-revolutionary bands". Moreover, it has indicated that even after a political

settlement it will not accept all the refugees present in Pakistan or Iran.

On the other hand, apathy has forced the mujahideen to rely more and more on themselves. They also appear virtually to have put aside many of their differences and are now carrying out the jihad under a supreme council. The mujahideen victories in Pakitia and Khost were direct products of this growing unity.

One logical outcome of the mujahideen's unified fight is that the Karmal regime has increased pressure on Pakistan. Violations of Pakistan's airspace by the Afghan helicopters and warplanes have become very frequent. These attacks, in which Pakistanis are often killed in addition to Afghan refugees, are meant to serve two purposes. First of all, they are aimed at creating negative feelings about the refugees in Pakistan. The Karmal regime seems to believe that as a result of attacks on Pakistani territory, pro-Moscow Pakistani parties may start demanding the refugees' return to Afghanistan to protect Pakistan's integrity. Secondly, the attacks are being used as a political weapon to extract maximum concessions in the ongoing Geneva talks. Karmal recently stated: "Whenever foreign interference and aggression ceases against the government and reliable international guarantees are given of their non-recurrence in the future and Pakistan makes it possible for the return of true

refugees to their homeland, the Soviet limited military contingents which were invited to Afghanistan in accordance with the Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship and Good Neighbourliness between the two countries and on the basis of United Nations charter will return to their peace-

loving country." In other words, the Karmal regime holds Pakistan responsible for the jihad and therefore wants to deal with the Pakistani government directly. In Karmal's strategy, the regular attacks on Pakistan's territory would force the country's government to directly negotiate the settlement. Pakistan has so far resisted the pressure, supported by the existence of powerful segments supporting the jihad among population. However, opposition groups led by the PPP have been trying to whip up resentment against the Afghan refugees

and the burden they represent on the country.

Ultimately, the Karmal regime will have to deal with the mujahideen directly. Although Pakistan's support is crucial, a determined force of over 200,000 mujahideen would not be amenable to manipulation even by a friendly Pakistan. The mujahideen's success will ultimately depend on the methodology they employ in their jihad but their morale would certainly be boosted if the Muslim world which is their natural ally, came forward with concrete proposals for political and military assistance. □

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CSO: 4600/169

AFGHANISTAN

LEADER STRIVES TO UNITE MUJAHIDIN

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 85 pp 20-21

[Text]

 Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani is the President of the Seven Party Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen in the Paktia province of Afghanistan and the Supreme Commander of all the resistance forces in that province. In appearance he bears a striking resemblance to the 19th century leader, Imam Shamil, who waged a 30-year campaign against Czarist imperialism in Central Asia. Penetrating eyes, a broad forehead marked by years of prostration, square shoulders and towering height — are complemented by an imposing personality. Jalaluddin can be seen as a symbol of the glory and grandeur of Islam — the literal meaning of his name.

Known throughout Afghanistan as Haji Sahib, Maulana Jalaluddin hails from the Zoran tribe which has its home in the Shimal valley of Paktia province. His father, Khwaja Muhammad Khan, was a trader with business interests in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. All of Khwaja Muhammad Khan's sons are involved in the jihad. Haji Ibrahim is the commander of the Ismail Khel operations, Mohammad Ismail is the commander of the Sirrin Centre and Muhammad Khalid manages the base camp at Miran Shah inside Pakistan.

Maulana Jalaluddin is 42, married and has two sons. From early childhood, he developed a deep attachment and love for the Quran and has devoted his life to its study. He was educated at Akora madrassah where he also served as a teacher for two years. Before returning to his native village, Maulana Jalaluddin performed the hajj. Thereafter, he established a madrassah at Shimmil and remained attached to it for two years.

In 1971 — the year of his marriage — Maulana Jalaluddin commenced military

operations against the Daud administration which had opened the doors to Soviet imperialist penetration into Afghanistan. The ulema were the first to warn of the dangers of developing political and economic contacts with the Soviets; they paid heavily for giving these warnings. Zahir Shah and Daud adopted a policy of domestic repression with the ulema as their main target. The official propaganda machinery was placed at the disposal of the communist activists of the Khalq and Parcham factions and more than a hundred ulema became martyrs in military operations mounted by Zahir Shah's regime in collaboration with communist terrorist squads. In Qandahar, Zahir Shah's governor issued public statements insulting the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon Him) and public authorities desecrated holy relics in the city. Maulana Jalaluddin organised mass protests against the governor and succeeded in imprisoning him. The Daud administration secured his release by promising to institute a fair trial. It failed to keep its promises however, and aided and abetted communist agents in fresh atrocities which culminated in the burning down of the main mosques at Khost. This in turn led to the start of a mass struggle against the ruling oppressors.

A group of leading Afghan ulema including Maulana Haibib-ur-Rahman, Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Abdur Rahim Niazi and Ustaz Mansoor issued a proclamation of jihad and initiated a national guerilla campaign against the ruling oppressors. Maulana Jalaluddin was an enthusiastic worker for the jihad movement and one of his men was responsible for killing Mir Akbar, the governor of Kabul and Daud's minister of planning. This was in retaliation for the arrest and torture of the

ulema who had issued the jihad proclamation.

Local army units under the command of the chief administrator at Shimmil attacked Maulana Jalaluddin's residence in an attempt to arrest him. The attack was foiled however and 30 government troops were killed. Army reinforcements were sent from Kabul, but Maulana Jalaluddin and other resistance leaders escaped, thanks to the assistance of a government army officer. Maulana Jalaluddin established an operational command in the nearby hills and defeated several military expeditions sent out against him. The locality was bulldozed and the government forces succeeded in cutting off supplies to the mujahideen. After a month of extreme hardship in which the fighters had to survive on roots, berries and even leaves and grass, the mujahideen crossed the Durand line.

In 1977 an attempt was made by Maulana Jalaluddin's men to rescue the Hizb-i-Islami leaders from Muzzang prison. The mujahid responsible for killing Mir Akbar also masterminded the Muzzang operation, and constructed an underground passage linking the prisoners' cell with a shop in the main bazaar. The plot was inadvertently discovered and the entire leadership of the Hizb-i-Islami — with the exception of Muhandis Gulbadin Hikmatyar who had escaped to Pakistan — was murdered at Pulcharkhi prison.

Between 1971 and 1977 three attempts were made to overthrow the Daud regime and on two occasions Maulana Jalaluddin was an active participant in the attempted coups. During this period Maulana Jalaluddin earned recognition as one of the national leaders of the Hizb-i-Islami. Since 1979 his success as a military strategist and field commander has enhanced his standing and he is widely regarded as an equal of Ahmad Shah

Masood, the internationally-known leader of the Panjshir resistance. That Maulana Jalaluddin is relatively unknown outside Afghanistan is due primarily to the undeveloped press and public relations of the Hizb-i-Islami — Maulana Jalaluddin belongs to the Yunus Khalis faction of this organisation — and the inability of its leaders (including Maulana Jalaluddin himself) to speak any European languages.

Maulana Jalaluddin's forces control most of the roads in the province; several military and supply convoys have been destroyed. The Soviet troops and their Afghan camp followers have been confined to Khost and Gardez. Since early 1982 the mujahideen have besieged Khost and, despite heavy reinforcement and bombardment, only two outpost have been lost to Soviet forces during 1985. The Soviets have now abandoned attempts to break out of the seige and have used their Afghan soldiers to lay networks of mines to impede mujahideen attacks. Nonetheless, the grip of the mujahideen is tightening. On August 19, the seige was extended to the airport at Khost as the main runways were put out of action.

Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani is a military genius and through his inspiration his followers have developed a virtually

impregnable position in Paktia. Although relatively little is known internationally about Maulana Haqqani's achievements as an administrator, military commander and religious guide, he is anxious that the lessons learned from the Paktia struggle should be made known throughout Afghanistan. He is an ardent advocate of unity among the ranks of mujahideen confronting the occupying Soviet forces. He has attempted to develop training facilities at his major camps and has made them available to all mujahideen operating in Afghanistan. □

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CSO: 4600/169

AFGHANISTAN

LEADER GIVES VIEWS ON RESISTANCE

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 85 p 21

[Text]

☉ Could you please tell us something about the current situation in Paktia province?

The city of Khost has been under seige since early 1982 — that is for a period of over three years. All land communications have been cut off. There is one brigade, containing both Soviet military personnel and Afghan mercenaries, stationed in the city.

Improved communication has enabled the mujahideen to establish control over the road networks linking Gardez, Satkudo, Darra de Mando and Nadir Shah Kot. The mujahideen first established control over Satkudo pass. They then cut the road linking Khost and Nadir Shah Kot and also occupied the road network from Sayeed Karmi and the Mengal controlled area to Khost. Also, the passageway between Khost and Gardez via Chamkanti has been effectively blocked. Chamkanti is currently under seige. All road links between Khost and Kabul have thus been effectively severed. Khost's sole remaining life-line is the airport, but the Soviets and the mercenaries are acutely apprehensive of mujahideen attacks. Planes are unloaded while still in motion. An Antonov aircraft was destroyed just 600 metres off the runway in July (in August the airport came under seige). Five military posts protecting the airport have been seized by the mujahideen. The mujahideen have carried out operations beyond Khost and have on several occasions attacked Durgani.

In late June the imperialists attacked our Ismailkhel centre; but they were beaten back with heavy casualties; 38 imperialist soldiers and mercenaries were

killed. The Soviets have so far been unable to recover their dead from the battlefield. We captured 26 Kalashnikovs and a sizeable ammunition store during this six day engagement.

Could you briefly describe the situation throughout the rest of Afghanistan?

The mujahideen are on the offensive in every province in Afghanistan. The fighting is particularly intense in Herat, Qandhar, Logar, Parwan, Kanhar, Nanghar, Paktia, Paktika, Kabul, Takkar, Qanzar and Panjshir. In all these theatres the mujahideen generally have the upper hand. The situation could be improved if a wireless communication network could be established on a national basis.

In your opinion, what are the prospects of the mujahideen struggle?

It is true that we face a well-prepared and ruthless imperialist enemy and enjoy comparatively little material support from the Muslim world. But the Soviet Union is an ageing imperialist power, plagued by a highly inefficient economy, ridden with internal political contradictions and unable to create popular enthusiasm for its archaic and obsolete state ideology. The decline and fall of the Soviet Empire — its inevitable retreat from Asia — will begin with its military defeat at the hands of the Afghan mujahideen.

What is the Soviet position in Afghanistan today?

The imperialists are passing through an experimental phase. They believe that a massive concentration of weaponry and manpower can prove decisive. The

resistance has gone some way in convincing some sections that this is impossible and the imperialists are in the doldrums, in a stalemate situation in Afghanistan. Once this realisation becomes widespread, the Soviet Union will begin to organise and plan its retreat from Afghanistan.

What relevance does the Afghan struggle have for the rest of the Muslim world?

We are fighting not only for the survival of Afghanistan but in defence of the entire Muslim world. If Soviet imperialism is not checked here, Iran, Pakistan and the Gulf States are unlikely to withstand Soviet pressure for long. The Muslim world must develop a common strategy *vis-à-vis* the imperialist power. Equally important is the need to understand the Soviet offensive on the propaganda front. This has several essential ingredients. First of all, the war is presented as a US-Soviet conflict. Soviet atrocities committed against the Afghan people and the brutal cruelties constantly enacted by the imperialists are concealed. The impression is given that the war is over and

Soviet imperialist domination is complete. By pressuring international recognition of the mercenary Karmal administration, the Soviets hope to legitimise their imperialist annexation of Afghanistan.

The Soviets are working to create hatred between the people of Pakistan and Iran on the one hand and the Afghan refugees on the other. Rifts between the local population of these countries and the refugees will lead to the isolation of the mujahideen who will gradually lose support and sympathy of the Pakistani and Iranian people. What is more important, members of the mujahideen will become increasingly apprehensive about the security and safety of their relatives in Pakistan and Iran. This may serve to divert their attention from the jihad and to instigate armed conflicts in the host countries, exactly according to the plans of the Soviet imperialists. I appeal to the Muslim people not to be taken in by these lies, but to develop ties of friendship with the refugees and to resolutely support the mujahideen in the war against Soviet imperialism. □

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CSO: 4600/169

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIET POPULATION LEARNING PRICE OF WAR

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Dec 85 pp 16-19

[Text]

☉ The appointment of Gorbachev as the latest Soviet leader fuelled rumours that a deal was soon to be struck over the fate of Afghanistan. All the evidence, however, seems to indicate the opposite — that Moscow has formulated a long-term view of Afghanistan, aiming to transform it into a communist, sovietised country by the next century. The Soviet Union appears to be thinking decades ahead, and not in terms of annual United Nations votes or annual military campaigns. As one Soviet official put it, "Time changes everything. In another 10 or 20 years, the new generation of Afghans will view our presence differently."

To this end, the Soviets are concentrating on Afghan youth in an attempt to re-model them into communist cadres willing to participate in the absorption of Afghanistan into the Soviet empire. Upwards of 20,000 young students are already in Soviet Central Asia, and Afghan schoolchildren regularly take their summer vacations across the border. In November 1984, a thousand children aged between seven and nine were sent to Central Asia for their entire ten-year schooling, and there are already plans for 14,000 more to be sent. A mechanic from Samarkand described how one group of Afghan children complained to him about their treatment at the hands of their Soviet instructors: "They were forced to eat pork... they were obliged to run ten kilometres every night for their 'physical development'. If they tried to talk to strangers, their Soviet escort quickly stepped in and halted the conversation."

Inside Afghanistan, the ministry of education is patterned after that of Soviet

Central Asia. Textbooks are direct translations of their Soviet counterparts. University and school curriculums now include Marxism-Leninism and Russian language instruction. Soviet advisors control all aspects of the media, education and administration. Afghan history has been re-written to present the Russian (and Soviet) neighbour as a "friend". Each year, nearly 400 Afghan teachers are sent to the USSR to study how to apply Soviet communism to the hearts and minds of Afghan children.

Much propaganda is aimed at building ties between the northern Afghan nationalities (Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Turkomen) and their ethnic cousins in Soviet Central Asia. Many analysts believe that the ultimate aim is to dissolve Afghan nationalism. In addition, by emphasising differences between Afghan nationalities, at the same time as increasing contacts between the nationalities living north of the Hindu Kush and Central Asia, Moscow is aiming to make Afghanistan easier to assimilate into its empire. It is no coincidence that the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, established in 1981, is run by the head of Khad, the secret police, patterned after the Soviet KGB. A Khad defector has described how upwards of 4000 Khad personnel are sent to the USSR each year to study "the recruitment of agents, criminology, Marxism-Leninism and the Russian language."

Reports of atrocities by Soviet forces in Afghanistan filter through to Russians at home from soldiers who return to the USSR after their tour of duty. A pensioner from Lutsk in Ukraine remembered a discussion he had had with young war veterans. It was clear to the

pensioner that they had behaved "like animals". One of them had related how the entire population of a village had been thrown over a precipice "so as not to waste ammunition". Soviet punitive detachments not only took hostages but also

"drove women and children in front of them so that if the *dushman* attacked, the women would be hit".

Although Moscow has attempted to prevent all objective coverage of the war in Afghanistan from reaching its population, it has not been successful. Many soldiers have returned from Afghanistan, and relatives and parents receive letters from the battle-front. Only in July this year, a Soviet soldier stationed in East Germany, distraught over news that his brother had been killed in Afghanistan, was shot down as he left the garrison with a gun attempting to return to the USSR. The following letter, taken from the body of a dead soldier, reveals the trauma and anguish facing Soviet conscripts in Afghanistan: "...we're having a hell of a time, dodging bullets and up to our necks in mud. Four of the lads have been killed and our deputy political officer Batuyev was blown up by a mine. Almost nothing was left of him. Your former battalion is gradually being wiped out... Its impossible to describe everything. We're counting the days remaining to 'demob'. At last we'll be able to go home, we hope... we don't get anything. By the way, the third company has been put out of action. They're all either in hospital or in zinc graves." Earlier this year a woman in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov attempted to set herself alight in front of the party building because she was unable to obtain the body of her son, who had been killed in Afghanistan.

In the summer of this year, Soviet television began more detailed reporting of the war in Afghanistan, with footage of actual battle scenes. *Pravda*, the communist party daily, has called for increased patriotic and ideological importance to be given to military service. It also called for better Russian-language instruction for recruits from non-Russian ethnic republics. Since the latter part of 1984 the Soviet press has been projecting the war not only as an intervention on behalf of a "fraternal ally" but also as an extension of the defence of the motherland. Memories of the Second World War have been invoked and analogies with it drawn. In Kabul portraits of Stalin have appeared alongside those of

Lenin and Karmal. The Soviet army newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, carried a statement hinting openly at the true nature of Soviet designs on Afghanistan: namely, that it should no longer be regarded as a "foreign land".

Soviet decrees announced this year to tighten up on avoidance of military service by young conscripts, reflect one sign of growing disillusionment over the war in Afghanistan. A physician from Kirovgrad, Ukraine, recounted tales of when he: "worked in the military registration office, where bribes were distributed unashamedly. One father of a potential soldier even offered me a house or a car to have his son exempted. The authorities are attempting to send boys who are partially orphaned to Afghanistan, to reduce problems with the parents." In the USSR, Afghanistan is now "widely discussed in the provinces, especially in Central Asia", reported one western visitor this year. He claimed that the main theme of discussion was not political but the human cost, and he believed that "no one wants to go and fight in Afghanistan". In Uzbekistan, bribes of between five to ten thousand rubles are offered to avoid military service in Afghanistan.

Undoubtedly, the effects of the war are felt most strongly in Central Asia. As the western visitor pointed out: "for the first time in many years the USSR has a poorly defended border. Afghans allegedly penetrate Soviet territory bringing literature, contraband, narcotics, and even weapons. They allegedly have the support of the local populace and at times even have secret meetings with them. It is said that this war has revived Muslim feeling... and has also politicised... those who previously had always been estranged from politics."

In the second half of 1982, five people with contacts among Afghan guerrillas, were arrested in Bushanbe, Tadzhikistan, and charged with circulating leaflets protesting against the occupation of Afghanistan. Those arrested were said to have distributed false announcements of the deaths of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan "with the aim of provoking discontent among the population".

A German journalist, interviewed this year in Peshawar after returning from inside Afghanistan, claimed that he had met a Soviet army deserter aged 19 from Tadzhikistan. The defector revealed that the Central Asians, especially the Tadzhiks, were very badly treated by their

Russian officers: as non-Russians they were suspected of having sympathy with the Afghan resistance. In addition, the defector stated that the "soldiers are generally not inclined to fight and are trying to avoid it". He also revealed that the Soviet authorities are in increasing trouble with their own population about the war in Afghanistan. "The relatives are asking for the dead bodies, especially the Central Asian Muslims, whilst more and more often, the Russians are burying them in Afghanistan."

In Central Asia the war in Afghanistan has led to a resurgence of Islam. One mechanic from Samarkand noted that attendance at the mosques of Bukhara and Samarkand had doubled over the past four or five years, and that many young people had embarked upon serious religious studies. He believed that even Uzbek party workers had been affected by the return to religion. Another, a musician from Bukhara, stated that his Uzbek friends were believing Muslims. They belonged to some kind of secret brotherhood led by an underground mullah. He also noted that his friends were very upset by Soviet activity in Afghanistan. They saw this as analogous to events in Bukhara 60 years ago.

The first *samizdat* (underground publication) statements in support of the guerrillas were by a Soviet Muslim, Mustafa Dzhemilev, the hero of the Crimean Tatar people. In November 1983, he was arrested and at his trial was asked what connection there was between events in Afghanistan and the Crimean Tatar question. He replied that, in one region alone, unofficial estimates put the casualty rate of young Crimean Tatars at 130 killed in Afghanistan.

The plight of wounded Soviet conscripts who have returned from their tour of duty is another cause for worry. In order to assuage the grief of relatives, an unpublished law was passed stipulating that the same privileges would be extended to those wounded in Afghanistan and their families, as to the veterans of the Second World War. A nurse from Lvov has revealed how a doctor she had worked with had been wounded in Afghanistan. After drinking too much on one occasion he had described how he had been left for dead, and cursed the "brainless idiots for the deaths of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers and Afghan civilians". A few days later he was warned by the party committee to hold his tongue in future.

A Soviet civil servant, responsible for providing social services for veterans, admitted that "up until three years ago, we had difficulties in handling the special needs of the veterans, but we have now stepped up our efforts to accommodate veterans who have returned from Afghanistan physically or emotionally handicapped. The military intervention has had important repercussions on social services, and the general population has also had to become more sensitive and sympathetic to the needs of the veterans."

A book-keeper from Bryansk witnessed a debate on Afghanistan where some people said that the Soviet army went into Afghanistan "for nothing", and that, "our men were dying or returning home as cripples". One man said that he had recently been demobilised from the army and claimed: "We received clear-cut orders to destroy everything: cattle, grain and crops, adults and children. Let those who could escape go to Pakistan — there the Americans would feed them. If we don't destroy everyone who resists us, there will be a big problem in our country." An engineer from Pushkino remembers being on a suburban Moscow train when a blind man and accordion player got on. They began singing a song about a soldier who had died in Afghanistan. The song was very anti-Soviet: "What did we fight for? For whom did our blood flow? Do they drink our blood in Moscow?"

In the summer of 1985, demonstrations in both Yerevan and Tbilisi (capitals of the Soviet republics of Armenia and Georgia) highlighted the level of discontent prevalent over the number of lives lost in Afghanistan. The demonstrations by relatives and parents of conscripts, were the first known collective protests against the war. Around 200 were arrested in Yerevan, accused of "hooliganism".

In western Ukraine in 1984, the underground Catholic church began publishing a chronicle which featured, for the first time in *samizdat* sources, details of casualties inflicted upon Ukrainians in Afghanistan. Issue number seven described these as follows: "Gains for Moscow — losses for Ukraine, that is how the 'union' of these two republics with equal rights appears in the Afghan war. Recently there have been more and more funerals of Transcarpathians who have fallen in Afghanistan." Issue number six of the chronicle included a collective protest "at the forceful and unlawful sending of our Ukrainian youth to the

unjust war in Afghanistan, led by the Soviet government against the freedom-loving Afghan nation". And it claimed that "Russian chauvinism is responsible for the ventures in Afghanistan", they stated that "Ukrainians do not wish to fight, nor do they want this unjust war..."

A Ukrainian worker from Odessa, Leonid Siryi, protested when the eldest of his sons was conscripted into the army, with the possibility of being sent to Afghanistan: "...we are not murderers and do not want anyone to die... we are for peace... and we do not want our son to come back a cripple or, still worse, to die. After all, it is written in the Gospel: 'He that lives by the sword shall die by the sword'."

Many varying protests have appeared in *samizdat* literature against the occupation of Afghanistan, and dissidents are paying heavy prices for these protests. Others have chosen to flee. In December 1984, four Estonians made a spectacular flight to Sweden, because they did not want to be conscripted and sent to Afghanistan. Russian pacifists have protested against the war in Afghanistan and 200 were arrested in June 1983, after they distributed leaflets calling for an end to the war. Oleg Radzinsky, a member of an unofficial pacifist group, was tried in October 1983, accused of "condemning the expansion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan", and of writing a film script in which, when speaking of the occupation of Afghanistan, the hero compared the Soviet regime with that of Hitler.

Five years into the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow has insurmountable and rising problems, both at home and inside Afghanistan. In a survey

conducted by Radio Liberty among Soviet citizens, only one quarter of the Soviet adult population expressed approval of Soviet policy in Afghanistan; another quarter disapproved of that policy, while half of the adult urban population was either ambivalent or held no opinion. Only one quarter of adult urban Soviet citizens expressed confidence in the eventual success of official policy in Afghanistan; one quarter foresaw no clear Soviet success, while again one half was ambivalent. Radio Liberty concluded their survey, by stating that this lack of active popular support for and faith in Soviet policy in Afghanistan suggested a potential political problem for the Kremlin. Disapproval of Soviet policy towards Afghanistan runs highest in non-Russian Baltic republics, Ukraine and Central Asia.

Five years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has made the Soviet public more acutely aware of the human cost of the war, and it is no wonder that large numbers of them transform their discontent over this human cost into opposition to the overall policies of the Soviet regime. Rumours are rife, death notices are received, the remains of sons and fathers come back, letters are sent home that only the families can decipher, wounded soldiers return from tours of duty and reveal their experiences. In the words of a Ukrainian engineer, "the Soviet people are tired of this war and everyone would like it to end as soon as possible... To be frank, no-one would object if the Afghan war ended in the same way as the war in Vietnam: that is, if our troops were withdrawn and the Afghans were left to decide things among themselves." □

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CSO: 4600/169

AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW ADVOCATES 'DIALOGUE' WITH RESISTANCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Dec 85 pp 1,3

[Excerpt] Afghanistan is one of the subjects on which the Reagan-Gorbachev talks have raised the most serious hopes. Not only because the Soviets keep telling anyone who will listen that they would like to end their military intervention, but also, and above all, because the Americans admit that they are beginning to see signs of changes in Moscow's attitude.

Nevertheless, the most recent round of indirect negotiations between the governments of Islamabad and Kabul, held in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations, ended on 19 December without achieving any results. Total impasse? The UN representative, Mr Diego Cordovez, says only that he formulated proposals aimed at dissolving the "wall of mistrust" that separates the two sides, and that a new meeting--the seventh since 1982--has been scheduled for late February or early March.

It is still too early to call Mr Cordovez's efforts completely futile. In fact, they have already led to the identification of three points which could be part of any eventual agreement: reciprocal commitments by Afghanistan and Pakistan not to interfere in each other's internal affairs and to respect each other's territorial integrity; a systematic plan--in event of an overall settlement--for the return to Afghanistan of some 3 million refugees currently living in Pakistani territory; assurances that any Pakistani-Afghan settlement would be "guaranteed" by both the USSR and the US.

The main issue, of course, remains: withdrawal of the Soviet troops. From Moscow's point of view, such a withdrawal is only conceivable if the Soviets leave in place behind them a Kabul regime which is both "acceptable" to the USSR and has reasonable chances to survive. Now no one has many illusions about Mr Karmal's chances of maintaining his position--in the face of an Afghan resistance whose vigor has been proven in 6 years of guerrilla war--without his Soviet protectors.

Curiously, the main obstacle impeding the conversations in Geneva has not been this fundamental one, but rather a diplomatic point of order. Among the subjects discussed has been a schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet

troops. Now Kabul refuses to continue indirect discussions under Cordovez's mediation, and instead demands direct talks, which would imply Islamabad's recognition of the present Afghan government. Impossible, the Pakistanis reply, because that would amount to legitimizing a regime put in place and supported by the intervention and presence of foreign forces.

It would take a political solution to get out of this vicious circle, and the editorial published Saturday by PRAVDA, confirming indications picked up earlier from Soviet sources, shows that Moscow is beginning to realize this.

"Compromise"

The Soviets say that Kabul's objective is to gain acceptance of its legitimacy, that the latter seems to give the impression that no one person is irreplaceable and that Mr Karmal might be led to step down from his position in favor of one of the other members on his team. But would the Afghan regime not make itself more acceptable to Pakistan and the rest of the international community if a dialogue were opened up between Karmal himself and some of the movements which make up the Afghan resistance?

This is indeed what PRAVDA is suggesting when it writes that "it is necessary, for national renewal to proceed in Afghanistan, to create an atmosphere of positive dialogue between the social and political forces, including those which have taken positions hostile to the revolution." Acknowledging that "mistakes were made during the course of the first stage of the revolution," the PCSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] journal stresses that "reconciliation presupposes compromises."

Thus it is not being suggested that the resistance fighters simply lay down their arms and rally to the support of the Kabul regime. The idea, rather, is to hold discussions in which the views of both sides could be exchanged.

Soviet interlocutors do not necessarily find this kind of scenario unrealistic--if, first of all, it could be the beginning of a political solution; if, secondly, it should lead to a peace formula that respects the USSR's interests; and thirdly if the US would give sincere endorsement to the agreement, and not try later on to "exploit" it for its own purposes.

But all this still leaves undecided the question with which movements among the diverse components of the Afghan resistance might it be "useful" to open up a dialogue, meaning both a dialogue that is constructive politically and one that could lead to at least the partial cessation of hostilities on the ground. It is a complex problem--given the apparently irreconcilable positions of the Karmal regime and the principal resistance movements--but one which past experience could help resolve. Local ceasefires have been negotiated at various times, for example with young Commandant Mas'ud, and have they not been respected by both sides for some period of time?

Once the dialogue has gotten under way, those who are supplying weapons to the various resistance movements (in other words: the US and Pakistan) could make a major contribution to re-establishing peace by stopping their deliveries. Tit for tat: the Soviets for their part would encourage their friends in Kabul to make reasonable compromises. And if the resistance formations that enjoy Iran's support refused to participate in this process, continuation of their activities would be reduced to a merely local problem of maintaining law and order. This assessment, according to our interlocutor, is consistent with Soviet views regarding future prospects of the imam Khomeyni. In any case, since an Afghan government which began to entertain contacts with the resistance would be recognized as a valuable interlocutor, there would be nothing to prevent negotiations from focusing on the withdrawal of Soviet troops--and resulting in agreement.

Such a scenario is subject to many uncertainties. But it is difficult to see how any of its essential elements could be omitted, if the necessity of a political solution is actually accepted in Moscow.

9516

CSO : 4619/20

AFGHANISTAN

RESISTANCE BECOMING PROFESSIONALIZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Dec 85 pp 4,5

[Text] Valley of the Panjshir--Since the previous evening, the 50-man resistance commando team has been hiding in the ruins of a house, about 200 meters from the outer perimeter of the Pushghur base, which is held by the cream of the government's army: several hundred soldiers from the 444th commando brigade, as well as secret police units and the constabulary. Morale among the soldiers is poor. Every day a number of deserters succeed in getting through the minefield and joining the resistance.

Two days previously, a team from the general staff, headed by General Ahmeduddin, were in a helicopter checking out the situation in the area surrounding this base, the most distant outpost in the valley of the Panjshir. Just as it was preparing to leave, machinegun fire pinned the (armored) helicopter to the ground: the team waited for another craft to come looking for it. Whether by good fortune or premonition, the dozen or so Soviet advisers had been withdrawn just a few days before. At precisely 1800 hours, on 15 June, the base was struck by a deluge of firepower; all of Commandant Mas'ud's light artillery was brought into action. The insurgents have little enough ammunition, but their new tactic is to strike hard and quickly.

As soon as the first salvo was fired the commando team, equipped with portable radios, started off in single file, the two men in the lead watching out for mines. The commandos have obtained a copy of the layout of the base's minefield. Every man has memorized his tasks. Upon arrival at the first entrenchment, they divide into four groups; three move in along the communications trenches that link the base to its outposts, while the fourth seizes the radio and continues to transmit to the support base several kilometers away, assuring it that everything is going well. Attacked from within, the support units surrender one by one. In half an hour, virtually the entire base has been taken. Only the secret police and the general staff team continue to hold out. General Ahmeduddin is killed in combat.

Tricked by the radio, the Soviets take 2 days to react. The mujahidin use this time to good advantage, carrying off the large stock of ammunition

that has fallen into their hands, and sifting through their 700 prisoners: the simple soldiers are sent to Pakistan to be released, while the 126 officers are imprisoned in the small Mukini valley. Mas'ud proposes an exchange of prisoners with the government. In late June, the Soviets re-took Pushghur, which had been abandoned by the resistance. In July, rejecting the idea of a prisoner exchange, they mounted a paratroop commando operation to free the prisoners.

From the accounts of all the combatants interviewed after this attack, it was the most violent one ever seen in Panjshir. At dawn on 13 July, after a terrible initial artillery bombardment, in which the Soviets brought into action the full gamut of their ground-to-ground rockets (the new generation of Stalin organs), the paratroopers were taken by helicopter to the heights overlooking Mukini valley, and to its entrance. They took heavy losses from the start: the mujahidin mined the landing strip, and the helicopters, forced to descend below the tops of the surrounding mountains, came under heavy machinegun fire; four of them were brought down.

The Soviets, lacking adequate reconnaissance, attacked an empty prison. Unable to liberate the officers, they bombarded the detention site instead. During the night, after engaging in some hand-to-hand combat, the insurgents succeeded in escaping the ravines by scaling the cliffs. A week later, the Soviets in turn evacuated the valley, after having dynamited and mined all the installations the insurgents had built. Two more weeks and the insurgents reoccupied the valley and rebuilt their prison and shelters. The outpost of Pushghur is once again under siege.

A Weary Elite

Every day we have an opportunity to interview the small group of deserters from the previous night. This time the insurgents have mountain artillery, multiple rocket-launchers, mortars and ammunition. Throughout this time the government, to make up its losses, has been trying to transform what remains of the 444th brigade into a division, whose ranks will be topped up with conscripts recruited by force: this elite unit of the government army, now worn-out and weary, looks more and more like all the other units in the army--a group of men who should not even be trusted with arms, let alone guard duty.

The war has changed complexion. In the bastions of the resistance, it is no longer a guerrilla war in which elusive mountain fighters are sent out against heavy armored columns. We see well-trained, professionalized units, sometimes fighting real pitched battles against the elite troops of the Soviet army: airborne commando teams, who sometimes go into battle without the support of the interminable armored columns, whose ungainliness was the best guarantee an operation would fail. The Afghans are heavier now, while the Soviets are lighter.

The Paktya offensive, in August and September, was intended to liberate the town of Khost, which had been besieged by the resistance. Previously this

province had been under the complete control of the government army. It was a fiefdom of the "khalq" faction within the Communist ranks, opposed to the "parcham" faction to which the current head of state, Babrak Karmal, belongs. Paktya was the last symbol of Afghan Communist autonomy vis-a-vis the Soviet big brother. The difficulties faced by the government forces in August--after considerable reinforcements to the insurgents had boosted their strength--made Soviet intervention inevitable. The circumstances seemed favorable: Khost is in flat country where, unlike in Panjshir, the armor has mobility; Paktya is a tribal area where there are strong rivalries between tribes and local chiefs, particularly between the powerful Zadran tribe, led by a cleric, Djellaluddin, and the Tani, Jaji and Mangal tribes led by more traditional chiefs; finally Djellaluddin, the most prestigious of the chiefs, made a pilgrimage to Mecca.

The offensive began as expected, after a month of uninterrupted aerial bombardment. The Soviet troops, at about division strength, succeeded in lifting the siege of Khost and occupying strategic positions throughout the province, capturing a number of resistance bases and killing several local commanders.

But this time we did not see the usual good-natured retreat before the steamroller. Not only did the local combatants hold their ground, but fresh troops descended from the tribal areas situated in Pakistani territory.

"Bastions" and "Soft Areas"

It was something new for intertribal units to stop a Soviet offensive. In fact, troops from other ethnic groups--primarily Tajiks and Turkmen from the north who were pinned in the Pashtun province of Paktya--fought alongside the Pashtuns. For the first time in a major battle, tribal and ethnic cleavages were ignored. And at last the insurgents had light artillery at their disposal; they sometimes even engaged in something like positional warfare. Losses were very high on both sides, but the offensive was stopped in mid-September.

In coming to judgments about the overall military situation, two facts stand out: first of all the polarization of the resistance between the professionalized bastions and the "soft" areas; second, the weaknesses of the Soviet army, which has done about as much as it can do with an expeditionary force in which only the elite troops (the paratroopers) are effective.

The Afghan resistance is not all becoming professionalized at the same rate. Alongside bastions like Panjshir, Paktya, the Kabul region, Kandahar and Herat, one also finds vast areas where the insurgents continue to conduct the war as they did in the early days, and where the Soviet pacification program has had some successes--particularly since these zones felt the full fury of a military escalation they were unable to withstand.

On the other hand, except in the West, where the resistance is being hindered by an Iranian blockade, the resistance bastions are getting stronger, as American aid slowly gets in.

Of course, the military aid to the resistance is still highly restrictive, from a qualitative standpoint; no sophisticated Western arms, no ground-to-air missiles, except for the obsolete SAM-7's. The Americans try to convey the idea that they do not want to bleed the USSR, and that the door remains open to negotiations, as President Reagan proposed in his UN speech. However, the reinforcements are sufficient to cause the elite troops of the Soviet army to gnash their teeth about the bastions.

These days it is the Soviet army that undertakes all initiatives. The elite troops, the paratroopers and commandos (although the presence of the more or less mythical "spetnatz" elite units remains uncertain), who are unafraid to venture out far from the support of the armored columns or mount night operations, are no longer in a backup capacity; they are serving as the backbone of the force.

The "Great Patriotic War"

They are nevertheless running into the same constraints that have plagued the Soviet army since the start of the war: insufficient numbers of troops for territorial occupation after offensives are completed, or for sealing off the border; difficulties in mounting lengthy operations, and logistical deficiencies. the morale of the men in the ranks is low, and the black market is constantly growing. In Panjshir, not far from the major road linking Kabul to the USSR, one can buy anything from a brand-new KGB officer's uniform to jeep tires, not to mention paratroopers' boots. Soviet prisoners are full of stories about the lack of discipline of the troops and the harshness of living conditions. One new twist is that the four prisoners we saw in Panjshir were European rather than Muslim Soviets. Tensions inside the Soviet army remain high, and the incident in which Russian and Tajik soldiers with the Soviet force reportedly got into a scrape after the execution of a Tajik for hashish trafficking is all too plausible (LE MONDE of 9 November).

The more the Soviet troops are involved in the fighting, the more losses they sustain. It is no longer possible to hide those losses from a public which is less docile than reputed. Since 1984, films and articles have been showing the realities of the war: the authorities are soft-pedaling the propaganda about "responsibilities to proletarian internationalism" and instead there is emphasis on defending the frontiers of the Soviet fatherland; articles recounting the feats of arms of the Soviet army in Afghanistan refer to the "great patriotic war." The picture emerging from the Soviet press is fairly close to reality: forget about the Pakistani mercenaries; the real enemy is the Afghan. But if the Soviets have been forced to re-evaluate the nature and the stakes of this war, their long-term perspective remains unchanged.

The resolve of the Soviets to consider the "Afghan revolution" as irreversible has not weakened. However, they are currently running into unexpected medium term problems. Control of the insurgency's communications and the border areas is an urgent necessity. And since they do not have enough troops to seal the frontier, and the Kabul regime is not providing them with the wherewithal to expand the pacification program, it looks like it is Pakistan--standing behind the resistance--which could become the target of a Soviet escalation.

9516

CSO : 4619/20

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC POSITION INCREASING

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Dec 85 p 4

[Text] Much has been written about the burden Pakistan is sustaining in the Afghanistan war. The presence of three to four million refugees concentrated in the province of Nord-Ouest and Baloutchistan has had negative effects on the local economy. The refugees are free, not kept in closed camps, which is a tribute to the regime; but at the same time the herds and primitive encampments are contributing to deforestation; the men are accepting wages lower than those the Pakistanis earn while rents are skyrocketing in the big cities; social and ethnic tensions are being exacerbated.

Pakistani public opinion is anti-refugee, even if the intelligentsia does not oppose the policy toward Kabul. Situated in the tribal areas where the Pakistani government has not really imposed its authority (the political agent is considered an ambassador, rather than a governor), the border with Afghanistan is rife with arms (and drug) trafficking in both directions, and the Soviet-Afghan army is not reluctant to intervene against villages on the border. Even more ominously, the Communist regime in Kabul has espoused the traditional Afghan claim to tribal areas situated in Pakistani territory (not only "Pashtunistan" but also Baloutchistan), the tribes there being very seriously considered in Kabul as under the jurisdiction of the (Afghan) minister of tribal affairs and nationalities. And the latter has no qualms about holding a general assembly of the Pakistani tribes in Kabul (most recently on 14 September 1985).

Finally, if one bears in mind that the fundamental conflict is between Pakistan and India, which has traditionally been allied with the USSR, the Soviet invasion has aggravated the strategic vulnerability of Pakistan, caught as it is in a pincer between two hostile and allied nations. In short, internal destabilization and external threats seem to be the most immediate consequences of the war; that is the argument being made by the opposition, which in the name of defending Pakistan's national interests is demanding direct negotiations with the Kabul regime.

The Pakistani opposition believes that support for the Afghan resistance, by prolonging the war, strengthens the Zia regime but weakens Pakistan.

This analysis is often picked up by Western journalists, for whom the Zia regime is a military dictatorship, bereft of any social base of support, a regime that can only survive by exploiting the war to silence the internal opposition and obtain American support. In reality, things are more complicated. This regime, whose imminent fall has been predicted for years, has shown that it is becoming more stable and more moderate.

General Zia, certainly, has used the war to reinforce his legitimacy and obtain Western support, for which otherwise he could not have hoped. However, the regime of General Zia is not as isolated domestically as people say; the process of democratization is under way, albeit slowly; the press, especially the English language press, has regained freedom of expression (so long as it refrains from attacking Zia personally); the (nonpartisan) elections were a success, in large part because they corresponded to Pakistan's political structure, which puts more emphasis on patron-client relationships than on adhesion to parties founded on ideological considerations (these parties are out in the open, however); and, finally, the opposition itself is divided and isolated. As for the separatist movements, they are losing strength: in the case of the Pathans (Pashtuns), it was in large part the Soviet invasion that discredited those of their leaders who were too closely tied to Moscow.

More importantly, it is not clear that General Zia's policy toward Afghanistan is a short-sighted one. It is in the interest of Pakistan itself, not merely the regime, to "profit" from the war in Afghanistan by strengthening its own regional position, which has been very weak since 1971. The adroitness of the regime is attested by the skill with which it has implemented this policy, carefully avoiding any action that would lead to a brutal reaction from the USSR.

Islamabad First

Pakistan's strategic thought revolves primarily around the "Indian threat" and not around the East-West conflict; India's perspective is similar, in that India perceives the USSR only as a regional factor, not as a superpower peddling an ideological system; for India, policy revolves around the rivalry with Pakistan for regional hegemony.

One might object that the game was already over in 1971, that India is now the great power in the region, and that it should have nothing more to fear from a weakened Pakistan; it could also be said that Pakistan is not really facing the threat of a frontal attack from the Indian army. No matter: for these two players, the Indo-Pakistani conflict is the primordial one.

Without American aid, both military and economic, Pakistan would be one of the poorest of countries, a helpless victim of the economic crisis. It is of interest to the US solely in the context of East-West confrontation, not in terms of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The United States has never supported Pakistan in its disputes with India, despite the bilateral military accords, and it is firmly opposed to the Pakistani nuclear

program. Any Pakistani drift toward neutralist positions could only encourage Washington to court New Delhi, whose regional weight dwarfs that of Islamabad.

On the other hand, when Pakistan appears as the last bastion against Soviet expansionism toward the Gulf, American support is assured, despite Washington's desire to maintain good relations with India. The East-West dimension carries the day. The Pakistanis thus condition their support to the Afghan resistance on American military and economic assistance. In vain do the Indians argue that American military aid serves to strengthen the Pakistani army on their border, not on the Afghan border. One might add that American economic aid is currently mitigating the problems caused by the currency transfers of emigrants working in the Gulf countries, many of whom have been sent home. Finally, it is clear that the border areas are experiencing an economic boom brought about by international assistance to the refugees, which has put money into construction of housing and roads and spurred commerce.

The position of the Zia regime is not servile vis-a-vis the United States, but corresponds to the national interest of the country as the Pakistanis themselves, including the opposition, have always defined it: existing in the face of India. Once that condition is fulfilled, all it has to do is avoid getting trapped in a dangerous confrontation with the USSR. In that respect, too, the Pakistani policy has been consistent since the start of the crisis. Military aid to the resistance, even after recently being increased, is carefully kept below the point where it might threaten to upset the military balance in favor of the mujahidin : no ground-to-air missiles, no sophisticated arms.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan has always kept the door open to negotiations, both by participating in the indirect talks in Geneva under the aegis of the UN ("the "Cordovez exercises"), and by opposing the formation of an Afghan government in exile. The Pakistanis have not even bothered to hide their displeasure about the sending of a joint Afghan resistance delegation to the UN General Assembly in October.

A final point: the Pakistani strategists are primarily concerned with the effectiveness of the resistance on the border areas, in the Pashtun tribal areas which they share with Kabul. What happens north of the Hindu Kush, on the Soviet border, scarcely interests them: they aim more at creation of a no man's land between the Soviet troops and their country than at an indirect confrontation with the USSR using Afghanistan as the battlefield. If the only objective of the USSR were to guarantee the security of its southern border, no doubt an accord with Pakistan would be easy to reach. But is that all the USSR wants?

9516

CSO : 4619/20

INDIA

REFUGEE PROBLEM EXAMINED

New Delhi DINMAN in Hindi 24-30 Nov 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Shadid Rahim: "When Will Our Guest Refugees Return Home?"]

[Text] The continuously increasing number of refugees in India is causing a serious problem. The "guests" who are a burden on the economy of the "host" country can neither be evicted nor permanently kept here. We do not know how to tackle this double jeopardy.

The problem of helping refugees running away from their homelands is universal and is not limited to India. At present 95 countries are supporting refugees. Before 1971, East Pakistan had the highest number of refugees--2.9 million. According to a recent report the number of refugees in various countries is: Iran 2.2 million; United States of America 100,000; Cuba 2,000; France 161,200; United Kingdom 140,000; Germany 175,000; China 276,900. India, however, has more refugees than any of these countries. In 1971 there were only 600,000 refugees here.

Refugees from Burma and Sri Lanka also began to arrive after 1980. Whenever there was a problem in a neighboring country, its citizens headed for India for refuge.

There are 2 million families consisting of 7 million refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka. The Rehabilitation Department of the Home Ministry is responsible for providing food, clothes, accommodation, medical care and education for these refugees at the cost of 5 rupees per diem. This adds up to 1.05 billion rupees per month. According to some reports, out of the 12.6 billion rupees, only 8 billion are spent for the budgeted purpose. The rest goes into the pockets of bureaucrats in the Rehabilitation Department and some political leaders.

The naive refugees are suffering from this corrupt practice and they are forced to support themselves by selling discarded newsprint, smuggling and pushing drugs.

The largest influx of refugees occurred as a result of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. There were 1.6 million refugees from Bangladesh in 1971. This number has almost trebled to 4 million persons. At the time of India's partition in

1947-48 about 10 million refugees had moved to India. During the Indo-China War, 200,000 Tibetans emigrated to India. Of these, 80,000 are living in Arunachal, Himachal, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Laddakh. About 15,000 have accepted Bhutan citizenship. The rest are still wandering in various parts of India.

In 1980, Bhupal Chowdhary Ghosh threatened a hunger strike because of the ill treatment of Hindu refugees. He accused the then government of ignoring Pandit Nehru's promise to these refugees from 1947. Most of the present demands by refugees are based on Pandit Nehru's promise. The problem is not their coming to India but of their rehabilitation here. According to the Naike-Shashtri agreement of 1964-65, all refugees from Sri Lanka who entered India between 31 December 1965 and 28 March 1971 and those who failed to get Indian citizenship were to return to Sri Lanka. According to the Sharnarathi Sangram Parishad [Refugee Federation] these refugees were not allowed to enter their own country.

When Bangladeshi refugees are asked why they did not come to India in 1947, they claim that they were building a new life and culture in a new country and it all went to pieces in 1971. In 1980, Kanti Vashwas, minister of youth affairs, announced that these 219,000 Bangladeshi refugees have decided not to return home.

At that time it was decided to keep the 38,000 Hindus in India and deport the 14,000 Muslims to Bangladesh. This, however, was not agreeable to the Ershad government. The Indian government did not want to push this religious issue either. No action was taken on this decision.

In 1981, 30,000 Afghans took refuge in India. Of these, 8,000 were registered with the United Nations. Nine hundred of these Afghans moved to West Germany and the rest have settled in South Extension, greater Kailash, Defence Colony and Jama Masjid areas of Delhi.

On 12 February 1982, Home Minister Giani Zail Singh told the leaders of Assam Agitation that the 16 June 1965 amendment could not be recognized. He cited the Naike-Shastri agreement which denied immigration to any foreigner entering India after 28 March 1971. However, the organizations supporting refugees ignored the home minister's advice and continued their efforts in getting the refugees rehabilitated. On 13 June 1984, the Refugee Federation with about 150 refugees held a demonstration in front of the residence of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In a communique issued by the prime minister's office on 6 July 1984 it was stated that necessary instructions to help the refugees had been issued to the Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation. The Refugee Federation was asked to supply detailed information on the refugee problem, but gave only a brief report.

On 23 August 1985, after Mrs Gandhi's assassination, the Refugee Federation and 51 members of the Lokdal held a demonstration in front of the president's house in support of their three-pronged demands. When the police tried to intervene, they offered arrests at the Boat Club. According to some newspaper

reports, 30 women were among the arrested. The demonstrators issued a press release which included their three-pronged demands: rehabilitation of refugees, a specific number of government jobs reserved for refugees and establishment of new refugee camps. These demands appear to be reasonable, but are against the Indian Constitution and the present situation in India. Their first demand is illegal. The second demand requesting reserved job quotas is dangerous. The present practice of reserving jobs for various caste, tribe and religious groups has been very detrimental to India's unity. In context of the third demand for establishing more refugee camps, it should be appropriate to mention that over 5 million refugees are living in India. Hundreds of refugee camps have already been established at Betia, Narkatia Ganj, Muzaffar Pur, Darbhanga, Jai Nagar, Sita Madhi, Purnia, Saharsa and Patna in Bihar; Vidyarthi Market, Kanpur, Lucknow, Nainital and Hastinapur in Uttar Pradesh; Raipur, Mana Camp, Paraskot, Bastar, Beladise, Sarguja, Harda, Itarsi, Hoshangabad, Bhopal, Jubbalpur, Karni Baital and Panna in Madhya Pradesh and Jalpaigudi in Assam. In addition, there are nine camps in Orissa, five in Andhra Pradesh, four in Maharashtra, six in West Bengal, three in Tamil Nadu, five in Rajasthan and three each in Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. Over 6 million refugees from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Tibbet, Afghanistan and Portugal are living in these camps. Still more refugees have been absorbed in various communities in the Delhi area. Over 1 million refugees are estimated to be living in Govindpuri, Gole Market, Tilak Nagar, Nazaf Garh, Bhumiheen Camp in Khanpur, Neopolvis Road, Shadipur, Simapuri, Jahangirpuri, Shahdra and a few other places.

In the context of failure to rehabilitate refugees, Sujata Chauhan, an administrator in the Home Ministry, said that several members of the Refugee Federation and refugees from Bangladesh were given shelter in Kanpur, Agra and other places. According to her, they do not like to stay in one place and move out without informing the officials. Yogesh Chandar Malik, general secretary of the Refugee Federation, told how he was allocated a two-bedroom apartment, number 100, in a two-story building in Govind Nagar's Vidyarthi Market in Kanpur. He was evicted along with his wife and two children when he refused to pay 2,000 rupees demanded by Mohinder Singh, an inspector in the rehabilitation department. That apartment was later given to another refugee who was willing to pay the required bribe. This apartment was allocated to Yogesh Malik in 1979. However, he has been braving heat, cold and rain in a polyethylene shack in front of the Home Ministry offices on Man Singh Road since 1980. He is still hoping that the government will listen to his problems and help him. During our conversation with him he showed determination to fight all his life.

There are some differences of opinion over these three-pronged demands in Lokdal, the political party supporting refugee demands. Rashid Masood, general secretary of its all India branch, said recently that India has enough problems of its own. He believes that foreigners should be deported since the Naike-Shashtri agreement demands it. He does, however, admit that as long as they are here, we cannot ignore their problems. Dhirendar Pratap, the president of the party, promised to support the Refugee Federation demands. He said that refugees should not be clamoring for food in a huge democracy like

India. He expressed concern that a tendency toward crime is increasing among the 2 million refugees in Delhi and over 7 million all over the country because of this neglect. During this conversation, Dhirendar Pratap warned about some foreigners who have forcibly settled in border areas under the guise of refugees. According to him they smuggle and deal in the black market for opium, heroin, charas, hashish and even young girls. These so-called refugees are cooperating with countries that encourage terrorism in India.

There is no doubt that a large segment of these refugees is involved in criminal activities. Lack of food and clothes has forced them into such a life. Daughters of refugee families are sold before they are fully grown. They are addicted to charas, raw liquor and heavy smoking. The mental depression caused by the lack of food, clothes and housing have made them lazy, cowardly and irrational.

Refugees living in Tilaknagar in the capital spend their days under the street lights at various street crossings. Women and children gather discarded paper [for selling], men either ply rickshaws or sell ice cream. The young work for some labor contractor. Working as rickshaw drivers and laborers gives them opportunities for selling black market goods. Hunger forces them to do anything. These actions are influencing the Indians also. Are we going to enter the 21st century with such a distorted society?

7997/12795

CSO: 4624/9

IRAN

KHOMAYNI ENDS SPECULATIONS ON HEALTH, ACCUSES WESTERN PRESS

Paris QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 2 Dec 85 p 3

[Text] Imam Khomeyni made a public speech Saturday--the first in a month--with the two-fold purpose of silencing speculation about his health, which began 8 days ago with the designation of the Ayatollah Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri as his successor, the guide of the revolution, and of calling on the Western press to exercise greater moderation in its judgements of the Islamic Republic.

In a 30-minute speech delivered in a steady voice and punctuated at times by a short but brisk movement of the hand, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni sought to demonstrate that at the age of 86, according to his official biography, he is in "perfect health," as authorized sources in the Iranian state structure, including President Khamene'i, have indicated several times in the past few days.

To put the finishing touches on this demonstration, the guide of the revolution suited the action to the word, walking straight ahead and without assistance toward the chair covered in a light blue cloth in which he sat down to deliver his speech. The ceremony marking the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad took place in the small mosque of Djamaran, the village north of Tehran at the foot of snow-capped mountains which he has made his home since heart problems in January 1980.

A Spectacular Reappearance

The Imam also stood up unaided, refusing to take the arm of the ecclesiastic who accompanied him and, before leaving the small, indoor balcony from which he customarily delivers his messages, greeted the hundreds of followers who had come to see, hear and cheer him. This was the first time that Ayatollah Khomeyni had spoken in public since 31 October when he received the members of the new government and President Khamene'i and Prime Minister Huseyn Mosavi. At that time, the guide of the revolution assumed the role of mediator in political tensions within the state, calling on the new governing team to "work together."

The month-long silence and the council of experts' designation 8 days ago of Ayatollah Montazeri as the successor to Imam Khomeyni on the latter's death had given rise to rumors--Tehran is very fond of them--concerning the state of the Imam's health.

The absurdity that the speculations had been in vain was thus demonstrated to the public and to the officials present--President Khamene'i and several ministers--and also to the international press, of which four representatives attended the ceremony Saturday in the Djamaran Mosque. This demonstration was accompanied by sharp criticism of the way in which the Western media report the situation in Iran.

In particular, the Ayatollah Khomeyni accused the Western press of making Iran "the center of international terrorism" and of alleging that "people are executed without trial in prisons of the Islamic Republic."

He added some humor and triggered the laughter of those present by also explaining that the Western press had announced several times that Kharg Island, Iran's main oil terminal, had been destroyed by Iraqi planes, and that Iran's crude oil exports had been suspended. The Imam asked his delighted followers, "how many times can one destroy the same thing?"

With these criticisms came an implicit appeal for greater moderation in the analysis of developments in Iran's domestic politics.

By not commenting on the designation of Ayatollah Montazeri, Imam Khomeyni sought to reduce this decision to the dimensions of a "normal" procedure, an expression of precautionary concern, in the event that--as was explained by the president of the Parliament, Hojjatol-Eslam Hachemi-Rafsanjani--something should happen to Imam Khomeyni, and not a sign of a rush to be ready in the face of a forthcoming political succession.

12314/12379
CSO: 4619/15

IRAN

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES NEW STRATEGIES, POLICIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 Oct 85 pp 17-18

[Text] One four-year term of the people-serving government is completed and now we are at the threshold of a new period in the activity of the country's executive system. The government left behind a four-year period of eventful services. The people-serving government shouldered the responsibilities at a time when the circumstances were not so favorable or easy. At the time vast areas of the Islamic homeland were occupied by the aggressive Ba'thist forces of Iraq. The intensified plots of the archsatan, the United States and its malicious allies in the Western World against the Islamic revolution had taken on a dangerous dimension. It was a time when the Islamic system had lost tens of its brilliant and competent offsprings as a result of the heinous crimes of the lackeys and henchmen of the superpowers. It was a time when the minions of the world arrogance inflicted a new deep-cut wound on our society with each and every passing day. The atheist minigroups were sauntering and roaming all over Western Azarbaijan and Kordestan challenging everyone. In those days the sick minds of the superpowers were predicting the downfall or breakup of the Islamic Republic's system within a matter of a few months. Our country was practically exposed to an economic sanction and our GNP followed a downward trend. It was a time when our factories were paralyzed, our foreign exchange reserves were below the red mark, the sale of oil had plummeted to the lowest level, there was the heavy burden of a 25 percent rate of inflation on the shoulders of the poor strata of our society, there were not enough supplies of essential needs of the people on the market, the situation of the food reserves was critical, our economic policies were haphazard, our administrative system was shattered, the management of Hezbollahis had to bear the isolation which was inflicted by the liberals, our foreign policy was but a neophyte, and ... Such was the prevailing circumstances of the country at the beginning of this people-serving government. Today, after four years we perhaps cannot judge the weak and strong points of the government's operations during that period. However, if the government of the deprived people had any role in changing those conditions into the present situation, it has been achieved only through the sincere efforts of all the responsible members of the government and the committed staff of the executive offices. In the course of these sincere endeavors, we have felt the blessings of God toward the government. The generous support by the great leader of the Islamic revolution, from whom the government has had the honor of receiving the title of "servant of the deprived people," the support of the great Islamic nation, particularly the faithful multitude of the deprived

society, the guidelines provided by the eminent scholar, the grand Ayatollah Montazeri, and the honorable heads of the three branches, especially the president and the chief executive, the unreserved support of the revolutionary deputies of the first as well as the second term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly [Majlis], particularly our eminent brother Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Muslemin Hashemi-Rafsanjani, to whom this government has always been indebted under most difficult circumstances, the cooperation and support provided by the judicial power, especially our dear brother, his excellency Ayatollah Musavi Ardebili, the kindness of the dear clerics, particularly the Friday imams throughout the country, as well as the cooperation of other anti-oppression, righteous and justice-seeking forces following the line of the imam, especially those in the holy seminaries and universities, who by adhering to their great imam, paved the way for the advancement of the government--all these are regarded by the government as manifestations of the same blessed hand.

We, the servants of the nation, feel quite inadequate to express our gratitude for so much support, attention, kindness, and comradeship; particularly we feel inadequate to express our appreciation for the fateful support of the imam of the nation, who, like the divine's fabulous bird of good omen, have supported the government under the most serious conditions.

At the end of the first four years of this people-serving government, I wish to mention and remember the Islamic combatants as teachers of love and devotion, and to recall their powerful arms as a great support for the government in assisting it to cross sensitive stages. I also like to remember the hard-working and committed staff of the executive branch as unknown soldiers of the revolution, to remember the dear colleagues in the cabinet, be it those with whom I had the honor of working until the end of this period or those who shouldered part of the government's heavy burden during the past four years.

At the beginning of this new term, I would like to invite my new and old colleagues to prepare themselves to accept difficulties and have patience in the face of problems and devote themselves to serving this great nation.

At this point we are involved in a section of the history of the Islamic Republic's system, where an emphasis and stress on the primary mottos of the revolution--which have been followed until now by the principal responsible officials of the nation with the same initial fervor--seems to be one of the most significant necessities. The opportunity provided by the regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly for the presentation of the policies and the general principles of the government's program afford us the best chance to stress the point. The policy and the general principles of the government's program which are termed hereunder as the government policy versus the war, the executive policy, the economic policy, the domestic policy, the foreign and the cultural policies of the government cannot be anything other than more emphasis on the genuine mottos of the revolution, which like divine statements, have guided the Muslim nation of Iran during the very first days of the movement.

Government Policy Versus the War:

The imam of the nation has said that the war has top priority and that the government is obligated as before to follow this order. The honor and integrity of the combatant nation of Iran is in the pledge of a struggle against aggression which has been committed by the Ba'thist Zionist enemy. The government believes that even if the war is prolonged for 20 years, it has the capability to properly manage the country's economy. Along with its combatant nation, the government is prepared to mobilize every and all its possibilities in order to resist this unwanted war and as far as possible it will not allow any compromises.

Executive Policy:

During the four years of its activity, the people-serving government has gained additional experience which will in the future, under the title of "the general programs of the government" be put into action. Now, at a time when the internal regulations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly have been created to give vent to these statements, it seems appropriate that we mention such experiences for the benefit of the respected Majlis which intends to make a proper decision in order to take a vote of confidence for the members of the government, and also for the benefit and information of other brothers who are willing to utilize our experiences to serve the Muslim people of Iran in a better way.

1- The experiences of the last four years have taught us that one of the secrets of success in the work is the proper use of the guidance of all the scholars and devoted individuals who support the revolution, particularly those personalities who are favorites of the people. However, while the government can follow the guidance as stated above, it cannot be held responsible for its actions except to the leader of the revolution and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and it should not be made answerable to other sources or be questioned by them. Acceptance of responsibility toward other sources not only will violate or transgress the legal bounds as determined by the constitution, but in its wake it will create innumerable difficulties for the executive system of the country which will eventually lead to a delay in the proper progression of the affairs and squandering or expending the rights of the nation.

2- We have learned from the experiences of the last few years that where the management of the affairs of the remotest areas of the executive system of the country is not in the hands of committed, faithful and devoted individuals, we cannot rely on complete stability of the Islamic Republic, no matter if seven years have passed since the victory of the revolution. From the beginning of the revolution, long strides have been taken to trust the management of the affairs to the Hezbollahi forces, however one of the main duties of our brother ministers in the new cabinet is to take even wider strides in this regard. Since in addition to its ideal dimension for us when we utilize the services of faithful forces in our management positions, it has also been proven that in order to be successful in the management of an entity it is far more advantageous to use a force which is stimulated by faith and devotion in its drive.

For instance, a specialist or an expert who does not have a faithful stimulus for the performance of his task, will not naturally ever be able to create or present the favorable services which are expected of him. Today we have a large number of committed specialists and furthermore, the executive teachings or knowledge which have been gained by our faithful forces during the years after the advent of the revolution are far more constructive than the accumulated knowledge of a college graduate specialist who lacks commitment. Of course, trusting the management affairs of the country with the committed forces does not imply non-utilization of the specialist forces, but it signifies the use of specialist forces by the faithful and committed individuals and use of non-committed forces in the lower level of key management positions.

3- Other important necessities of today's country concern the strengthening of revolutionary organs and the injection of an "organ" spirit in the executive system of the country. This thought that the revolutionary organs were but some institutions which were created at the beginning of the revolution in order to help keep it going and that today they have lost their cause for existence, though at one point was true, right now its reverse has been practically proven. The structure of our administrative affairs is formed in such a way that as long as there is not a fundamental transformation in their ruling relationships, they cannot adjust or harmonize themselves to the needs of the revolution. This transformation should be focused on bringing ever closer the very essence of the official organs of the country to those of the revolution. A portion of this grave responsibility for the creation of such a transformation can be achieved by proper cooperation from the Majlis and the approval of suitable laws and another portion can be brought about by buttressing the revolutionary organs which are progenitors of the revolution and injecting an "organ" spirit in our departments.

4- At present, one of the most difficult executive afflictions of the country, which is confirmed by all, is the abstruse or arcane issue of bureaucracy. When we talk about bureaucracy and red tape in various government departments, we usually think only about the people's difficulties who have to go through the maze of officialism whenever they have to use the services of these departments. Of course the people's difficulties as regards the problem of red tape is numerous, however the very executive system itself suffers more from this malady than the people in the cause of advancing its own activities. The solution of the problem of bureaucracy depends on devising a new administrative system, placing trust and importance on the committed managers and the Muslim people, and the cooperation of the government and the Majlis in changing the existing inhibitive regulations. For example, the method of approach of the respectable Majlis with the public accounts' bill which is currently being discussed in the Majlis is very important and fateful.

5- Another weak point of the executive system of the country pertains to the system of supervision. The strengthening of the system of supervision which, on the one hand does not allow a free reign in the various government departments, and on the other points out the errors and mistakes of the managers;

it should help alleviate their problems and encourage their voluntary participation in supervising the higher institutions. These comprise some of the other programs of the government.

6- One of the most urgent matters which in the past comprised part of the government's programs and in the future should be given top priority is the fight against corruption. This is a fight, which as the most urgent action toward creation of a healthier executive organization, cannot be left idle. During the past term, through the formation of commissions which were charged with attending to administrative offenses, the government took notable steps. From the date of inception [March 1984] until August 1986, these commissions have investigated 12,600 dossiers pertaining to administrative offenses of which nearly 11,000 pertained to improper use of position and negligence during the course of the execution of duties.

However, whether in the process of activities of these commissions or whether in the method of approach of our judicial system towards administrative offenders which pertain to a low rate of success, the issue is punishment. The mere fact of discovering administrative corruption does not solve any problem at all, and as long as there is no suitable punishment for such crimes, we cannot hope to be able to seriously face this grave problem. Of course, the honorable Majlis, on various occasions has paid particular attention to this matter, but we hope through the realization of these considerations and with the adjustment and approval of severe "punishment laws for corruption," which have been returned to the Majlis from the honorable Council of Guardians, we will be able to follow more up-to-date programs in fighting administrative corruption.

7- Furthermore, in order to bring about an administrative change throughout the country, the government must also consider the following:

- Improvement of employment regulations and proper payment or remuneration system.
- Gravitation of the administrative system toward reducing the current office expenditures.
- Simplification and fast response to people's problems in the government departments and creation of a change in the performance of administrative services.

Confrontation with Extraneous Paperwork:

The suitable distribution of the government duties among various executive organizations, the separation of duties of different systems and the elimination of extraneous or repetitious work in government organizations ought to be considered by the government.

The creation of a non-centralized administrative system and the granting of more authority to general departments and executive organizations of each province should also be considered. At present, some of the abovementioned issues

are under consideration by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. However, at times the revolutionary deputies of the Majlis oppose the presentation of some of the above-stated issues and they're right in some cases, in that the valuable time of the Majlis should not be spent in dealing with some unimportant or insignificant executive issues. Nevertheless, at the present time, according to the law, the government has no other choice except to present these bills to the Majlis. It seems that the solution to the problem--in case that the honorable Majlis sees advisable--regarding these executive issues, within the framework of the law and supervision of the Majlis, lies in granting more authority to the cabinet ministers. Such a decision will help eliminate a great deal of the difficulties of the executive organizations.

Economic Policy:

With due consideration to the experiences of the last four years and recognition of the weak economic points of the country, as well as the evaluation of the policies and strategies which have been imposed by the government, considering their rate of success, and also taking into account the present economic situation of the country, the goals and programs of the government in the area of economy have been properly determined as follows.

A- Giving top priority to furnishing and providing the defense needs and resources of the country in such a way that even if this present war is prolonged for 20 years we will be able to manage the country's economy in a healthy fashion. Particularly, at a time when the non-reconciliatory status of the Islamic Republic with the superpowers of the East and the West and their allies have proven that the country ought to be in a state of complete combat readiness all the time.

B- Taking into account the dependent economic structure of the country, which is inherited from the time of the satan [shah], whether from the viewpoint of foreign exchange resources and revenues, which are dependent on oil, or whether from the standpoint of technological needs, raw materials and so forth, our general strategy and movement ought to focus on a gradual decrease in this dependency and replacing that with relative self-sufficiency in every aspect. The economic boycott of 1981 and the recent attack of the Zionist regime of Iraq on the Kharg Island, which were both aimed directly at dismantling our country's defensive and economic machinery gives us adequate reason to constantly pay attention to this axis and redirect all other economic programs and policies accordingly.

With proper consideration to the two above-stated general axes which are regarded as the taskmasters of future strategies, the goals and programs of the government for the future term will be as follows:

1- Preparation of a medium- and long-term program for the social and economic development of the country based on negotiations between the special 5-year commission and the specialists from the Plan and Budget Ministry.

2- Self-sufficiency and economic independence of the country.

3- Control and stabilization of prices.

4- Maintaining a proper balance of foreign currency with favorable foreign reserves with regard to the continuation of the war.

5- Growth of gross domestic product, particularly the implementation of the economic growth with a rational share for oil.

6- Application of correct budgetary policies for the purpose of increasing the share of non-oil revenues in the total composition of incomes, enacting new policies for attracting more development budgets and making them relatively independent from the eventual fluctuations in the government revenues.

7- Moving toward a just distribution of wealth or revenues in order to enhance the living conditions of the oppressed people.

8- Increasing productivity and preventing the promulgation of false employment.

9- Reviewing our distribution system, so as to curtail the hands of the middlemen.

10- Application of an economic foreign policy on the basis of "Neither East nor West."

With due consideration to the above, the general policies and strategies of the government for realizing the aforementioned goals and programs will be as follows:

1- Preparation of medium- and long-term social and economic development programs, and realization of many of the goals of the constitution can only be carried out when and where there is an enacted program, therefore the new government, as one of its most urgent measures, plans to follow up on all its medium- and long-term social and economic development programs up to the stage of completion, particularly when the goals and general strategies of the future programs have been prepared by the special 5-year program commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly with the cooperation of specialists and responsible officials. Thus, the government finds itself obligated, within the framework of the above-stated goals and strategies, to enact a complete social and economic development program for the country as soon as possible and present the same to the Majlis for approval.

2- In the matter of self-sufficiency and economic independence, with due regard to the past economic dependence of the country--which effects can still be clearly seen in the economic fabric of our country--as a general and unchangeable goal, the government finds itself obligated to reach self-sufficiency in the area of agriculture, particularly at a time when the new policies of the government regarding the insurance of agricultural products such cotton, growth in the purchase price of wheat and so forth... through the formation of new organs such as the Supreme Agricultural Council has attained certain eye-catching successes. Therefore, the government will exert every possible effort until we

reach the self-sufficiency stage and hope that with the help of the honorable deputies of the Majlis the issue of the irrigable lands is completely resolved, so as to complete the cycle of the adopted policies. Likewise, in the area of industrial economy, the government will give top priority to the defense industries of the country and thereafter it will take appropriate steps toward developing and completing heavy and mother industries.

3- As regards the control and stability of prices, with due consideration to the unfavorable social effects of inflation and its upward trend after the revolution, as from the very beginning of its activities the government made it as one its most important economic goals to control and stabilize the rate of inflation and so far it has achieved impressive successes. After precise recognition of the causes of inflation in Iran, through the application of suitable budgetary policies toward a gradual decrease in the budget deficit, tax increases and employment of correct monetary policies such as an increase in the volume of legal deposit of the banks and continuation of a just distribution plan for basic or essential goods, the government succeeded in controlling the rate of growth of cash supply in the private sector, so much so that the rate of growth of private sector's cash supply which had reached to over 20 percent in 1360 [21 March 1981 - 20 March 1982] dropped to 6 percent in 1363 [21 March 1984 - 20 March 1985]. Here, I see it appropriate to mention a few points regarding banking and monetary issues and the pertinent government policies.

The necessary ingredient for economic stability in any country is the dependence on stability of banking and monetary fluctuations. Experience has shown that in most countries, the absence of economic stability has stemmed from fluctuations in the parameters of banking and monetary dimensions and as long as governments fail to control the monetary situation, they are not able to bring about economic stability and use it as an infrastructure for introducing economic development and growth.

Experiences among Latin American and African countries regarding the inflation rate of three-digit figures and possibly up to 1,000 percent is adequate proof to substantiate the above point. In those countries, monetary and banking issues are so far out of the control of officials that they no longer have any hope for an economic recovery nor do they entertain the idea of economic growth and their only preoccupation is how to cope with the present monetary and banking chaos and confusion.

Fortunately, one of the most important achievements in our country has been the trend of monetary and banking fluctuations toward more stability. Existing statistics show that following an increase in oil prices, Iran's economy has been experiencing rapid growth in its money supply and an increase in circulation of printed money. So much so that the median growth in money supply from 1976 to 1978 exceeded 30 percent and that of growth of printed banknotes during the same period was about 64 percent. This trend indicates that had the Islamic revolution not taken place, there would not have been any fundamental changes in the economic and monetary policies, and who knows, maybe our country also would have

had to face the same monetary instability and multi-digit inflation rate like one of the Latin American countries. As a result of the satanic regime's policy which used to resort to imports in order to offset or negate inflationary pressures, our people would have had to bear the burden of multi-billion dollar debts.

Luckily, as a result of fundamental changes in the banking and monetary laws and relevant policies, the above trend has completely been turned around. So much so that the growth rate of money supply, which is one of the effective factors for creating inflation, in 1363 [21 March 1984 - 20 March 1985] was only 6 percent annually and during the first five months of the current year it was about 4.1 percent. A comparison of this figure with the median growth in money supply in the years 1976 to 1978, which stood at over 30 percent, shows the effectiveness and correctness of the adopted policies.

Likewise, the percentage increase of circulated banknotes which was about 64 percent in the years 1976-1978, in 1984 was 7 percent and during the first seven months of the current year this figure was substantially reduced to about 1.8 percent.

The volume of private sector deposits in the banking system which in 1978 as a result of people's lack of confidence in the satanic regime, faced a drop of 0.2 percent in comparison to the year before [1977], stood at 1.8 billion rials after the restoration of public confidence in the government and the warm reception of the new banking laws and increased deposits, the corresponding figure for the current year passed the 6.2 billion rials mark. The statistics and figures which were briefly mentioned above are indicative as variables moving in the right direction and more stability in the monetary and banking system of the country. Such achievements became a reality under circumstances in which the Islamic Republic of Iran has spent more than five years of its life in an imposed war which would have had destructive and devastating effects on the economic situation of any country. In spite of this fact, our country has maintained its economic strength and independence so much so that even the enemies of the revolution have admitted this point. The government's correct and timely policies have caused the inflation rate which stood at 23.5 percent in 1980, to drop to four percent during the first five months of 1985 [21 March - 22 August]. It should be noted here that Iran is one of the most successful countries in the world in controlling and keeping down the rate of inflation. Considering the government's success in controlling the inflation rate, the government intends to continue the adopted policies in this regard and will not allow that inflation once again as a social and economic phenomenon to create any problems.

4- Maintenance of the country's balance of foreign currency and retention of suitable foreign exchange reserves: Among the issues which have created some problems for our country's economy during the last four years, one can cite the issue of foreign currency. Of course, by dint of mere flexibility and resilience the government has not allowed any disruption in the economic activities,

however as a means of preventing more economic tensions, and in order to gradually increase the volume of foreign exchange to a favorable level, it has adopted this measure as another program and policy of the government. Although for obvious reasons, we cannot go into details about the volume of our foreign currency figure, yet as an example, despite all the Iraqi propaganda regarding restriction of our foreign exchange and the pressures thus exerted, during the current year not only have we been able to prevent any decrease in our foreign currency reserves but we have been able to add more than \$700 million to our foreign reserves and deposits, albeit we have had to bear many pressures.

5- Growth rate of gross domestic product, especially the realization of economic growth without oil sector: The growth of gross domestic product without considering its subsidiaries has not been a concern of the government, since although the sector of services alone accounts for more than 53 percent of the total share of gross domestic product, yet the government does not look at the growth of gross domestic product as a general objective. However, our general goal in this regard is an increase in the production share [industry and agriculture] and a decrease in the share of services in the matter of production throughout the country. In addition, the experience of the past four years has shown that from among the economic sectors of the country, the oil in a direct way, and industry which is dependent on oil, in an indirect manner, on a world level, is vulnerable; therefore, in this connection with regard to the growth rate of each sector the following process will be adopted:

5.1- Oil Sector: We plan to stabilize our oil export as needed with due regard to decreasing its role in the gross domestic product and also increasing our oil-dependent industries and its products so as to be able to absorb the added value thus produced by an increase in the production of this commodity within our country. As regards the provision of energy for domestic use an effort will be made to make use of gas as far as possible and decrease the domestic use of oil so as to be able to provide the possibility for exporting more oil within the framework of OPEC programs.

5.2- Industry and Mine Sector: In addition to giving top priority to defense industries, we intend to focus the principal strategy the government in the area of industrial projects so as to be able to put into operation as rapidly as possible, such mother and heavy industries as the Mobarakeh Steel Plant, the incomplete Sarcheshmeh copper industry and its subsidiaries. Furthermore, in the area of industry the government policy will focus on those industries which have a ready domestic supply of materials as far as mines are concerned in order to bring about a self-reliant industrial atmosphere.

5.3- Agricultural Sector: With due consideration to the relative successes of this sector and its relative independence from sources of energy, in the allocation of development budget and credits, this sector has been given priority. It is intended that through correct planning to make use of all the existing possibilities in the country, particularly by preventing waste and squandering of irrigation water so as to increase essential agricultural production through encouraging policies and decreasing the need for the import-related commodities.

5.4- Services Sector: The general policy of the government in this regard focuses on decreasing the overall share of this sector in the gross domestic product of the country and guiding or directing the available factors of this sector [labor and investment] towards the productive sectors of the country. Nevertheless, some parts of this sector such as transportation are of major concern and it is duly intended to reactivate the system of transportation in the area of import and also the export of non-oil goods. The focus of attention in this sector will be expansion and increase of non-oil products.

6- Application of Correct Budgetary Policies:

As during the past recent years, the government intends to follow a policy which focuses on a change and correct composition of its incomes and expenditures. As regards the change in the composition of budget revenues, the government intends to increase its tax revenues and decrease the share of oil incomes. It is hoped that with the swift approval of the tax bill, the Islamic Consultative Assembly will help the government in this regard. Moreover, as regards expenditures, with proper review of the administrative and organizational system of the country and prevention of further expansion of related departments, which are all reflected in the resolution of the special commission of the 5-year program, the government will avoid any increase in the current expenditures and make an effort to allocate a larger share to the matter of increasing the principal development activities. With due regard to the methods and policies which are under investigation, the government will make an effort to make the infrastructural and fundamental activities of the government independent of the fluctuations of foreign exchange as far as possible.

7- A Move Toward Just Distribution of Revenues:

The index of unbalanced distribution of income throughout the country in the years 1977, 1982, 1983 and 1984 indicated that the distribution of revenues in 1982 in comparison to that of 1977 had an upward trend in favor of the low-income groups, so much so that the difference of income between various strata dropped considerably. Unfortunately, in the years 1983 and 1984 in comparison to the year 1982 this trend remained unchanged. Therefore, in the future term, the government deems itself obligated to take further steps such as application of various policies, particularly in the area of personal income and relative coordination or unification of wages in the government and non-government sectors, control of the capital share in the value of production, application of financial policies through use of progressive tax measures, and other pertinent budgetary policies to decrease the difference in income levels among various strata. Of course, a victorious end to the imposed war would make it possible for the government to continue this policy ever more strongly.

8- Increasing Productive Employment and Preventing the Spread of False Employment Opportunities:

Another program of the government concerns the policy regarding creation of productive employment and prevention of some false employment opportunities which have come about in the large cities, particularly in Tehran. With regard to this issue, considering the young population of Iran and the fact that each year a large number of people join the active population and the lack of possibilities for the government to absorb this new work force as a result of over-employment in the government departments, which as been inherited from the previous regime, in addition to creating new job opportunities through an increase in development budget and the production investments of private sector the government will help to further increase employment possibilities. Moreover, it will take appropriate steps toward an increase in the activities of productive co-operatives through application of policies which will facilitate securing of bank credits.

9- Revision of Distribution System:

With due regard to the over-inflated work force and investment in the distribution of the country which is aimed at creating more profits and is at the same time the main cause of false transactions and usually create an opportunity for several middlemen to handle the sale of imported and productive goods until they reach their intended consumers, and taking into account the fact that the investors prefer this sector to any others the government deems itself dutybound, in addition to encouraging and supporting the private sector's productive investment which transfers the capital and additional work force to the production sector, to reorganize the distribution system in such a way so that the imported and domestically produced goods reach the consumer without the interference of the middlemen.

With regard to this issue, through the application of monetary policies such as correct allocation of bank credits and financial policies such as progressive-rate tax measures at suitable time, the government will implement its plans.

10- Implementation of our Foreign Economic Policy Based on the Slogan "Neither East nor West" : The government's foreign economic policy is oriented toward realizing this motto in its economy. It is for this reason that the government from the very beginning has stressed exchanges with Muslim and the Third World countries. A brief glance at the share of Western, Muslim and Third World countries in the overall value of the imported goods averaged for a three-year period prior to the revolution [1975-77], the year 1984, and the first six months of 1985 [21 March - 22 September] indicates the government's relative success in advancing this strategy. The share of our country's imports from the West during the three years before the revolution was 86 percent, but in 1984 this figure dropped to 72.7 percent and in the first six months of 1985 this figure was further reduced to 63 percent. In contrast the share of the Muslim and Third World countries, which averaged at 2.4 and 6.3 percent respectively for the three years prior to the revolution, reached 11.3 and 8.4 percent in 1984. The same figures for the first six months of the current year are 16.5 and 9.5 percent respectively. With regard to the government's relative success from its dependence on western goods, the continuation of the same policy will be duly followed in the future term as far as possible.

Domestic Policy:

The foundation of the domestic policies of the government will be based on the principal duties which entail the preservation of the achievements of the Islamic revolution, and prevention of those dangers which threaten this holy entity will be the duty of the servants of the Iranian nation. In order to achieve this grave task, in addition to the social, cultural and economic measures which ought to be undertaken, the government is dutybound and intends to put into effect the following:

1- Maintaining people's perpetual presence on the scene. The main reason for the presence of our nation in all the political scenes is the prevailing revolutionary spirit in our society. If we see that this spirit becomes ever more profound and after seven years from the victory of the revolution it has not faded away, the reason lies in the fact of heeding the revolutionary wishes of the people. If the Iranian nation considers the system of the Islamic Republic as its own and defends its accomplishments against the threats of all the arrogant powers of the world with all its might, it is all because their revolutionary wishes are being heeded. The people-serving government ought to continue this policy and ever more increase its efforts to maintain the people's presence on the scene, and furthermore it intends to accomplish the following:

A- Follow the guidelines of the great leader of the revolution, whose every word is but a reflection of the very wishes of the people.

B- Maintain the political atmosphere of the society. Each and every Iranian must support the slogan "the Unity of Religion and Politics" with utmost power and look at all the political issues of the country quite vigilantly and take part in making decisions, expressing their opinions, criticizing the government and so forth. We must not follow the previous regime's example, which prevented the people's participation in politics. The awareness of our nation is a guarantee for the stability of our system. If the security of the shah's regime was protected by the United States, the security and stability of the Islamic revolution is protected by the presence of millions of oppressed and vigilant people who are present on the political scenes. The factories of the previous regime were protected by SAVAK while the guards and protectors of our factories consist of committed Muslim workers and the Islamic societies which are participants in every aspect of life throughout the country. In the previous regime, the villagers and peasants were but a formless society who had to serve the shah and his American masters. However, our peasants of today fill up the war front and are independent and self-sufficient. The same story goes for our past and present market-place, universities, various departments and so forth.

C- The government is dutybound to prepare the ground for the people's participation in running the affairs of the country by using the genuine slogans of the nation as guidelines in making decisions, by their close relationship with the Friday imams and other esteemed clerics throughout the country who are the true speakers of the Muslim people of Iran, by holding undistorted elections for the

selection of president and Majlis deputies and honoring and respecting the selected representatives of the nation, by forming humanitarian councils according to the resolution of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and by utilizing the people's help and power toward advancing its affairs.

2- The people-serving government is dutybound and intends to make every effort towards preserving the national unity. A stalwart solidarity of all the tribal and ethnic groups who live in Iran is considered as one of the great assets of the Islamic revolution and it is the point of assault and aggression of the enemies of the Muslim nation of Iran. In order to safeguard this solitarity the government intends to:

A- Look at this solidarity, which is but a unity of word revolving around the word "monotheism" and which has through the ages been and ever continues to be the very guardian of the genuine Islam as the most important factor in creating the desired unity and do whatever it can to strengthen this posture. The relationship between the people-serving government and its functionaries with the clerics and the Friday imams throughout the land must be maintained in such a manner so as to project the clerics as the very manifestation of solidarity in each region. Likewise, the seminaries which are the true centers for rearing our soldiers ought to be buttressed and ever more continue the promulgation of the Islamic religious activities which along with its cultural dimensions constitute a political measure towards the preservation of an organic unity of the Muslim nation, so as to protect the independent and holy posture of the clerics and make this point clear that this people-serving government always seeks their help.

B- Make every effort to insure the elimination of discrimination between the Shiites and Sunnis, particularly following the effective guidelines of the grand Ayatollah Montazeri in this area. In fact Iranian society must be changed into an exemplary Islamic society in which all the ethnic groups, hand in hand strove to further the cause of the holy rites of Islam.

C- Work toward elimination of some of the prevailing discrimination which are the remnants of the previous era.

D- Obligate its functionaries not to interfere in local disputes, but instruct them to work toward resolving such disputes and as far as possible they ought to carry out the due course of law and in a just and impartial fashion.

3- As a further step, the government intends to to maintain the healthy political atmosphere of the country and for this purpose the following points will be considered:

A- Friday prayers are some of the most effective means of maintaining the political well-being of the country and raising the political awareness of the people constitute one of the pertinent measures of the government. In its new term of office the government will make an effort to establish an even closer tie with this institution.

B- The people-serving government, just as it has announced on various occasions, considers its acceptance of criticism as a means of protecting the healthy political atmosphere of the country. It does not take the opposition of individuals or political trends against itself as a sign of their lack of sincerity or honesty as long as this opposition does not originate from anti-Islamic Republic motives. In dealing with such opposition, the government takes the line of explaining the vague points and encourages and accepts justified criticisms as long as it deems they are beneficial and promotes the interests of the country.

C- The government will deal with the forces following the line of the imam quite modestly. In dealing with the Muslim groups committed to the revolution, the government will try to give credibility to the main mottos of the Islamic revolution and regulate its relations with each group according to its emphasis on ideological and fundamental slogans. Perhaps the government's vision and its domain of action should go beyond those motivated by political inclinations and it should encompass the whole cultural and political geography of our great nation. Priority must be given to a longstanding revolutionary and a combatant who goes to war against oppression, seeking justice and who takes his life in his hands for Islam because he is using his past experience as a tool to serve and fulfill his ideals and does not expect remuneration from the revolution.

4- In the area of domestic policies another task which ought to be attended to is the security of the land, in this regard the government plans to:

A- Take action in order to strengthen the country's information or intelligence gathering system.

B- As in the past, it will decisively deal with the warring minigroups. It is not advisable for the government to diminish its vigilance for the mere reason that some or most of such groups have been crushed or devastated. Government's analysis points to the fact that at the present time since the arrogant powers are discouraged and disappointed by the disability of these minigroups to overthrow the system of Islamic Republic, they will try to use such groups in order to exert certain pressure for blackmailing this holy system.

C- Although during the past four years the filthy hands of the functionaries of the superpowers in Kordestan and Western Azarbaijan have been cut and all their sinister and evil plots have been rendered futile and their remnants have scattered in the mountains and deserts, yet it is necessary, as before to continue the government policy to crush all the remaining parasites while at the same time keep the doors of repentance open for those who are willing to return to the fold of Islam. Similarly, in order to continue government services to the deprived people of these regions, the execution of development projects in Kordestan and Western Azarbaijan must be duly expanded.

Foreign Policy:

As regards the foreign policy, the government's programs will be based on the principle that for the mere reason of its global dimension, the Islamic revolution is an ideological and not a nationalistic policy, by that it is meant that in a nationalistic policy every step is taken with the direct interest of the nation in mind while in an ideological foreign policy of the Islamic Republic's government, although the first and foremost ideal is the protection of the well-being of the country and strengthening of the holy foundations of the system of the Islamic Republic within the country yet there are various other ideals which are equally as important. In adopting such a policy in its foreign relations, the Islamic Republic can neither tolerate oppression nor will it sit back and witness other nations to be a tool of oppression by others, no matter whether there are any short or long-term benefits derived from such actions. A revolutionary foreign policy with global dimension ought to encompass the interests of all the nations accordingly. Based on this principle, the people-serving government which has become an exemplary pioneer for protecting the rights of the world's oppressed people should act in a fitting manner so as not to create any doubt in the minds of the oppressed otherwise. The Islamic Republic cannot put off the issue of the export of revolution which is today's work, until tomorrow. Of course, on many occasions it has been stated that the physical export of the revolution has never been and will never be of concern to the Muslim revolutionaries. What is meant by the export of this revolution is that to relay this message to the people of the world that the remedy for the liberation of the oppressed people is to follow the path taken by the Muslim nation of Iran. In its foreign policy, the people-serving government will only give priority to the protection of the holy system of the Islamic Republic over the export of revolution as explained above.

The first slogan which has been used toward liberation by the Islamic Republic of the Iranian nation is an unmitigated belief in the motto "Neither East nor West." Therefore, the first step for exporting revolution is a true adherence to this belief. Without adherence to such a belief the very essence of the Islamic Republic's system will be changed. Furthermore, one of the most important programs of the government in the area of foreign policy is the substantiation of this fact to the people of the world--as far as practicality of this motto is concerned. During the past seven years we have taken long strides to prove this fact and God willing we will continue to do so in the future. Adherence to the slogan "Neither East nor West" does not mean to be evenly or equally blackmailed by both superpowers nor does it mean to sever realtions with both. What it means is that there should be a change in the essence of those relations. Of course, the people-serving government considers the severance of realtions with the United States as a God-given blessing and similarly it regards the state of irreconcilability with the archsatan a greater revolution than the first revolution, and it will do what it can so as to shatter the false image of this head of the world arrogance. Thus, the continuation of the second revolution is the second necessary step for the export of the revolution. Unless and until the oppressed people of the world witness that how a nation with an empty fist is continually challenging the criminal America and how it inflicts new defeats on the archsatan ever so constantly, they will never gain confidence and believe in their own power.

The third dictum of the government program for the export of revolution is to direct its activity toward unifying the people of the oppressed nations. If as a result of the gaps which have been created by the superpowers, the deprived nations of the world cannot join hands to create a genuine and practical unity, they should not neglect even the least possible opportunities which still exist to achieve this goal. This minimum possibility is unanimity and expression of fellow-feeling of all the deprived people towards one another. The same way as the eyes of the many oppressed nations are fixed at Iran, our eyes have always been and will always be searching and looking for them.

It is on this basis that we will defend all the liberation movements and all the progressive and independent nations in every and all forums throughout the world. It is for this reason that we will fight against all the manifestations of oppression, aggression, expansionism and racism anywhere in the world. In order to be able to challenge the aggressions of the arrogant powers, we ought to work toward eliminating a great misunderstanding from the world's public opinion. This is a grave misunderstanding and a false notion that oppression is but part and parcel of the history of a nation. The mere passage of five years of oppression against Iran, 40 years of oppression against Palestine, six years of oppression against Afghanistan and many other years of oppression which have been brought to bear on other nations throughout the globe can not account for all the abuse and mistreatments. Based on this principle, even if all the world supports the Ba'thist Zionist regime of Iraq, the government of the Islamic Republic is intent on using every and all its possibilities in order to resist and continue the war with that country.

The government of the Islamic Republic intends to continue its fight against the occupying regime of Jerusalem, even if all the countries of the world officially recognize this very root of colonialism. Likewise, we will maintain our stance against Afghanistan and we will continue to make appropriate decisions in all other international issues proper to removing or oviating the above-stated misunderstanding.

The realities of the revolution have placed heavy burdens on the shoulders of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic's government, thus it is incumbent on us to make the best use of every possible means available in the world's arena. Based on this principle the Islamic Republic is intent on:

1- Expanding its relations with other countries of the world and using this expansion of relations to fulfill the objectives of the revolution. It is not a wise statement to say that as a result of specific global dimensions of the revolution we have to only establish relations with nations alone. Furthermore, it is not a small mistake to think that the special requirements or needs of the revolution have given us a free hand to establish relations with whomever we choose. As regards establishing relations with other nations, the government of the Islamic Republic intends to consider the following points:

A- The government of the Islamic Republic has no qualms about establishing relations with other governments [except the United States, the usurping Israel

and those governments which are not officially recognized by the Islamic Republic], however it is always seeking equal and balanced relations and will never accept the relationship between the wolf and the lamb.

B- The government of the Islamic Republic will follow the policy of reciprocity in its relations with other nations and it will deal with other governments the same way as they're dealing with Iran.

C- The government of the Islamic Republic will seek to establish expansive relations with those countries who have no political avarice and as long as it does not suspect any political greed or voracity in their relations it will continue its association.

D- The relation of governments with their nation [whether their own or other nations] is an important factor for the Islamic Republic in considering a new association.

E- Lack of relations with other countries cannot be construed as the confirmation of the absolute stance of a given country and such postures cannot have any effect on the reaction of the Islamic Republic regarding the wrong political position of other nations. The main purpose of our relations with other governments focuses on the interests of the country and the realization of the goals of the revolution and not fostering a proclivity toward certain other nation.

F- Finally, most important of all the government of the Islamic Republic will not tolerate other's intervention in its domestic affairs. We must accustom ourselves and our younger generation to withstand any intervention in our domestic affairs by foreigners unconditionally.

2- The government of the Islamic Republic intends to have a more active and fruitful presence in the international forums, however this presence does not in the first place mean the acceptance of cruel relations which prevails in certain forums [such as UN Security Council], and further the government is dutybound to fight against such injustice and make every effort to free such international forums from the domination of the superpowers. Second, our presence in such forums is merely to explain the prevailing realities in Iran. There is no use if international forums try to effect the course of events in Iran, since in our foreign policy we have not made it our goal to be liked by those forums. The government of the Islamic Republic considers it treason to Islam and the revolution in giving credence or value to the unfair judgment of the superpowers and international organizations which pertains to the Islamic Iran. We believe that pertinent judgment should only come from ideological-related institutions and not from the gratification of the desires of the East or the West. The mere acceptance of a measure on the international level is not an adequate reason for its confirmation by the Islamic Republic and as far as human rights are concerned, our government will be obligated to adhere only to those charters which are in conformity with Islamic tenets. Otherwise, the

government of the Islamic Republic will consider the preference of some arbitrary man-made rules over those of the divine laws as an unforgivable sin.

3- The people-serving government considers the policy of good-neighborly relations as one of the important parts of our foreign policy of the country.

4- The expansion of relations with the Third World countries, both politically and economically, constitutes one of the important programs of the foreign policy of the government. Furthermore, buttressing of the competent societies of the Third World which are active independent of the domination of the superpowers and other international forums [such as UNESCO] which are seeking to rid themselves of the influence of the superpowers, will be given top priority by government in its foreign policy.

5- In order to have an independent foreign policy, it is necessary to enjoy the privilege of an independent and powerful military system. Of course, the Islamic Republic does not intend to practice a militaristic policy in the region, however since all the evil or demoniac forces of the world have sat in ambush against this holy sapling, we have no other choice except to outfit and equip ourselves. What is important here is the military independence of the country, which calls for a long and incessant effort. Fortunately, we have taken long strides in this area, but in order to continue its efforts, the government needs the cooperation and attention of the honorable Majlis.

6- The young diplomatic system of the country during the last four years has rendered multitudes of services of undeniable significance to the revolution. But the burden which has been laid on our foreign policy by the revolution is so ponderous that it seems our fledgling diplomatic body is too weak to haul. It is the intention of the government of the Islamic Republic to outfit this system and again we hope to receive proper cooperation and assistance from the revolutionary deputies of the honorable Majlis.

Cultural Policies:

Usually the Islamic revolution is known as a cultural movement dependent on religion which has been able to become victorious over the satanic culture as a result of the aspirations and the generous sacrifice of a nation despite the domination of the decadent cultures of the East and the West. This type of recognition of the Islamic revolution, which reflects the basis of the judgment of domestic and foreign sources regarding its trend, makes the task of the responsible cultural officials, other pertinent organs and non-governmental societies which are concerned with the cultural affairs of the country ever more sensitive and momentous. However, this is not the only reason that this task seems so ponderous on the shoulders of the people-serving government. The imam of the nation has on many occasions pointed to this very significant issue. In other words, the most important factor for mobilizing the nation and the government for an assault against the cultures of the East and the West is to outfit our nation with the profound and all-encompassing Islamic culture, as has been repeatedly mentioned by the leader of the revolution. At present, particularly

with the support of the imam of the nation and the president and the favorable vote of the honorable deputies of the Majlis it would be quite appropriate to continue on with this significant task. It is but proper for all our relevant cultural institutions to learn the complex and convoluted approach of the deceptive arrogant powers regarding the spread of their culture and accordingly devise the expedient answer to combat its dissemination. The government of the Islamic Republic has two principal roles and task:

1- The government will follow the guidelines of the imam in the area of culture and because of the significance it places on culture and education, as far as possible it will not allow hidden talents to remain dormant. It is the goal of the government to make such talents bloom. Wherever possible it will use every means to create a proper atmosphere for the flowering of the talents directed toward attaining and enhancing the cause of Islamic culture. Unfortunately, we often erroneously think that the fundamental principle of the slogan "Neither East nor West" only pertains to the structure of our foreign policy which ought to be put into execution solely by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone, whereas the people-serving government has always believed that this principle, like warm blood, ought to be flowing in the veins of every political, cultural, social and economic activity. It is for this reason that more elucidation and illumination of this principle constitutes a top priority of the official organs which are in charge of transfer of culture.

2- For the application of the cultural policy, the government of the Islamic Republic has always been faced with a lack of sufficient management and planning forces. The planners and managers who can fulfill the wishes of the Islamic Republic and who will be able to export our revolution beyond the limit of our borders should be such individuals who, in addition to their genuine piety, faith and commitment, ought to be familiar with the cultural crisis in the world and have come to know the needs to the pure human characters in the remotest corners of the world from the domination of the prevailing undesirable cultures. It is only through the training of such forces that a practical inferiority versus the western culture can be replaced by a cultural assault or onset against the West, an assault which in its very matrix inculcates a new order and reflection.

It is based on this belief that the people-serving government in its executive policy in the realm of culture will utilize the services of such organs as Education and Training, Culture and Higher Education and the Islamic Guidance.

I do not believe that whatever has taken place in the domain of education and training, higher education, universities and the general education system of the country during the years of my incumbency has only been the result of the three ministries mentioned above and the government of the Islamic Republic. Both in the wider sense of culture and the commitment and responsibility which is felt by non-governmental organs, particularly the theological centers, the Friday imams, the clerics, Islamic propaganda organization, the office of Islamic publicity and so forth, as regards our education and culture have made various cultural movements throughout our society feasible. Certainly, each and every one

of these organs has been effective in the growth and enhancement of Islamic culture. The reopening of universities, destruction of the corrupt armed centers, annihilation of moral and political deviationary sources in the schools and universities, efforts and activities towards exporting the revolution, and the reopening of our cultural offices abroad have all certainly played a valuable role in the overall picture which can be seen through relevant figures and statistics. The people-serving government believes that all these and many more similar measures have been made possible first by following the frequent guidelines of the imam and the active participation of the martyr-nurturing people and the students, and second through the sympathetic and understanding efforts of the Hezbollahi administrators who are active within the body of the organizations of various institutions, universities and departments of the country. However, during the past term there has been some inadequacies and impediments which prevented rapid progress of our activities. In any case, with regard to the participation of the prime minister and the ministers of Culture and Higher Education, Education and Training and the Islamic Guidance in the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, which is under the supervision of the eminent imam and is headed by his excellency the president, we hope that the present government will be able to take more effective measures in the area of education and culture in the future. The following is a brief picture of the programs and objectives of the government which will be carried out by the aforementioned ministries during the future term:

Culture and Higher Education:

- 1- Promulgating the Islamic culture in the universities through providing opportunities for the existing committed and specialized forces and giving them an adequate chance to follow their higher education.
- 2- Bringing closer together the faculty and management views and those of the Muslim and committed students of the universities as a key to creating a harmonious atmosphere in the universities by making use of Hezbollah forces in the administration and management positions of the universities.
- 3- Training of specialized forces in the field of medicine, industry, arts and human sciences.
- 4- Strengthening of the university crusade as a revolutionary posture which has arisen from the cultural theme of revolution.

Education and Training:

- 1- Putting emphasis on the generalization of education and training in all the strata of the population and avoiding the total control of pre-university educational system by the private sector.
- 2- Promulgating the Islamic culture through training of primary and high-school teachers and improvement of the quality of the textbooks.

3- Disseminating a revolutionary Islamic spirit in the students through competent teachers, quality textbooks and extracurricular activities for the students so that as the future hopes of the country they will be prepared to face the plots of the world arrogance.

4- Diffusing a jovial and mirthful morale in the students through exercise, healthy recreations and the presentation of various arts.

5- Training of specilized cadres such as primary and secondary teachers, training instructors, planners and managers for the realization of the goals of the revolutionary education and training.

Islamic Guidance:

1- Training of specialized and committed cadres for the purpose of carrying out the important role of exporting the Islamic revolution far beyond the borders of Iran, with top priority being given to the third world and oppressed nations. Expanding the cultural homes and offices abroad and developing of information banks regarding the cultural situation of various countries in the world.

2- Creating proper grounds in the area of art, painting, calligraphy, theater, cinema and other relevant arts through training of specialized and committed cadres. Preparing necessary possibilities to the extent permissible and creating the freedom of choice for the establishment of art societies in order to promote the Islamic culture. And in a like fashion, buttressing the existing art centers and schools.

3- With the approval of the new press law, the stability of this profession enters a new stage. According to the new law this profession will be guaranteed all the rights and freedom specified in the constitution. The law will also create the proper grounds for the liberation of the press from the self-imposed censorship and present various views which are religiously and lawfully permissible through guiding encounters and their spiritual nourishment and support of healthy press societies.

4- Bringing an order to the system of book printing and publication, preparing the relevant publishing regulations, encouraging and motivating the authors and translators through setting up seminars and competitions. Creating cultural centers and libraries, disseminating a proper morale for research and study through participation in the various cultural societies and preparing the grounds for the healthy growth of thought by introducing Islamic culture through various means and fighting against opportunists and demagogues in the realm of education.

5- Continuing the past years' planning procedures regarding the execution of the glorious Hajj ceremonies as the grandest international Islamic gathering.

6- Preparing and using more technical and specialized possibilities for the purpose of having a better news presence in the world.

7- Expanding our tourist facilities and attractions to familiarize the people of the world with the revolution and the Islamic country, particularly through the development and expansion of active museums.

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In conclusion, I deem it necessary to point out that during the new term of office of the people-serving government without the support and guidelines of the leader of the revolution, the ever-present-on-the-scene nation, the struggling clerics, the revolutionary deputies of the Majlis, various worthy political, executive and intellectual personalities of the country and all the individuals who are sympathetic towards the revolution the government will not be able to carry out the grave and momentous tasks which have been placed on its shoulders. I am fully confident that all the revolutionary and sympathetic forces of the country with due consideration to the existing realities will assess and evaluate the prevailing problems of the country and properly gauge the capabilities of the government. If there are those who ask us to perform miracles, we will say that it is the people present on the scene who can perform miracles. It is our selfless combatants and millions-strong Muslim groups who perform miracles. Our capital in this arena is our effort. We promise to do our best to protect the ideals of the revolution. And if we succeed in doing so we have managed to do what God wanted us to do and not any more. I hope that the Almighty God will grant success to all the servants of the people in carrying out their duties.

12719

CSO: 4640/116

IRAN

FADLALLAH GIVES VIEWS ON PRESENT LEBANESE CRISIS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 14 Nov 85 p 20

[Text] [Question] Do you consider military measures the most effective way to resolve the current crisis, or are there democratic tools available to provide security for urban people, and protect the country from increasing destruction and decimation?

[Answer] Perhaps the studies being conducted concerning the current reality in Lebanon, which are based on the complex weave of society and on the local, regional and international political situations, have given this country a specific role in the totality of the regional and international reality.

Moreover, the studies show that the military solution, due to the above political and security complexities, is not a real one, and that it cannot be used to build a new Lebanon. On the other hand it is noted that military violence has been used in such a way that it no longer has any feature that could play a part in the construction of a new reality. This violence is now considered customary and routine in Lebanon's internal affairs.

The armed struggle in Lebanon has actually become an obstacle to the creation of a background for the emergence of changed ideas through which a future reality could be shaped. Armed struggle, following its regressive course, has returned the Lebanese people to a backward, clannish environment, and because of the accumulated reservoir of clannish feelings in this environment, naturally any form of solution will end in defeat. For this reason I believe that the experience of armed confrontation in Lebanon has been one of failure, and in the future, no matter how great the military superiority of one side may be, this approach will continue to fail. Therefore, the movement towards political struggle is inevitable, because no matter how intense a political struggle becomes, there will be no smoke or dust produced to obscure reality. On the other hand, political struggle and conflict allows the emergence and creation of ideas and thinking

directed to change in various contemporary situations, because no matter how powerful a political confrontation is, in addition to its passionate slogans it also has an intellectual side.

Thus our view of the current situation in Lebanon has led us to the belief that political struggle and conflict, with the study of local and international political parameters, which itself grants freedom of action to the two sides in a conflict, is the way to achieve change and transformation.

[Question] In your view, is the call by Walid Junblat, leader of the Socialist Progressive Party, for eliminating the use of the Lebanese flag and the national anthem a step towards the creation of districts, or is it an effort to create a new Lebanon with new slogans?

We know from the new slogans on the scene that these things are desirable political maneuvers which have been made to put pressure on the regime and its party leaders, especially since the present regime's practice in recent years has been to use the Lebanese flag in the context of a specific clan, and the existence of other clans and religions have been seen as economic and military guarantees for the regime.

The current regime insists that it is through the ascendance of one specific clan that guarantees can be given of good behavior.

When there is talk of the cedar tree, they seem to consider it their own; when there is talk of the national anthem, they seem to consider it their own invention and property, and it is as if they are the ones who protect it.

This phenomenon was of course disruptive. It led to the emergence of a public maneuver (typically Lebanese) intended to destroy all of the bridges and to nullify all the sacred national symbols, and it succeeded in depriving the Lebanese of all their freedom and motivation. Furthermore, the flag itself is not a symbol which cannot be undermined. It is a manifestation that can be changed, just as the law and other existing foundations can be changed.

Changes take place in the world every day, but the Lebanese regime has held back from activities directed to change which would bring us out of the pit of backwardness, and save us from the shackles and chains which are our national symbols.

Therefore, Walid Junblat's call for the elimination of the national anthem and changing the flag is not necessarily considered a step in a plan for fragmentation; it is a means for

vigilant progress and advancement which will arouse the Lebanese nation to destroy idols. Furthermore, it conveys the idea that nothing is sacred other than the interest of the nation.

Any phenomenon can be changed. This change can begin with the flag, the national anthem, the president, and even the regime, because the regime and the Constitution actually came into being to serve the nation; the nation was not created to serve them.

[Question] The phantom of a second war between the camps is already visible on the horizon, and it is thus expected that Arab blood will be spilled in a battle that will benefit neither Arab nor Muslim. Has an Islamic-Lebanese plan or an Islamic-Arab plan been proposed to prevent this war?

[Answer] Our true problem in the war between the camps and in all the Arab wars is that it has become customary Arab policy to dig pits of blood throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, the Arabs also believe that it is impossible to create any kind of role or project for their consideration without resorting to military solutions which force the other side to back away from the confrontation. Therefore, apart from the existing propaganda games and chicanery pertaining to this war, we must first realize that this war of camps is definitely not a religious war, because the religious path, with its ideological and religious concepts, completely rejects every war of this type, and this is our actual and foremost view. Today the Palestinian scenario is the scene of political struggles, and the crux of these Palestinian struggles is the Palestinian. They have begun fighting among themselves over the manner of managing the Palestine problem. On the other hand, intra-Arab regional struggles and Soviet-American international struggles are two other parameters which can be seen as factors in the war between the camps.

Lebanon is one of the largest arenas available to the Palestinians in which they can fight freely. Furthermore, the Arab regimes benefit from the free management of the war outside their own lands, and further still, the two international poles of conflict (the Soviet Union and America) are involved in this explosive arena. It appears that the existing explosiveness in this arena does them no harm.

[Question] In view of the above reality, the question that arises is how did this fire start?

[Answer] To answer this question we must go back in history to the first confrontation between the Lebanese and the Palestinians. This history is full of sensitivities, problems, and disturbing situations, and therefore any war could easily be fed and grow out of the legacy and slogans which have arisen from the fear of the Palestinian presence.

This situation has persuaded some organizations to plant the seeds of doubt and fear in the Lebanese and Palestinians.

On the one hand, events have played a part as factors in magnifying this fear. Thus, as the big players gained dominance on the playing field by keeping the small players under the control, the war between the camps burned more brightly. Thus what has happened is the natural result of the real and existing situation which was etched into the scene previously.

Therefore, our foremost consideration is, what means do we have available to prevent this war?

The humble means we have is our own efforts to make the people neutral and to purge the social situation of the malice and hatred which has overtaken the two parties to the conflict.

The key to this is the remorse of some individuals. Some say that that this situation was a mistake, others believe that the war between the camps was a plot. This awareness played a part in forestalling the Sidon plot, because everyone felt that they could not move ahead away from these shifting sands. For this reason we applied much pressure to prevent the shedding of sacred blood. As long as the war of devils is raging on all sides, we cannot stop the influence of the international and regional powers in the country's various arenas. Furthermore, as long as the devils reign over the scene, this situation will evolve within the framework of their presence.

This does not mean that we should submit, because this is not our fate. We must make struggle and make war to prevent this war, and we are in the service of God.

[Question] Sheikh 'Abd ol-Amir Qolban said in a speech that the Shi'ites have come out of the bottle, and that no one can put them back. Do you think such a thing has actually occurred with the Shi'ites, and in addition, what have the Shi'ites achieved in view of the disproportionate volume of casualties?

[Answer] I do not like to talk about "Shi'ites" as such. Just as I speak of oppressed Sunnis and Christians, I prefer to speak of their social deprivation. There have been social deprivations in Lebanese society and the Shi'ites have seen much of it. They have therefore made efforts to escape this deprived social situation. However, the method they have used so far must not be followed, because in my view the methods and procedures the Shi'ites have used do not produce positive results.

These days, warlike plans, in the political circumstances under which many groups operate, cannot produce important results for them. They will increase the size of their forces by stages, but of course these forces will have no will. Shi'ite power will be achieved through their motivation and activity in the vast framework of Islam in which they live with other Muslims. Moreover, the power of the Sunnis also resides in the same Islamic framework; they share unified integrative thought. This integration will form the core of their forces. Wars between Sunnis and Shi'ites are actually cheap wars of attrition, and if they continue Muslims will never have a strong front. The power and authority of Muslims lies in their unified response to their common enemy Israel. With such unity they will realize that their power will actually cause other Muslims to follow them.

[Question] How do you see the future of political Islam in Lebanon?

[Answer] When we speak of political Islam, we are implying two concepts:

First, there is the traditional use of the name which implies a Muslim uprising against other ethnic groups and clans. This is the way the term has been used in Beirut in the form of continuous slogans from the old-line politicians.

That concept has no concept and no future, because it is not derived from the perspective of political thinking which accommodates the conditions of the day; it represents personal aspirations and a clannish orientation that tries to expand its position in order to carry out extensive plans.

The second use of the term "Islamic" has a suitable and correct foundation, and motivates and activates Islam beyond clannishness and various selfish orientations. The Islam of ideas, the Islam of religious law, and the Islam of methods and procedures, which represents a specific method in the areas of political activity and holy war, is today engaging in regional and international confrontations. In this regard, perhaps it needs to intervene in battles with the aim of providing its fruitful experience, where it must play a part in exchanging rigid and withered concepts for motivating concepts. Thus, this concept does not portray Islamic planning as clannish planning, but rather as revolutionary, intellectual, and transformational planning, which can be presented for study, discussion, and deliberation along with other intellectual plans. It must be added here that despite the fact that Islam has been able to defeat and destroy many political plans, at this stage its movement is caught up in difficulties. While we place value on political activity in the region to stand steadfastly against America's plans, we believe that it was this Islam that defeated NATO's plans in Lebanon.

Furthermore, the bombing of the multi-national base, the defeat of America's plans in Lebanon, and the nullification of the 17 May Agreement were done on the Islamic pattern.

We believe that the Islamic perspective in idolatrous Lebanon has cried out in revolt against the 17 May Agreement, and it has given martyrs for this cause. Furthermore, these same Islamic processes, such as the bombing of two Israeli spy centers and many other heroic operations by Muslim combatants, thwarted Israel's plans.

This Islam which I am describing is now besieged from all sides, and we believe that this Islam has the parameters and the elements to make of it a free, just, and well-supported force. In this regard, the Muslims who are working with an Islamic position are not simply seeking to regain lost Muslim rights; they are demanding the rights of the oppressed everywhere in the world. Furthermore, they have constantly called for the formation of a world front to support the world's liberation movements. This position has arisen from their belief that freedom is the right of all people.

[Question] In a country containing various clans and suffering from numerous religious wars, do you dream of establishing the kind of Islamic government that can resolve all of these conflicts under the banner of Islam and unity?

[Answer] I have always said that current political conditions in Lebanon, at least at this stage, do not permit the presentation of such a plan, because the appropriate conditions do not exist. But we add that this plan is not an impossibility. Why do the Marxists propound the idea of establishing a Marxist government in Lebanon, even though Marxism in Lebanon is in conflict with the ideas of Islam and Christianity, and even though it would destroy the reality of the traditional foundation accepted by all? Furthermore, despite this, why don't the Muslims have the right to establish the Islamic government they want, which would benefit Muslims and non-Muslims alike?

With regard to the Christians of Lebanon, it must be said that the Christians, with their Christian religion, have no thought of establishing a government. In their Christian ranks, they have only faith; they believe in rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's. However, any Caesar, with any ideas, can establish the government he desires without it containing the slightest Christian influence. Therefore, the idea of promoting an Islamic government in Lebanon is not in conflict with Christianity religiously or ideologically. It does not conflict with the aspirations of Christians or with their religious principles; it conflicts with their alignments and personal and political affiliations. We therefore support

Islamic thoughts and plans in Lebanon and throughout the world, in order to make our ideas and thinking dominant over the lives of the people, but for the purpose of achieving the desires mentioned above. We will never resort to terrorist measures, sedition, or anarchy. We will use civilized intellectual and political means, in order to prove to the world that just as Islam ruled the world in the past, it is capable of doing so now.

[Question] Today the name of Islam has been associated with terrorism and hostage-taking. Of course threats to governments and individuals are behind this concept. What is Islam's position on this terrorist perception, and how can it be changed?

[Answer] In order to meet the propaganda which has been launched against Islam, we must study the political terminology and idioms used by the media in promoting this war.

In reality it must be said that "terrorism" is a term invented by America, Europe, and many of the world's imperialist countries in order to suppress Islamic awareness.

Moreover, what is terrorism? Is terrorism a routine activity, is it an individual act, is it material, or is it carried out to reach material objectives? When a conflict breaks out between oppressed nations and imperialism, or between two hostile governments, the parties to the conflict seek ways to complete the elements of their power and to neutralize the weapons used by the other side. For example, the oppressed nations do not have the technology and destructive weapons America and Europe have. They must thus fight with special means of their own. Why do they call what the Muslims do to protect themselves terrorism, while Israel's bombing of Beirut and southern Lebanon is not called terrorism? Why isn't America's theft of Cuban aircraft considered terrorism? Why isn't French hijacking of Algerian aircraft considered terrorism?

Whatever terrorist acts they carry out they consider well and good, because these are the means they employ to carry out their own political plans, thereby protecting and supporting their own special institutions. However, we oppressed nations, who are being trampled by the infernal military machine of imperialism and are besieged on all sides economically, politically, and culturally by them, recognize the right of nations to use every unconventional method to fight these aggressor nations, and do not regard what oppressed Muslims of the world do with primitive and unconventional means to confront aggressor powers as terrorism. We view this as religiously lawful warfare against the world's imperialist and domineering powers to reach their goals. Of course this does absolve us from criticism for making hostages of individuals because their governments are in conflict with our governments. We are critical of air piracy, we are

fully aware of what we are saying, and we believe that the world's transportation facilities must be respected, because the hijacking of an aircraft, for whatever reason, entails a reaction from the other side. If we hijack an aircraft, they will do the same thing. The world's transportation system will thus be destroyed, and we are opposed to this. Moreover, what is the crime of the people who are passengers on these aircraft? Are they to be called criminals because they are citizens of countries who have interfered with us in certain cases? Concerning this, I must say that Islamic activities are not behind this; in reality, this reflects methods prompted by special political circumstances, and Islam has nothing to do with it.

[Question] Some believe that America's role in the region has been defeated. In your view, what are the alternatives to America's role in the area?

[Answer] In reality it must be said that our problem with the big countries is that they are always telling the world's small governments and oppressed nations that if they distance themselves from the big countries, they will be less than whole. The countries of the third world have thus grown and developed thinking of themselves as backward and in need of help and supervision from others. Perhaps the reason for this is that in the early stages of the imperialism that was carried out under the supervision of the United Nations, in order to prepare and civilize the smaller nations, the big countries made colonies of these lands using the people themselves, in order to manage their affairs.

Thus the big countries, in the process of colonizing nations, always considered themselves obligated to bring the colonized nations out of backwardness into civilization.

This produced a complex deep in the minds of the world's oppressed people, in Europe, in America, and indeed the entire civilized world, causing people to believe that the solution to all of their political problems requires an international umbrella or international solutions. We say that our plans are alternatives to America's plans in the region. It is our responsibility to assess capabilities, to resolve our difficulties, and to make our future. Perhaps we will not be able to attain all of the desires mentioned above, and we will need cooperation from the big countries, but there is a difference between trampled governments and big governments and cooperation between the big governments and governments wishing to grow and develop in order to succeed the big countries.

We need to maneuver in every area, and moreover we must be alertly active and make use of our potential capabilities. We must realize that America's plans are not our destiny. We must discover a destiny for ourselves which we will build with our own will.

Our perception of destiny is that it comes from the will of a nation that cannot be divided, and is the result of the nation's free choices.

[Question] Since the keys and the cards for solving the Lebanese crisis are in the hands of the Syrians, why aren't the Syrians using them? Moreover, should Lebanon pay the cost of its liberation from this crisis in the same way, in order to obtain the cards it wants for liberation?

[Answer] In Lebanon we have become accustomed to presenting complex matters in very simple ways. If we want to study the cards in the hands of one of the two parties to a conflict, we must realize that this game depends on the assumption that if these cards are played they can produce results. The problem with the cards, however, is that they are not played at only one table. There are numerous tables in the game. Moreover, perhaps the rules for winning at one table differ from those at another, and perhaps the rules for winning at different tables conflict with each other. Thus the one holding all the cards has no guarantee of a direct win at every table.

In addition, it must be added that the one with the fewest cards can be effective, because he can at least delay the game.

In this regard we must study the political game. Of course this game differs from the one played at a gaming table.

[Question] Why is the role of the Muslim woman in Lebanese events still in the shadows, and are there important deeds by Muslim women which can be cited as achievements of Muslim women?

[Answer] If we want to study the history of women, we must realize that our history is considered a history of men.

In the past, women lived in seclusion, away from the events of society. When Islam spoke of political and social activities ("the believers, men and women, some are saints, and others enjoin good and prohibit evil"), when Islam spoke of positive things ("the male and female believers, the man who is patient, the woman who is patient"), and when it spoke of negative things ("the adulterer and the adulteress, the man thief and the woman thief" [all quoting the Koran]), men and women alike were always included. Likewise, it spoke of weak and strong women, using the wives of the Pharaoh and Noah as examples. Our problem, however,

is the role Muslims are to give women at this stage in Lebanon. The Muslim woman fights in the front ranks with the Muslim combatants and participates actively even now in political demonstrations and marches. There are groups of women who carry out political activities, and who present the political situation in a positive way. Until now, however, the media has said nothing of them. I think it is better to allow the political activities of women to grow and develop naturally, because the time is coming when the role of the Muslim woman, who has given indispensable help to Islamic affairs, will become evident.

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CSO: 4640/131

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